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(.,' PREFACE 
Although there exists a growing mass of informa-
tion on the subjects of strategic and critical materials and 
st ockpiling ,changes in related policies and programs are 
occurring so rapidly that normal research techniques could 
not possibly yield an accurate portrayal of the contemporary 
situation.Accordingly,I found that responsible officials in 
the governmental agencies participating in stockpiling oper-
ations were the only possible source of truly current data 
a nd trends . 
Despite heavy work schedules and the obvious press 
of duties all government personnel whom I visited gave freely 
of their time to explain their policies and programs . In 
particular I wish to thank the following officials for gen-
erous aid in the resolution of certain difficult research 
problems: Dr. J . D. Morgan , NSRB; Colonel R. D. Dick and Lt. 
Colonel P . M. Spahr , Industrial Planning Division,U. S • .::\. ir 
For ce;Lt . Colonels F. H. Holmes and Matulski, Materials Div-
ision, Munitions Board;and Mr . Carl Rolle , Secretary for the 
Interdepartmental Stockpile Committee , Munitions Board. 
The data for this study were collected during the 
period September 1949 to April 1950. I trust that readers 
using this report as a source document for a dditional re-
search will recognize that significant changes oc·cur so 
frequently that no formal r e port on a transitory subject of 
this type can long remain completely accurate. 
L. G. S . 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The people of the United States, through the i r on-
gress, reaffirmed the policy of the acquisit~on of a stock 
pile of strategic and critical materials with the passage of 
Publi c Law 520, 79th Congress , on July 23, 1946. Neverthe-
less, it is probable that the majori t y of the people know 
little of this law, the thinking back of it, the efforts of 
the govermnent agencies toward its i mplementation, nor of the 
far reaching economic implications i nherent in this program. 
Current writings on this subject are buried in mining and engi-
neering journals and on the financial inner pages of the news-
papers. Even in periodical indexes, it is rare to find perti-
nent references under either trsto ck piling tr or tt strategic 
materials " . The laws and the goverr..ment reports on them are 
not easily obtained unless exact titles are known and they are 
much les s eas ily interpreted without some trained guidance . 
AccOI'di ngly, the people can ha1•dly be blamed for ignorance and 
d i sinterest in an area thus concealed by inadequate interpre-
tation and garbled by technical and legal jargon. 
Further complicating the understanding of this 
policy is the f act that the ma jority of the materials which 
are strategic and critical are not those with which we come 
into direct daily contact. The names attached are technical 
and, unless there is specific knowledge of the uses, most 
people know little of them and are even less interested. 
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Seldom do we translate sisal as meaning rope, jute as sacks, 
nor quebracho as tanning material indispensable in the prep-
aration of leather. Of the few that are in direct daily use, 
we are prone to accept them as continuously and constantly 
available items, pepper for instance. Because of this, the 
subject of stock piling catches the imagination of only a 
few outside the technical fields and is perhaps the reason 
why the more common publications have no articles on the sub-
ject of stock piling. 
Yet, even by very loose definition, strategic mate-
rials are those which we must have for both individual and 
industrial use and which we cannot produce in sufficien t 
quantity to meet our peacetime needs, to say nothing of our 
wartime requirements. This means that these materials are 
the core of our standard of living and if we are to preserve 
that, we must somehow assure ourselves that they are in suf-
ficient supply at all times. 
I t is important to recognize that the objective of 
stock piling is not primarily for the peacetime or wartime 
military machine , but is designed to insure the preservation 
of the total national economy. Since, in an emergency, the 
military will have the highest priorities for all materials, 
shortages will fall largely on civilian. consumers. Accord-
ingly, this program is of as much importance to t he c ivilian 
consumer and industrialist as the military planner and gov-
ernmental economist . Any policy which is established by the 
Congress in this matter then directly affects each of us and 
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pr obably in a broade r and more significant manner t han is 
commonly understood. It is toward this end of clarifi~ation 
of this enormously complex stock piling program that thi s 
r eport is directed. 
I 
The purpose of this study is : 
(1) to examine the historical developmen t and 
trends in the concept of national stock piling of strategic 
rna t erials; 
(2) to analyze current policies, governmental 
organization, and the implementation of programs relating 
to the acquisition and storage of strategic and critical 
materials; 
(3) to appraise significant and contemporary eco-
nomic aspects of these policies and programs . 
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CHAPTER I I 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. VJhat is Stock Piling? 
Like so many other administrative phrases today, the 
term "s tock pilingu sounds like glib terminology for something 
vague and mysterious that has been put over on the public by 
" spec:tal interests". Actually, it is just a current name for 
a habit people have had for centuries. It is the accumulation 
of goods when they are plentiful and in excess of current needs 
saved for ureat some other time when they are not expected to 
be available in sufficient quantities. Canning, storage in 
the deep freeze, savings in the bank are all forms of individ-
ual stock piling. Commercial inventories are another form of 
stock piling; the holding of sufficient stock on hand to assure 
a continuous flow to production or to customers. I t could be 
called one of the expressions of the instinct of self-preserva-
tion. The purpose of it is to insure against future mishap or 
periods of non-availability of those items which are needed for 
personal or business well-being. 
On a national scale, this logic is applied to those 
conditions which are beyond the scope of the individual or 
single industry because of the size of the investment required. 
This concept has led us into provisions for unemployment relief, 
old age pensions, industrial subsidies, and finally to the 
stock piling of strategic and Cl"'itical materials. Under• the 
Stock Piling Act, we are now setting aside a portion of the 
present supply of those items essential to national and personal 
well-being, the supply of which, in times of emergency, is both 
uncer t ain and insufficient for our needs. 
Both World 1Nars I and II proved to us that many i terns 
fell within this category, particularly those which came from 
foreign sources. (Table I) Vfuile we had to live within rations 
of many of these, we were very fortunate during these wars that 
some of our supply lines were kept open. The threat of present 
day airplanes and submarines now l .eaves us no assurance that 
any supply lines can be kept open in a future war. (Chart I) 
If we then are to insure that industry can continue to supply 
the manufactured goods needed by both the civilian economy and 
our military force.s in time of war we must have an "emergency 
shelf" on which to draw. 
2. Vfuat Are the Limiting Factors in Stock Piling? 
At each level of stock piling, whether individual, 
business enterprise or Governmental, the size of the stock pile 
is limited by much the same factors . The first limit is the 
availability of the item to be stock piled. If there is only 
sufficient supply available to fill the minimum day-to-day 
needs, any hoarding will cause destruction of well-being faster 
and more surely than the anticipated emergency which may or may 
not come. Food on the shelf is of little value if you are too 
weak to get it down. Materials in inventory are of little 
value if, by curtailment of operations, personnel have been 
released and equipment has become obsolete. Likewise, on the 
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national level, a stock pile of materials is not much of a 
safety factor if, in the meantime and due to lack of materia ls, 
industry has substantially curtailed i ts operations. 
The second limitation is that of storabili t y. How 
long can it be s t ored and retain its usefulness? Must it have 
very special treatment when it is in storage? Is the storage 
space available or must it be cons truc'ted? These questions 
must be answered for each material considered and form the basis 
for the elimination of certain items from the stock pile and 
the quantitative limitation of others. Petroleum, for example , 
is needed in large quantities during an emergency. To have it 
on hand, already refined, would be a grea t saving bo th in time 
and refinery capacity. Yet, because it is bulky and requires 
utank farm" type storage, more than a few months wartime needs 
would be impractical to store in the refined state . For those 
reserves located within the United States the natural, or "in 
the ground", storage is most practical when the survey work and 
some initial field development have been accomplished. 
Other materials present the problems of deterioration 
and the resultant limited storage life . Natural rubber, for 
example, was estimated by one of the National Defense depart-
ments to have a practicable storable life of only five years. 
Tnis means that stocks of such materials would have to be 
rotated, preferably at a rate no higher than the annual national 
peacetime consumption. If, · then, the annual peacetime consump-
tion of a material is one million pounds and the storable life 
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is estimated to be five years, the maximum stock pile objective 
would be five million pounds. One million pounds would be 
rotated each year. 
The third limit is determined by the amount of money 
which can be spared from current needs. This factor is very 
much like the first one in its considerations of today 's need 
over those of some tomorrow. Here the value of the stock pile 
insurance is weighed against the other uses to which the money 
can be put, and the effectiveness of the amount of money which 
is to be spent; that is, the amount of i nsurance which can be 
obtained versus the costs of procuring and storing the stock 
pile. 
3. vVhat Makes ~ Commodity Stra tegic? 
"Strategic" pertains to a vital blow dealt by the 
enemy which reduces our power to carry on the war. One of 
the simplest methods .of doing this is to cut the supply lines. 
The farther back in the manufac~1ring process the supply is 
intercepted, t he longer it takes to rebuild. The materials to 
be intercepted are selected with two views in mind: one to 
make it impossible for the manufacture of munitions by reducing 
the materials needed for them and the other by reducing those 
things which go to make up our day- to-day living to the point 
that the sacrifices become intolerable and the will to fight 
is lost. Both methods have been used effectively in the past. 
They continue to be effective for the futur e. On this basis, 
anything that we have to import that is essential to the 
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manufacture of our weapons of war or ·is a v i tal part of our 
daily needs becomes strategic in that it can be ea sily 
intercepted by the enemy. 
There is a tendency when thinking of these commodities 
to consider them as useful only in time of war . Nothing cou ld 
b e farther from the truth since very few are used only for 
munitions manufacture. Those which are components of steel are 
as necessary for automobiles, tractors, machine tools, and 
refrigerators as for tanks . Rubber in its numerous uses is 
indeed a household item. Sacking, rope , quinine, and industrial 
diamonds all are essential in our day-to- day con~erce . During 
peacetime the trade routes are generally open and sufficient 
supplies of these commodities reach us to permit the production 
of all the things necessary to the economy. During war , how-
ever, not only are the trade routes intercepted but the very 
sources themselves may b e destroyed or confiscated by the 
enemy, thus reducing the supply of the materials available to 
us. Our demands, on the other hand, increase very greatly to 
meet the greatly enlarged munitions expenditures and to fill 
the pipelines of the war machine. 
Thus it can be seen that a wide variety of comraodi-
ties fall within the scope of strategic importance. Some of 
them can be forgone, though the effect on morale is. not good, 
especially if the shortage is extended over a long period of 
time. Others have substitutes which, while not as effective, 
still can be used. For example, the substitution of cotton 
for wool is possible, but the quantity of cotton which has to 
be used is much larger and therefor requires much more machin-
ery for its production. On the other hand, the majority of 
these commodi ties have no substitutes. Certain materials 
impart specific characteristics to steel which it must have to 
be of use and certain types of crystals are essential for 
radio transmitters. There are many examples for each of these 
classes. 
In the literature one finds the words "s trategic" , 
"critical", and "essential" in reference to materials used 
sometimes as synonyms and other times as separate degrees of 
indispensability, generally in the order given. The defini-
tions in the latter case are: 
STRATEGIC MATERIALS - Those materials which are 
essential to the national defense, for the supply of which in 
war dependence must be placed in whole, or in substantial part, 
on sources outside the continental limits of the United States; 
and for which strict conservation and distribution control 
measures will be necessary. (1) 
CRITICAL MATERIALS - Those materials which are essen-
tial to national defense, the procurement problems of which in 
war would be less difficult than those of strategic materials 
either because they have a lesser degree of essentiality or are 
(1) Army Servi.ce Forces Manual MlO, "s trategic and Critical Raw 
Materials", Headquarters Army Service Forces, War Department 
(United States Government Printing Office, 15 January 1944) 
Page 10 
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obtained in more adequate quantities from domestic sources; 
and for which some degree of conservation and control will be 
necessary. {1) 
ESSENTIAL MATERIALS - Those materials not now strate-
gic or critical but which are necessary to national defense , 
adequate supply of which in time of war may depend on sources 
outside the continental limits of the United States; and for 
which some degree of conservation and control will be 
necessary. 
(1) Army Service Forces Manual MlO, "S trategic and Critical 
Raw Materials 11 , Headquarters Army Service Forces, War Depart-
ment (United States Government Printing Office, 15 January 
1944) Page 10. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POLICY OF STOCK PILING FOR WAR 
1. Causes of Shortages 
Although for years we have thought of the United 
States as self-sufficient in practically al l materials neces-
sary to our industries, upon closer study it becomes apparent 
that the Uni ted States does not produce enough of over sixty-
five basic materials to meet peacetime industrial needs. 
Inasmuch as we have no production at all of the majority of 
these materials , the seriousness of shortages in time of war 
is clearly evident. For the purpose of appraising this prob-
lem in detail the shortages may be considered to be in the 
areas of minerals , agricultural commodities and finally time. 
Shortages of certain minerals have not been caused 
by wastefulness nor lack of technical "know-how". Geologi-
cally speaking, the elements necessary to produce deposits of 
these materials were absent in this country many eons ago. 
For some of these materials we have smal~ low grade ore 
deposits which can be extracted a t only very high costs. 
There are definite linli ts to all deposits which are known 
from past surveys and knowledge of the mineral occurance. 
Some additional deposits may be discovered through prospecting. 
Several es timates of the extent of our reserves of 
these minerals have been made in the past in te rms of years of 
supply remaining. These estimates vary widely, some showing 
great pessimism and others great optomism as to the length of 
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time remaining before we become a completely "have-not_na-
tion1'. The validity of each of these estimates is limited by 
the assumptions used as to rates of discovery and consumption, 
improvements in the technology of extraction and refining, 
and the usability of low grade ore. Chart II shows one esti-
niate of the number of years normal requirements (peacetime) 
which can be supplied from United States sources for selected 
materials. This chart was prepared by the Bureau of Mines, 
Department of Interior and the data includes the utilization 
of all possible low grade ores. 
In hearings before the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Mr~ James Boyd, Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Mines, stated that: 
1
' Although the United States has only 7% 
of the world's population, it uses 5o% 
of its minerals and 7o% of its oil; 
moreover it does 4Q% of the world's 
work through utilization of energy ob-
tained largely from mineral fuels ••• 
We consume, per capita, 13 times more 
petroleum, almost 5 times more copper, 
and three times more coal, lead, zinc 
and steel than the rest of the world." (1) 
This means that we are depleting our smaller reserves very 
rapidly. Chart III shows our transition from an exporting 
nation to an importing one for four minerals thought until 
recently to be in good supply. 
(1) 11Mineral Resources Developmentn, Hearings Before the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. s. Senate, 
8lst Congress, on S2105 Page 27. 
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Historically, in our attempts to produce at the 
lowest costs and relying on the bounty of our resources, we 
have taken only the high grade ore from many of our deposits, 
leaving in the ground amounts which vary from ten to fifty per 
cent of the total deposit. Accordingly, these remaining depos-
its become most expensive to extract. Chart IV shows a com-
parison for certain selected materials between what is mined 
and what is left in the ground. This tendency, if allowed to 
continue, will reduce the reserves of even the most plentiful 
minerals to inadequate ones in the forseeable future. This 
will increase our dependency on foreign sources for many 
minerals much as iron and copper whi ch a r e now being dra ¥n from 
Canadian and South American mines for our domestic use. 
The agricultural aspects of shortages follow a simi-
lar pattern to that of minerals, for in ,certain agricultural 
products we are again limited by natural conditions. The 
necessary combinations of soil, temperature and rainfall are 
absent. The majority of these products are tropical habitants, 
such as rubber, jute; sisal, quebracho, mahogany and coconut 
oil. Little can be done ·about the production of these commodi-
ties in the United States on a commercial basis. True these 
same conditions could probably be reproduced in hot houses but 
the investment needed would. be of such vastness to meet the 
needs of the United States that it could not feasibly be under-
taken. Table II shows the domestic production of principal 
strategic and critical materials in 1948 expressed as a 
18 
percentage of 1947 consumption. From this the range of vulner-
ability can be - seen $ 
The above limits of nature on certain minerals and 
agricultural commodities as described. above are present at 
all times. However, there is one additional factor which is 
also beyond control. That is the factor of time. It has 
been estimated that after the discovery of a mineral deposit 
it takes about three years to bring the deposit into full 
production. During this time, tunnels, shafts, initial con-
centrating equipment must be installed, trained labor acquired 
and the transportation equipment necessary to move the ore to 
the closest railroad must be obtained. To expand production 
to meet wartime requirements additional refining capacity 
must be built and manufacturing capacity enlarged. Depend-
i ng on the industry, this expansion will take from one to 
three years. Further, construction at each of these points 
takes additional steel, concrete, labor, etc., which again 
increases the requirements for raw materials. A case in 
point is the production of guayule which is knovm to require 
a minimum of one and one half years to obtain raw ·rubber in 
any quan t ity. 
If it is assumed that the United States will be 
attaclced without warning in a future war, it can be readily 
seen that we will not have the three years necessary to build 
up our productive resource s. Each additional structure or 
piece of machinery which has to be built at that time further 
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dilutes our stocks of manpower and materials to say nothing 
of the additional load of transportation facilities. The 
degree of dilution will dictate the rapidity of arming our 
expanding military fighting forces. Chart V shows the build-
up of military requirements after the beginning of the war. 
Military requirements, as will be shown later in a 
more detailed description of their computation, are the 
total military needs for all materiel, less that amount which 
is in inventory or on order. Thus the requirements shown in 
Chart ':V represent amounts which have yet to be produced. 
It will be noted that they are time phased and that after 
the force requirements and the pipelines have been filled 
there is stabilization at a somewhat lower level. This means 
the retirement of some of the productive capacity which was 
necessary in the earlier phases. The materials and labor 
that went into building the excess expansion is lost. This 
phenomenon was very apparent in World War II after about 
the third year. OUr mercury and tungsten mining activities 
were contracted as were certain manufacturing plants. Some 
of the latter were released for the production of civilian 
type items and others went idle. This seemly expensive waste 
was necessary in order to mee t the expansion to the full 
scale of the fighting war. And at that our industries had 
been expanding into war production since 1939 when foreign 
orders became effective • 
. 2. Possible Solutions. 
One answer to these problems of shortages both of 
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materials and time for their acquisition is to have a stand-
ing military force of t he maximum size needed to fully prose-
cute the next war . Such a concept would also require suffi-
cient materiel both in use and in inventory to sustain war 
operations until industry could expand sufficiently to meet 
the requirements. However peacetime use of munititions and 
other equipment is very small by comparison to wartime expend-
itures and pipelines are not only much shorter, but are not 
in danger of interception by the enemy. To provide for this 
reserve of materiel, huge stocks of very expensive equipment 
and munitions ·would have to be maintained at all timei. The 
weapons of war ~re subject to rapid obsolescence and to be 
effective against an enemy should be at least as modern as 
his. This, in turn, means that those finished items of equip-
ment and munitions would have to be scrapped whenever a newer, 
more modern item was developed and the whole stock of that 
and related items replaced. Waste is inherent in such a plan 
inasmuch as certain ttsecret" materiel must be destroyed com-
pletely and few war devices have any use in the general econ-
omy except possibly as scrap. This means much waste of effort 
as well as materials if the war does not come before t he point 
of obsolescence; it may mean that obsolete weapons will have 
to be used to fight the war. 
Such a dilemma cannot be accepted for several 
reasons. It is most wasteful of the resources of the country, 
resource's which already are being depleted at a very fast 
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rate. It is most expensive in terms of opportunity costs, 
for with the same amount of effort and utilization of our 
resources we could have many other things which would be of 
benefit to the welfare of the nation and toward its normal 
peacetime destiny. 
Th~,support in peacetime of a war strength military 
force with modern arms would further mean that taxes would 
increase to an unbearable point and the standard of living 
would be depressed eventually beyond a healthy state. Taking 
t ll.e data given in the Economic Repor•t of the President to 
Congress, January 6, 1950, as a basis for 1949 gross national 
product and taxes paid to federal, state and local agencies, 
we find that taxes represent 23% of the gross national prod-
uc t. It has be en estimated that 7o% of the taxes went into 
defense expenditures. The military strength supported by 
this sum is considered to be of minimum size for expansion 
and with few equipment reserves. Though much of the money 
labeled as defense expenditures does not go directly t o the 
military forces, it represents nevertheless continuing ex~ 
penses, i.e.; veteran payments, North Atlantic Pact, and. 
E. R. P. Thus a program to double or triple the size of the 
military establishment would at least double the funds 
required. This would, on the basis of the 1949 figures, 
bring the taxes up to about 100 billion dollars or approxi-
mately 4o% of the 1949 gross national product. The ramifica-
tions of such expenditures would be such that the whole 
economy of the United States would be changed. It is difficult 
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to visualize exactly what such a progrma would mean, but one 
thing would be true -- we would surely be an arsenal and 
soon a bankrupt nation from a resources point of view. 
Other dangers in such a program could be the les-
sening of military efficiency through the problems inherent 
i n attempting to keep so large a force busy in peacetime. 
Further, an overconfidence in our military forces could lead 
us to antagonize others in our diplomatic and business rela-
tions, depending on our military strength to get us out of 
any troubles which might result. This would surely lead us 
t o war as it has other nations before us. .Another danger 
lies in the tendency to feel that once we have built up 
these reserves of equipment for defense that we can then 
r educ e our costs by ceasing to build more military equ ipment 
and can turn back once again to civilian goods. Nothing 
would be more disasterous as we would then be relying on old 
and probably obsolete weapons. The expenditures wou ld have 
t o continue. Thus this solution becomes unfeasible becau se 
o f expense, unsatisfactory because of its inherent military 
dangers and dangerous because it, i t self, contains financial 
self-destruction. 
A second possible answer is: war can be averted 
by othe r means su ch a s t he United Nati ons . Any building 
of military force beyond the internal guardian force is 
liable to lead to an international armmnents race which will 
in turn eventually lead to the situation described above. 
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If we continue through our Trade Agreements program to make 
satisfactory tariff negotiations we will 'be assured of those 
things which we need from overseas. Through the United 
Nations we will be able to solve any international disagree-
ments. By increasing our efficiency in the things we are 
able to produce and obtaining other things from abroad, we 
will assure ourselves . of the best standard of living possible. 
By accepting the possibility of another war we may be guaran-
teeing it. Therefor the better way is to have faith that we 
are all enlightened enough to recognize that wars have never 
settled basic problems and that only through diplomacy can 
the final- answers by worked out. Therefor we might take our 
chances that no insurance is needed and take no positive 
steps that could be construed as steps in the preparation for 
war. 
The idealism of such a program cannot be denied. 
Yet is it sound logic in this day and age when the s .ecretary 
of State has admitted that at the present time diplomacy is 
at a standstill? And through the veto power, the United 
Nations is blocked in many projects? 
The third possible solution lies be~veen these two. 
Under this alternative, the efforts toward fewer trade re-
s trictions would be continued. Both the United Nations and 
diplomatic channels would have firm support assured to them 
and the military force would be maintained at a minimum 
level capable of ready expansion if necessary. In addition 6 
certain stocks would be kept to assure support of the mili-
tary force, both in expansion and in the prosecution of a 
war effort. Unless there were certain stocks of equipment 
or the means of manufacturing equipment rapidly so that the 
military force could not only expand but be sustained in a 
war effort, then the money spent on maintaining the minimum 
force would have been wasted and we would'be no better off 
than if we had no military force and had elected entirely to 
follow the alternative of diplomacy alone. These stocks have 
the following forms : a. a balanced stock of munitions and 
materiel to support the war effort until industrial produc-
tio:n can meet the requirement., b. stocks of processed 
materials to be used by industry in the manufacture of 
materiel and ctvilian goods, c. stocks of raw materials 
which must be obtained from foreign sources entirely or in 
the principal part, and lesser stocks of those raw materials 
of which we produce less than our needs. 
/ 
This alternative, though it appears to be a com-
promise between the first two, maintains a better balance 
of the money costs and the insurance gained without opening 
the way for either complete militarism or simple invasion. 
Parts of this solution are now the policy of the United 
States. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY OF STOCK PILING POLICY 
1. Pre World War II. 
That certain materials have been important to 
c i vilization since the beginning of time nearly goes without 
saying. Most all of .history is punctuated with the seeking 
of strategic materials . The materials have changed through 
the centuries as the i ndu s tr i al processes have changed .· 
Until World War I, the United Sta t e s had ne~rer experienced 
critical shortages of imported materials. In 1917, a study 
of stra tegic materials wa s made and presented to the Con-
gress . In 1921 the Harbord list of materials was d r awn up . 
It is shown in Table III. 
I n 1933, the Natural Resources Board established a 
Planning Commi ttee for Mineral Policy and made a survey of 
natural resources which for the first time showed that in 
actual ity the Un ited States was not entirely a 11have 11 na tion , 
·but along with t he other nations was a "have not " in many 
i mportant materials . Private s tudies were made and books 
were written by such people as Broolrs E.meny, and C. K. Leith, 
pointing out the same t h ing. These studies recommended the 
acqui sition of a stock pile of t he so-called deficiency 
mi nerals. 
Subsequent to this the Pre sident asked the V'lar 
Department (1933) and t he Congre ss asked the Navy ( 1936) fo r 
a detailed study and recommendations for the acquisition of 
a stock pile. These studies developed the basic data for the 
laws which followed. Both departments were given statutory 
authority to stock pile i n 1937, but no money. On 27 April 
1937, the Navy FY 1938 budget was approved with a provision 
of 3.5 million dollars for the purchase of stra t egic and 
critical materials. This same item was approved in the Navy's 
1939 and 1940 budgets at $500,000. Tin, manganese, tungsten, 
chromite , optical glass, and manila fiber were procured with 
this money. In 1938-1939 the Army-Navy Munitions Board 
together with the Department~ of State and I nterior made 
additional studies and presented them to Congress. 
The first stock piling act resulted from these 
s tudies and was passed on 7 June 1939 (Public Law 173, 7lst 
Congress). It authorized a total of 100 million dollars to 
be appropria ted for the stockpiling or strategic and critical 
materials from fiscal year beginning 1 July 1939 to and 
including 30 June 1943, which was to be expended under the 
joint direction of the Secretaries of War and Navy. I n 
addition, 2 million dollars was authorized to the Department 
of Interior for developmental work. The responsibilities 
for the stock pile were assigned in the following manner: 
1. Requirements and selection of items--
Secretary of War and Secre tary of Navy 
through the Army-Navy Munitions Board. 
2. Procurement, storage, maintenance, and 
disposal--Depar~1ent of Treasury with 
approval of Secretaries of War and Navy. 
3. Development of new sources--Department 
of Interior . 
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Section 4 of this law restricted the sale of mate-
rials except for rotation purposes. This restriction was 
intended to prevent any disposition which might depress the 
commodity market. Any monies received from such sales were 
returned to Miscellaneous Receipts, Treasury ~unds, and 
thu.s lost to t he stock pile program. The law was amended on 
28 May 1941 to allow the establishment o~ a revolving fund, 
into which the proceeds from any sale of these materials ~as 
placed, for future utilization in the procurement of addi-
tional materials. 
Of the 100 million dollars authorized for stock 
pile purchases, 70 was appropriated as shown in the follow-
ing tabulation: 
Public Session of Date Amount 
Act No. Congress (millions) 
361 76 9 August 39 10.0 
442 76 25 March 40 12 . 5 
667 76 26 June 40 47.5 
Total 7 0.0 
The r emaining 30 million was not requested because 
subsequen t to 1940 world conditions indicated a necessity 
for broadening of the basis for the program. The 1939 act 
was basically a peacetime measure and depended on normal 
peacetime trade channels for acquisition of the stock pile. 
The war in Europe not only restricted t rade by an u nwillin g-
ness on the part of those countries and their dependencies 
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to part with the material s but also drove the prices upwa r d. 
Furth e r, our industry was using a large part of the mate-
l" i a ls, whi ch otherwise would have been s t ockpiled , fo r 
munitions manufa cture for f ore i gn gove.r n..11en t s. 
On Augus t 11, 1939, the Commodities Credit Corpo-
ration was authorized to trade agricultural products fo r 
strategic and critical materials abroad. Under this au t ho r i-
za t io n , arrangements were made with Great Britain to ob t ain 
s t ocks of crude rubber . In May, 1940, an agreement was made 
between the RFC and the Munitions Board that RFC would pro-
cure all t in, manganese and rubber required, while the 
Treasury would continue to procure all other materials under 
t he authority of the 7 June 1939 ac t . This was done to pre-
vent any competition between the two government agencies in 
the market. 
The RFC was given broad authOl'ity under Publ i c Law 
664, 76th Congress ( 25 June 1940 ) to make l oans t~ or with 
proper approval purchase the capital stock of, any corpora t ion: 
( a) fo r the purpose of producing, acquiring, and carrying 
strategic and critical materials, and (b) for plan t construc-
tion, expansion and equipment, and working capital. It was 
fUrther authorized to create or to organize a corporation or 
corporations with power (a) to produce, acquire and carry 
strategic and critical materials, (b) to purchase and lease 
land, to purchase, lease, build and expru1d plants, and t o 
purchase and produce equipment, supplies and machinery for 
the manufacture of arms, ammunition and the implements of war, 
and (c) if the President found it necessary for a Government 
agency to engage in such manufacture, to engage in such manu-
facture itself. The plants so established were to be leased 
to private manufacturers unless operated by the Government. 
This law also permitted t he RFC to make payments against the 
purchase price of strategic and critical materials in advance 
of delivery. On 16 September 1940, t he RFC was authorized an 
additional 10 million dollars for the purpose of making loans 
for the development of deposits of strategic and critical 
minerals which in the opinion of the Corporation would be of 
value to the United States in time of war. 
After the passage of these bills, the Mun i tions 
Board ceased operations in th~ field of stock piling speci-
fied in the 7 June 1939 Act except to complete, where practi-
cable, the contractual obligations already entered. 
2. World ~ II. 
The Recons truction Finance Corporation, under the 
authorizations cited above procured nearly all strategic 
and critical materials during World War II. To carry out 
these functions it established the Metals Reserve Company in 
1940 to acquire and carry a reserve of strategic and cri tical 
materials for the war program. The Rubber Reserve Company 
was to acquire and maintain similar reserve of rubber and the 
Defense Supplies Corporation to acquire and maintain reserve 
of strategic and critical materials other than those under 
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the cognizance o f the Metals Reserve Corporation. The Defense 
Plant Corporation was established to carry out the functions 
assigned to the RFC in regard to producing facilities and 
transpo~tation of strategic and critical materials . Alloca-
tion of materials held by these agencies was managed by the 
War Production Board. 
During the ea rly days of the war, the policy was 
to acquire all available stocks of imported strategi c and 
critical materials as fast as possible, as stocks then on 
hand were known to be i nadequate. The maximum objective s 
for the stock pi l e were increased constantly by the Mun i t i ons 
Board a s lend-lease and U. s. military requirements continued 
t o mount. These materials were consumed b y indu stry as fast 
a s t hey were acquired l e aving very little to become a real 
stock pile . 
Until 1943 the stock pile objectives were stated 
i n terms of a t hree year requirement . At that time i t was 
r educed by the WPB, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, t o a planning figure of one year. It was felt that 
this revision was necessary because the three year objective 
was unrealistic in terms of accomplishment. In granting 
approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance 
of establishing a separate actual objective for each material 
which would give weight to any special considerations affect-
ing its supply. The JCS outlined the following as areas which 
required special consideration : 
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1. The possibility of interruption of 
imports because of the loss or diver-
sion of transportation facilities, 
through sinkings or the opening of 
other fronts. 
2. The possibility of losing producing 
territories to the enemy. 
3. The possibility of failures of land 
transport as a result of military 
operations or port congestion. 
4. The possibility of temporary disrup-
tion of either foreign or domestic 
production occasioned by labor diffi-
culties, labor shortages, accidents 
or sabotage. 
5. The possibility of shortages that 
might be caused by increased fUture 
requirements. 
6. The possibility of relatively serious 
interruption of supplies owing - to the 
concentration of production. 
In 1944 as the war outlook improved, the stock pile 
objective was redefined as: three months total requiremen t s , 
or one year 's requirements less anticipated North American 
production, whichever was higher. The JCS approved this 
change with the same provisions they had outlined in 1943. 
~1ring these years the list of materials was en-
larged greatly and changed very often. The few materials 
stock piled under the original act were used as "las t ditch" 
resources. Supplies of cadmium, manila fiber, block mica, 
optical glass, quartz crystals and quinine sulphate in this 
reserve were the only available sources of these materials 
in the early phases of the war. The principal difficulty 
lay in the fact that the program had been initiated too late 
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to alleviate the critical shortages of the pe r iod. Table IV-
shows the materials purchased under the 7 June 1939 Act, the 
amoun t s released up to 31 October 1944, and the amounts 
remaining as of that date . The following tabulation shows 
the status of funds as of 31 October 1944 for the or iginal 
act: 
Total appropriation 
Proceeds, expended and 
committed, inc. admini-
strative charges 
Total unexpended 
Proceeds from release 
of materials 
Total unobligated 
$70,000,000.00 
55,263,737.89 
14,736,262.11 
8,845,792.00 
$23,582,054.11 (1) 
In 1942, Harry N. Holmes stated in his book, 
Strategic Materials and National Strength: 
u •••• all but the willfully blind can see 
that stock piles of three years' supply 
of these essent ial materials would have 
tremendous value in maintaining our mili-
tary machine and in supporting the normal 
activities of the people •••• Now that we 
are in the war we would gladly pay bil-
lions for the needed strategic materials 
if we could buy them or could s~nd enough 
convoyed fleets to guarantee deli very. 11 { 2) 
With the end of the military expansion period in 
late 1943 and with the war outlook improving, it became 
(1) Senate Document 5, "S trategic Materials," Letter from 
Army-Navy Munitions Board, dated 6 January 1945, u. s. 
Govermnent Printing Office, 1945. 
(2) Holmes, Harry N., "Strategic Materials,., The MacMillan 
Company, New York, 1942, Page 1. 
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apparent that something must be begun to f a c ili ta te an orderly 
transition be tween war and the coming peace in regard to any 
surplus materials which would be then on hand. The Munitions 
Board recons t itu t ed the Strategic Materials Committee at that 
t ime. This .committee was composed of representatives from 
t he War , Navy, and Inter ior Depar tments. Its fi1nct ions were 
as fo llows: 
1. To assist the Muni tions Board in t he 
development of policies for s to ck 
piling of strategic and critical mate-
rials under the 7 J une 1939 Act, 
2. To coordinate these policies with those 
of other government projects which were 
similar in nature, and 
3. To maintain liaison with the Deparnnen ts 
of State, Jreasury and Commerce, and 
with the WPB . 
In carrying out t hese functions, the committee had 
several immediate tasks . First it must establish t he rela-
t i onship be tV'reen stock piling and t he disposal of war sur-
pluses. Here the problem was to consider the requirements 
for a balanced s tock pile of rna terials, to consider the needs 
of industry in conver t i ng back to civilian production in the 
shortes t possible t ime, and the immediate civil i an needs fo r 
replacement of many items which were f'ar beyond their economic 
life. Methods by which deriva t ive' industries, which had been 
built up to meet wartime need s , could be sustained were to be 
developed. Vfuile these industries are most essential to a 
defense pr ogr run, they would be unable to compete on a cost 
basis in a world market. Balance had to be achieved in and 
between each of these. Many pressures were brought by each 
of these groups an~ as can be seen from their divergent 
interests, not always for the same type of action . 
The next step of the committee was to redefine the 
t erms "strategic" and "critical" materials and to revise t he 
list of materials in terms of peacetime acquisition. On 
6 March 1944, the following general definition was approved 
by the Munitions Board: 
"Strategic and critical materials are 
those materials required for essential uses 
in a war emergency, the procurement of which 
in adequate quantities, quality, and time is 
sufficiently uncertain for any reason to 
require rrrior provision for the supply 
thereof. ' 
This definition was then further subdivided into three classi-
fications based not on essentiality but on the relative need 
for stock piling : 
"GROUP A: comprises those strategic 
and critical materials for which stock 
piling is deemed the only satisfactory means 
of insuring an adequate supply for a future 
emergency . 
ttGROUP B: comprises additional stra-
tegic and critical materials, the stock 
piling of which is practicable . The Army-
Navy Munitions Board recommends their acqu i-
sition only to the extent they may be made 
available for transfer from governmen t 
agencies, because an adequate supply can be 
insured by the stimulation of existing 
North American production or by partial or 
complete use of available substitutes . 
"Group C: comprises those strategic 
and critical materials which ar e not now 
recommended for permanent stock piling 
because, in each case, difficulties of 
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storage are sufficient to outweigh the 
advantages to be gained bf. this means of 
insuring adequate supply. 1 (1) 
Based on these definitions a new list of materials 
was drawn up and approved by the Army-Navy Munitions Board 
on 6 March 1944. The list was again revised on 20 November 
1944. In this later revision 57 materials were included 
in Group A, 21 in Group B, and 17 in Group C. Along with 
these listings went the warning that many other materials 
.would be on the list if it were to contain semi-processed 
and processed materials such as aviation gasoline, synthetic 
rubber, chemicals, drugs, ferroalloys, steel, light metals, 
etc . Fur ther it was pointed out that the lists must be 
cons tant ly reviewed in the light of the availability of 
facilities to process the materials and to manufacture the 
items, and in the light of new developments in technology 
both for the manufacture of end items and in processing t he 
mater ials. 
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 became Public 
Law 457--78 th Congress on 3 October 1944. It provided for 
the transfer of all surplus strategic and critical materials 
held by any government agency or corporation, to the s tock 
pile which had been authorized by the act of 7 June 1939 
which was under the j urisdiction of the Tr easury Department, 
Procurement Division. The Surplus Property Act defined 
{1) Senat e Document 5, "Strategic Materials," Le tter from 
Army-Navy Munitions Board, dated 6 January 1945, U. s. 
Government Printing Office, 1945. 
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11 surplus 11 as any materials held by a government agency hich 
were in excess to its needs and in excess of industry's 
requirements for six months, excluding requirements for 
continued war production. It further provided that the 
Treasury Department would accept only those materials which 
met the Munitions Board's specifications and were within 
maximum levels to be established by the Munitions Board. 
Any surplus materials over and above these amo1mts were to 
be sold on the open market at market prices. The Munitions 
Board was instructed to submit to the Congress within three 
months recommendations for maximum and minimum levels for 
each material which was to be stock piled. 
The 1\tiuni tiona Board complied with the abo;re direc-
tive by the submission of a letter dated 6 January 1945, 
' 
subject : Strategic Materials, which became Senate Document 
5, 1945. ~1is docmnent recommended maximum and minimmn 
levels for both groups A and B materials. The minimum levels 
were considered to be the.absolute bottom for safe t y i n time 
of war . These levels were based on t he approved JCS assump-
tions and mobilization plan together with estimates of U.S. 
consump t ion. Military, fu t'nre lend-lease, and civilian 
consumption estimates were included, based on the peak con-
sumption for each material in World War II. I n the establish-
ment of the minimum levels, allowances were made for: 
1. Compensation for any known deple tion of, 
or reasonably certain increases in, 
available u.s . resources. 
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2. Compensation for knovm changes in 
resources outside t he U. s., though 
thi s info rmation was considered very 
meager , 
3. Adj ustments for antic ipated increases 
or deCl"eases in future military re-
quirements as the result of techno-
logical changes a lready evident, 
4. Adjustmen t s, where consumption data 
i ndi c ated t hat i t had been necessary 
to use inferior grades of mate r ial 
during World War II, 
5. Limita t ions which we re imposed on 
stock piles of perishable materials 
by reason of the necessity for rota-
tion of the qu an t i t ies involved. 
The maximum qu antities established for both groups 
A and B were to provide the maximum security within the 
economic considerations of the investment. In add i tion t o 
the s trategic assumptions, these estimates were based on 
considera tion of: 
1. The availability · of supply from foreign 
sources as it may be affected in an 
emergency by international poli t ical 
and economic conditions , 
2. The inordinate expenditures of man-
power, equipment, and money required 
to build up supplies of certain 
materials. 
3. The main t enance of the indus trial 
economy at a higher level of efficiency 
than was obtained in World War II as 
a result of the drastic dislocations 
necessita t ed by shortages. 
4 . Requirements as they may be affected 
by the civilian needs of a population 
o f the United S ta t es larger than the 
present population. 
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The maximum levels for perishables were reduced 
in the light of their requirements for rotation and the 
pe a cetime limitations on so doing. It was recommended that 
only those materials which met the specifications should be 
counted a gainst the stock pile minimum level and that pro-
visions should be made for the benefic ia t i on of any sub-
standard materials so that they would be of maximum use in 
an eme rgency. 
Senate Document 5 also made certain recommendations 
f or ch anges in the enabling legislation. Among these were 
the repeal of the "Buy Americs.n Clause" in order that our 
dwindling reserves could be conserved, and the addition of 
a pl~ovision for the disposition of stocks which became obso-
lete due to technologics.l changes in their uses. It fu1•ther 
recommended that the acquisi t ion of the stock pile be t ime-
phased in gradual increments over a one to ten year period, 
depending on the material. The suggestion was made t hat a 
provision should be added for the maintenance of stand-by 
fac ilities, pilot plant operations, continuous technological 
research and the development of more economi cal processes 
for the utilization of domes ti c marginal resour ces. J;Jiany of 
these recommendations were incorpora t ed i n Public Law 520, 
The S t rategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 
1946 which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile the Senate Special Committee to Study 
and Survey the Problems of American Small Business cons t ituted 
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a sub-committee on Mining and Minerals Industry. This sub-
comniittee published its preliminary report on the subject 
of, 11Fu ture Problems of the Nation 1 s Critical and Stra t egic 
Minerals and Metals Industry", on 16 January 1945.. In these 
hearings lie the beginnings of the post war efforts for a 
mine incentive bill of which S-2105 (1949} was the latest . 
The Committee report points out the problems of the marginal 
mine in the United States . These mines are an important 
source of strategic materials in an emergency when costs are 
of little importance, but because of their low· grade ore 
and high costs of extraction they cannot compete with foreign 
sources during peacetime. Many of the proposals received by 
the Committee favored the making of the national stock pile 
a dumping ground for all excess production while support 
prices were guaranteed to the producers, similar to those 
provided for agricultural commodities . The Munitions Board 
and the Bureau of Mines both fought this proposal on the 
grounds that such a system would produce great imbalance in 
the stock pile. They further pointed out that the majority 
of the materials desired for the stock pile were such that 
no incentives for domestic production would result in in-
creased quantities because there are no such domestic depos-
its to be developed . They argued that in those cases where 
there are small U. S. deposits that the mining proposal would 
cause wasteful mining and only succeed in hastening the day 
of total dependency on foreign sources. 
Both of these studies affected the final phr asing 
of Public Law 520. The history outlined above shows the 
gradual awareness during peacetime of the government agencies, 
the legislators and the public in the problems of materials 
shortages . It also demons trates the stringent measures 
required in time of war to acquire the necessary strategic 
materials unless there is effective advanced preparation. 
41 
CHAPTER V 
PRESENT POLICY AND LEGISLATION 
1. General Policy. 
The present broad policy of th~ United States in 
regard to stock piling is stated in paragraph 1 of the 
Strategic a.nd Critical Stock Piling Act (Public Law 520, 
79 th Congress, 25 July 1946.) It reads as follow·s: 
"Be it enac ted by the Senate and House 
of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, that 
the natural resources of the United 
States in certain strategic and criti-
cal materials being deficient or insuf-
ficiently developed to supply the 
industrial, military and naval needs of 
the country for common defense, it is 
t he policy of the Congress and the pur-
pose and intent of this act to provide 
for the acquisition and retention of 
stocks of these materials and to encour-
age the conservation and development of 
these materials within the United States 
and thereby decrease and prevent, where-
ever possible, a dangerous and costly 
dependence of the United State s upon 
foreign nations for supplies of these 
materials in times of national emergency." 
The implementation of this policy has two distinct 
and separate phases: a. the actual stock piling of strate-
gic and critical materials and b. the development of new 
sources and of improved conservation methods. Many of the 
difficulties in administering this act stem from this fact. 
There is a continuous tendency on the part of spec ial inter-
est groups to combine the two phases. The government agencies, 
on the other hand, maintain that the purposes of the stock 
pile would never be reached if it were allowed to become part 
of a development scheme. 
2. Stock Pile Policies. 
Corollary policies enunc iated in the Act establish 
the general rules for procurement a~d disposition of the 
stock pile. Under procurement · it s t ates: 
" ••• purchases (1) shall be made, insofar 
as practicable, from supplies of materials 
in excess to the current industrial demand 
and (2) shall be made in accordance with 
title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 
(Sta t . 1520). 11 
The latter is t he 11Buy Amer ican Clause" which requires that 
any purchases made by the Government must be made from U. s. 
sources~unless the material is not available from U. s. 
sources, or the world market represents a much less expensive 
source . In such event , differential s are set to es tablish 
t he pd:t int where the world market will be entered. Thus, to 
favor Ameri can purchasers the Federal Supply Service, General 
Servi ces Administration , has es t ablished 25% as t he differen-
tial where the cost of the foreign produc t exceeds $100 and 
lOa% where t he cost of the foreign product is $100 or less. (1) 
The president in signing the Stock Piling Ac t signified his 
displeasure with the inc lusion of the nBuy American clausen 
by instructing t he agencies to use t he exc ep tion wherever it 
was deemed necessar y to carry out t he other intentions of 
the Act . 
The law also permits : 
(1} Circular Le t ter B-61, Bureau of Federal Supply, Tr easury 
Departmen t , 10 October 1947. 
"A reasonable time (not to exceed one 
year) shall be allowed for the production 
and delivery from domesti~ sources, and 
in the case of any such material available 
in the United States but which has not 
been developed conwercially, the Secretary 
of War and the Secre tary of the Navy may, 
if they find that production of such mate-
rial is economically feasible, direct the 
purchase of such material without requir-
ing the vendor to give bond." 
This clause, too, has re sulted in much difficulty, for the 
mining interests say that it is impossible to develop a 
source and make it pay for itself in one year. 
The rotation clause contained in the old law was 
changed to provide for the replacement of acquired stocks 
with the equivalent quantities of substantially the same mate-
rial. An additional section was . added to provide for obso-
lescence . Disposition of a material can now be made when a 
change in requirements has resulted from deterioration, the 
development or discovery of a new or better material or mate-
rials, or where the material has no further usefulness in t ime 
of war . Obsolescence is construed in the Act as being the 
result of any one or more of the above three factors. Howeve r 
prior to disposition due to obsolescence, both Houses of the 
Congress must be notified and provided with complete justifi-
cation for the action and approve the disposition. The justi-
fica tion must conta i n a plan for and the date of disposi tion 
and must show that these have been established with due r e-
gard to the protection of the United States agains t avoidable 
loss on the s ale or transfer of the material to be released, 
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and the protection of producers, processors and consumers 
against avoidable disruption of their usual markets. The 
law further requires that notification of such disposition 
mus t be published in the Federal Register for six months 
prior to the sale. 
With the exception of release for rotation or obso-
lescence, no material can be released without the i ssuance of 
an Executive Order by the President. This is to be done at 
such time as the President determines tb.at such relea se is 
required for the purposes of the common defense. In time of 
I 
war or national emergency, the President is to delegate the 
' 
authority for the release of these materials to a government 
agency. The purpose of this section of the law is to prevent 
any market manipulation by government agencies during peace-
time, and to, insofar as poss ible, eliminate market price 
fluctuations caused by government buying or selling c 
I n spite of the fact that the goverm1ent agenc ies 
have been most cautious in carrying ou t these policies, the 
market is still affected by stock pile procurement and di s-
position as is shovm in mining journals which emphasize that 
the price of the material has either been stabilized or 
incr eased due t o the purchases, or decreased because of lack 
of goverrunent purchase s . At!> an example the following quota-
t ions from t he January , 1950, issue of Engineering and Mining 
Journal are offered : 
"Lead-Stockpile purchases absorbed a good 
tonnage during December, which served to 
4s 
steady the market and the price was main-
tained at 12¢, New York, throughout the 
month. 11 { 1 ) 
11 Tin- - ••• Moreovel", the stockpile program 
is likely to become more of a factor be-
fore long, which should e xert an influence 
on the market whether the operations are 
conducted openly or off the record.n (2) 
While these quotations are on the procurement side, it can be 
seen that the market is extremely sensitive to government 
actions. The effect of the required six months notification 
of a ny disposal ac tion probably would be a depressing factor 
on the marke t a s buyers would tend to hold off to get the 
government stocks at perhaps a lower price. 
Materials may b e acquired for the stock pile in 
other ways than procurement. Public Law 520 reinforces the 
Surplus Property Act of 1944 by providing that not only all 
surpluses of s t ra tegi c and critical materials owned by gov-
ernment agencies will be transferred to the stock pile, but 
also that any such materials which are received from foreign 
coun tries under Lend Lease agreements will also be trans-
f err ed. Vmile no transfers of funds between agencies is 
permitted as a result of the transfer of materials the value 
of the rna ter ials to be transferred is limited to the amounts 
of the annual appropriation for stock piling. In addition, 
no materials for which there 'is a shortage on the civilian 
market for industrial needs will be transferred to the stock 
( 1) Engineering and Mining Journal, "Market Sum.m.ary", Jan., 
1950, Vol. 151, No. 1, McGraw-Hill , Page 52. 
(2) Ibid., Page 53. 
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pile. To prevent the stock pile from becoming a catch-all 
for anything not desired by other agencies, latitude was 
given in the acceptance of such materials. No material 
which does not meet t he specifications of the stock pile or 
which cannot be economically beneficiated to meet these speci-
fications is to be accepted. 
Subsequent to the passage of the Stock Piling Act 
other laws have been passed or amended to permit the acquisi-
tion of these materials. The Economic Cooperation Act of 
1948 (Public Law 472, 80th Congr ess) in Sec tion lll(c)l 
authorizes : 
" • •• (the) administrator may provide 
assistance for an participating country 
under procedures given in subsections (a) 
and (b), through grants or upon cash pay-
ments or credit terms, or on such other 
term s of payment as he may find appropri-
ate, including paxpent Qx the transfer to 
the United States _under such terms and in 
such quantities ~mav be agreed to betWeen 
the administrator and the participating 
country) of materials which~ required 
Qx the United S tates~~ result of defi-
ciencies or potential deficiencies in its 
QYill. resources;-" - --
The underlining was added by the author . 
The Foreign Aid Appr opriation Act F . Y. 1949 (Public 
Law 793, 80th Congress) provides : 
" • • • that not less than five { 5) per centum 
of each special currency account established 
• •• shall be allocated to the use of the 
United States Government for expenditure 
for strategic materials where available •• • " 
These materials are transferred to the stock p i ~e at no change 
to stock pile funds . 
On 7 June 1949, Section 2 of ~~e C~mmodity Cr edi t 
Corpora tion Charter Act (1) was amended (2) to permit that 
Corporation to accept strategic and critical materials pro-
duc ~d abroad in exchange for the agricultural commodities it 
acquired. It was directed that priority be given to those 
goods which serve as "prime incentive goods 11 to stimulate the 
production of strategic and critical materials. The mate-
rials so acquired are to be transferred to the stock pile and 
the Commodity Credit Corporation is to be reimbursed at fair 
market value for them. The materials to be transferred are 
limited to those approved by the Munitions Board for stock 
piling. 
Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, ap-
proved 31 Oc t ober 1949, broadens still more the authority 
of the Department of Agriculture in the bartering of agri-
cultural commodi ties for strategic materials from foreign 
sources. It permits the Department of Agriculture to make 
available any produc ts , which are in danger of spoilage or 
deterioration, to any government agency for use in making pay-
ment for commodities not produced in the United States. From 
this authority the Munitions Board or any other Federal 
agency can obtain ce~tain agri cultural products for use as 
payment for strategic and critical materials for the national 
stock pile when such action is approved by the Secretary of 
of Agriculture. This amendment does not limit such barter 
(1) Public Law 806, 80th Congress. 
(2) Public Law 85, 8lst Congress. 
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to strategic and critical materials designated for stock 
piling. 
3. Development of New Sources. 
While the Act of 7 June 1939 provided for the devel-
opment of only mineral resources, the Strategic and Critical 
Materials Act of 194q recognizes that certain of these mate-
rials are agricultural commodities. It directs both the 
Department of Inter i or and the Department of Agriculture, in 
Section 7, to make scientific, technologic and economic 
investigations concerning the development of domestic sources 
of supply, and substitutes . 
The Economic Cooperation Act (Public Law 472, 80th 
Congress) announces the following Bilateral and Multilateral 
undertakings as policies of the United States. It will be 
noted that in each of these paragraphs the emphasis is on the 
obtaining of strategic and critical materials . 
"Section 115 b. Each country shall conclude 
an agreement with the United States ••• pro-
viding adherence of the country to the pur-
poses of this title and where appropriate 
make provision runong others for : 
• • a • • • • • • • • • • • • 11 (5) •• • facilitating the transfer to the 
United States by sale, exchange, barter or 
otherwise, for stock pi l ing or other pur-
poses, for such a period of time as may be 
agreed to and upon re a sonable terms and in 
reasonable quantities of materials which 
are required by the United States as a 
result of deficiencies or potential defi-
ciencies of its own resources, and which may 
be available in SlJ.Ch participating country 
after due regard for reasonable requir ements 
for domestic use and co1~mercial export of 
such country. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4'9 
117 with: 
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1(9) ••• recognizing the principal of equ i ty 
in respect to the drain on the natural re-
sources of the United States and of recip-
ien t countries by agreeing to negotiate ta) 
a future schedule of minimum availabilities 
to the United States for future purchase 
and delivery of a fair share of materials 
which are required by the United States as 
a result of deficiencies or potential defi-
ciencies in its own resources, at world 
market prices, so as to protect the access 
of the United States industry to an equi-
table share of such materials, either i n 
percentages of production or in absolute 
quantities from the participating countries, 
and (b) suitable right of access for any 
person ••• in the development of such mate-
rials on terms of equal treatment equiva-
lent t o the nationals of the country con-
cerned, and (c) an agreed schedule of 
increased productiori of such materials , 
where practicable, in such participating 
countries and for delivery of an agreed 
percentage of such increment production to 
be transferred to the United States on a 
long term basis in consideration of assist-
ance furnished by the administrator to such 
countries under this title ." 
The EGA Act continues in the same vein in Section 
"The Administrator, in furtherance of the 
purposes of Section 115 b (5) and in agree-
ment with a participating country, shall, 
whenever practicable, promote, by means 
of funds made available for the purposes 
of this title, an increase in the produc-
tion in such participating country of mate-
rials which are required by the United 
States as a result of deficiencies or 
potential deficiencies in resources within 
the United States. " 
The policy, then, of the United States is not only 
to increase the domestic production but to develop foreign 
sources and to assure that they are available to us. Tnere 
are many critics of the latter section of this pol icy, the 
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majority of whom have interests in the mining states. They 
say that development of foreign sources represents an inves t-
ment for the enemy. The answers given to this criticism 
are that what we have taken from foreign sources is no longer 
available for the use of the enemy. 
4. Funding. 
The new law specifically ' permits the retention of 
any appropriation until it is expended for the stock pile. 
Monies received from the sale of materials for rotation 
purposes are also retained. Any other monies received from 
the sale of materials (obso+escence etc.} must be returned 
to the Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts. Public Law 520 
places no monetary limits on the appropriations for the 
stock pile. 
5. Other Legislation Affecting the Stock Pile. 
The National S~curity Act of 1947 {Public Law 253, 
80th Congress) created the National Security Resources 
Board. This agency was assigned the function of advising 
the President concerning the coordination of military, in-
dustrial and civilian mobilization including programs for 
the effective use, in time of war, of the Nation's natural 
and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, 
for the maintenance and stabilization of t he civilian econ-
omy in time of war and for the adjustment of such economy 
to wartime needs . The NSRB advises the President also on 
policies for the establishment of adequate reserves of 
' 
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strategic and critical . materials and for the conservation 
of these reserves. 
The Munitions Board is charged by the same law with 
the duty to maintain liaison with the other departments and 
agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements 
with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the 
procurement or disposition of strategic and critical mate-
rial, the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, 
and to make recommendations as to policies in connection 
therewith. 
Voluntary allocation agreements for the distribu-
tion of scarce commodit ies by persons engaged in industry, 
business and agriculture are authorized by Public Law 395, 
80th Congress. These agreements cannot include any price 
fixing clauses. In Section 6 of the act, the President is 
directed to recommend measures for allocation and conserva-
tion of a material whenever he determines that there is, or 
threatens to be, a critical shortage of that material. 
The President is further authorized to place pri-
ori ty orders with any industry for any article or material 
deemed necessary to national security, the procurement of 
which has been authorized by Congress exclusively for the 
armed forces or the Atomic Energy Commission. This author-
ity is contained in the Selective Service Act of 1948 
(Public Law 759, 80th Congress) i n paragraph 18. Under this 
section any industry with whom such an order is placed must 
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give it priority over all other orders and deliver it within 
the time established by the President. Penalties, imprison-
ment and the confiscation of the plant are the result of 
failure on the part of any business so directed by the Pre-
sident. However such orders can only be placed with plants , 
facilities or mines which are capable of produc i ng such 
articles or minerals. In the event that the bus i ness is 
talren over by the government, a just rental will be paid for 
the facilities used. This section makes specific reference 
also to steel producers and requires t _hat they give priority 
to anyone who has such an order from the Government . The 
same penal ties apply to the steel producer who fails to com-
ply as to the prime contractor. 
Uranium was on the list of materials to be stock 
piled under Public Law 520 until the passage of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79 th Congress). At 
that time all fissionable _material i n the United States was 
declared to be the property of the Government and the Atomic 
Energy Commission was designated as its custodian. All 
stocks of uranium held by the Fede:..•al Supply Service fOl"' the 
stock pile were transferred. 
In the first session of the 8lst Congress, four 
bills were introduced into the Senate and six into the House 
of Representatives on the subject of mi ning incentives . The 
final Senate Bill, S2105, passed that body on 6 October 1949. 
It was voted on in the House after lengthy discussion on 16 
March 1950 and failed to pass by a vote of 166 to 144 . (1) 
The bill provided for the establisrunent of a Minerals Conser-
vation Board headed by the Secretary of Interior and consist-
ing o~ in addition to the Secretary of Inte r ior, the Secre-
taries of Defense, Commerce, and Treasury. This Board was 
to establi sh the regulations by which the Department of 
In terior would assist private producers. The assistance 
was to have been in the form of participation by the Govern-
ment in the costs of exploration and development, costs of 
mine maintenance in stand-by status, and the agreement by 
the Government t o purchase all or part of the production 
of such mines. Any materials purchased were to be first 
offered to the stock pile authorities. If any rna teri~l was 
not taken by the stock pile within sixty days after the 
follow ing appropriation, it was to have been sold on the 
open market whenever the price was such that the Government 
would regain the purchase price and s torage costs . Special 
emphas is was placed in the bill on the small producer to 
insure that he would get a fair share- of all contracts. 
In the discussion on the floor of the House preced-
ing the vote on the bill both the EGA Act and the Stock Pil-
ing Ac t were discussed . It was felt by some that the Stock 
Piling Act had been intended to be a virtual subsidy ~o 
~omest i c producers and if it were not for the stubborness 
of the Munitions Board and the Federal Supply Service in 
(1) Congr essional Record, Thursday, March 16, 1950, United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. ~ P.3593. 
placing contrac t s where the materials could be delivere d at 
t he lowest cost, usually foreign, that there would be no 
need for addit ional legisle.tionw Some said that the ECA 
a dm i n istration was ruining t he domestic producer , : that no 
materials should be allowed to be imported without heavy 
du ties, and that the ECA should cease all efforts to build 
extractive industries in foreign countries which would soon 
be in competition with domes t lc pr•oducers. Much fault was 
also found with the S t ate Department and the Trade Agree-
ments program on the same basis. Most of t he proponents 
of the bill felt that it did not go far enough in its help 
for the min ing industry. 
In spite of the fact that the bill failed to pass, 
it is indicative of the dissatisfaction of many members of 
Congress with the state of our mining industry. The Depar t -
ment of Interior, theDepartment of Defense and the NSRB all 
advocate that some aid be given to encourage the d evelopment 
of new sources within the continental limits and that the 
Government participate in the costs of stand-by mine maint e-
n ance for sources of strategic and critical materials. The 
latter is considered necessary to preserve our marginal 
sources for use in time of war. 
These government agencies a dvocate, however , that 
any mining incentive legislation should not be tied to the 
Stock Piling program. The Munitions Board believes that, a s 
a defense agency, i t should not be involved in decisions 
concerning the subsidization of any particular segment of 
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the peacetime economy. This policy is concurred in by both 
the Department of I nterior and the NSRB. It is further 
believed by these agencies that if the acquisition of the 
stock pile were restricted to domestic sources as part of 
a subsidy program that ' the purposes of the stock pile would 
be negated, i . e.; the stock pile would be overloaded with 
those materials of which we have a plentiful domestic supply 
and be deficient in those of which we have little . 
It can be expected that some legislation on this 
problem will be f o rthcomi ng in the near future for many mi nes 
are closing due t o high oper~ting costs. The result i ng unem-
ployment and depressed conditions in the mining areas are 
becoming economic as well as political problems. 
6 . Summary. 
The policies of the United States pertaining to 
strategic and critical materials can be summarized as ; 
1 . To build an adequate and balanced 
stock pile of the se materials to meet 
emergency needs . 
2 . To develop all possible sources of 
these materials both domestic and 
foreign as rapidly as possible. 
3. To insure the continued access of the 
United States to these sources inso-
far a.s possible. 
4 . To give precedence to c ivilian indus-
try in the use of available supplies 
of these materials. 
5. To develop and expand methods of con- -
servation of materials . 
6. To develop substitutes for these mate-
rials whenever possible. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
AI\fD THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STOCK PILE 
1. General Assignment of Responsibili ties ~ 
The scope of the stock piling policies makes it 
impossible for any single goverP~ent agency to be assigned 
the en til"•e responsibility for the program wl thou t duplica t-
ing fields already assigned to other agencies in the general 
field of government operations . It was felt that the crea-
tiori of a separate additional agency for stock piling would 
not only be extreme duplication., but that the stock pile 
authorities would not have the benefit of the latest infor-
mation developed by the other agencies. 
The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling 
Act assigned the responsibilities of the determination of 
requirements , the maintenance of balance and the direction 
of procurement jointly to the Secretaries of War, Navy and 
Interior. The Anny-Navy Munitions Board was assigned the 
responsibility of coordination of these. Procurement, s tor-
age, in-storage maintenance, and disposition functions were 
assigned to the Bureau of Federal Supply, Department of 
Treasury. The Departments of Interior and Agriculture were 
given the responsibility for the development of new sources 
of materials and possible substitutes . All other goverr~ent 
agencies were instructed to assist these departments in 
every possible way. 
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The Na tional Security Act of 1947 created the 
Department of Defense and the National Security Resources 
Board. The latter was established as a Presidential e.dvi-
sory council on matters concerning the coordination of mili-
t ary, industrial and civilian mobilization, with the Stock 
Pile as one of its specific fields of interest . Wi thin the 
Department of Defense t he Munitions Board was established, 
retain ing the coordinating functions as signed to its prede-
cessor, the Army-Navy Munitions Board, and with the addi-
tional duty of maintaining liaison with the other depart-
ments and agencies with regard to strategic stock piling . 
Because of the obvious overlapping of respon s ibi-
lities, two actions have been taken subsequent to the pas-
sage of these bills. Firs t , the Secretaries or the Army and 
the Navy, on 19 December 1947, delegated their responsibili-
ties with respect to Public Law 520 to the Munitions Board. 
Second, the Division of Administrative M~nagement, Bureau 
of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, submitted 
a s·tudy entitled, " T.he Organization of Responsibilities in 
the Executive Branch ibr Stockpii ing," to the President on 
17 December 1948 . 
The study of the Bureau of the Budget pointed out : 
"There is a very urgent need for a clari-
fication of . the responsibili t ies of the 
i ndividual agencies, for a posi t ive and 
aggres sive initiative by each of these 
agencies in the exercise of their respec-
tive responsibilities, for a maximum 
coordination by these agencies with each 
other, and for the fitllest exercise by 
certain agencies of their responsibi-
lities for obtaining this coordination." 
It continues to say'that until recently stock piling had had 
a low priority status in the total scheme of Federal activity 
but recommends that this be changed in the light of the for-
eign political situation. The report made specific recom-
mendations for the more precise spelling out of the functions 
of each government agency in connection with stock piling. 
This report was approved by the President on 5 January 1949 
in a Memorandum to John R. Steelman, Acting Chairrnan, National 
Security Resources Board, subject: The Stockpiling Progrmn. 
The memorandum from the President requested that 
Mr . Steelman notify the interested agencies of _the adoption 
of the revised statement of responsibilities. Together the 
above two documents became NSRB Document 99, dated 5 January 
1949. On 11 January 1949 letters we1•e sent to the Secre-
taries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture 
and Commerce, and to the Administrator, Economic Cooperation 
Administrat ion by Mr. Steelman advising them of the Presi-
dential decision. - These letters are contained in NSRB Docu-
ment 99/1, dated 11 January 1949. 
As of this writing rio other significant changes 
have been made in the assignment of functions. A comparison 
of the duties of each agency under t he various laws and 
documents has been made and is shown in Appendix B. The data 
for these comparisons are drawn from the original documents. 
It was cons idered that these were a better source than agency 
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statements of func t ion in that no agency bias or interpre-
tation would b e shown5 Chart VI is a diagramatic represen-
t ation of general inter-relationships and duties of the 
various agencies . It was prepared for the Iviuni t ions Board 
23 January 1950, "Stockpile Report t o the Congre ss 11 and was 
approved by the NSRB. Mr . J. D. Morgan, Jr. o f the NSRB t old 
the author in January, 1950, that he c onsidered it the clear-
est graphic representation of the stock piling functions t ha t 
had been prepared as of that date. 
The Munitions Board, us tockpile Report to the 
Congress," dated 23 July 1949 on page 16 reports on the sue-
cessfulness of the presen t assignments : 
"The Munitions Board feels that the stock-
piling organization as now constituted 
represents a satisfactory arrangement, 
involving wide inter-agency par t icipation 
in a single program, whereby each agency 
contribu t es to this program its own 
specialized function. " 
1ne discussion of the administrat ion of the s tock 
pile which fol lows is based on the current delineation of 
function s . It is subdivided into the various steps which 
must be taken to obtain and maintain the stock pile and to 
carry on the developme n tal objectives. 
2. Requ irements. 
The military requirements are computed separately 
by the Army, Navy and Air Force. for a specific strategic 
plan which has been pr-epared b y the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Each Department, af t er more de t ailed planning of its specific 
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part in the plan, computes its requirements for mil itary 
installations and equipment and supplies, with the necessary 
additions for inventory and pipeline, time phased for the 
duration of the plan. These time phased requirements are 
then translated into requirements for materials . By means 
of the Bills of Materials, which give the amounts of each 
basic material used in the end item, the total amounts of 
strategic and critical materials to be needed are determined . 
These functions are performed by the regular planning staffs 
of these agencies as additional duties. Military require-
ments include provisions for equipment and supplies which 
wi ll be supplied to allies as well as those for the U. s . 
military f orces. 
Civilian requirements which represent an important 
part of the total requirement for materials are computed by 
the Departrnents of Commerce, Interior and Agriculture. Both 
the end items required by the civilian population and the 
manufacturing requirements for plant expansion, and machine 
tools and supplies used in manufacturing, processing, and 
transporting of both military and civilian i t ems are computed. 
The requi rements for end items falling in this group are based 
on World War II experience . U. s. and British experience 
during World War II are used as the basis for maximum and 
min imum levels respectively. Factors for the conversion of 
these end item requirements into materials requirements are 
provided by industry . I t is recognized by the computing 
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Departments and by the NSRB that as time goes by this experi-
ence becomes less valid because of the changes in taste, the 
new development in either processes or end items, and the 
expanding population . These agencies together with the 
Department of Defense are sponsoring a study curJ•ently being 
made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which will give a be t -
ter basis for these e s tlma tes . The BLS is collecting data, 
along with the taking of the 1950 Census of Manufactures, 
on the inter-industry relationships and related inpu t s and 
outputs . This study together with others being made by the 
various Departments will provide better bases for these 
esti nates in the future. ( 1) 
The mil itary and civilian requirements are combined 
on Basic Data Sheets (Chart VII) in inter-departmental com-
mittees organized by the Munitions Board for each group of 
materials after they have been reviewed for the possibility 
_ of use of substitutes. As of 20 De cember 1949, there were 
twelve such co~mittees . All interested Departments have 
representation on these committees and the NSRB has observer 
status~ For instance the In ter-departmental Non-Ferrous 
Metals Committee is composed of representatives from the 
Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force and Munitions Board 
representing military requirements, and from the Departments 
of Commerce, a__11d IntePior, and the Tariff Commission for 
(1) Dr. J. D. Morgan, Assistant for Ma terials and Stock Pile 
Polic ies, Off i ce of the Vice Chairman , National Security 
Resources Board. 
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civilian requirements, with t he NSRB in observer s tatus . 
The same committees also fill in the data on expected 
ava.ilabili ties of the rna terial both fr•om domestic sources and 
from f oreign sources. Most of this data is provided by the 
Department of Commerce and the Department of In t e Pi or or Agr i-
culture whichever is app ropriate. The Basic Da ta Shee t s 
then go to the Muni t ions Board, Office of Material Resources , 
where the estimated foreign availabilities are screened and 
adjusted i n the l i ght of the strategic assumptions o f the 
JCS plan . The diffe r ence between the total requirement and 
the net availability is next filled in as the gross require-
ment for the stock pile if it is a minus fi gure. This figure 
is again adjusted by industry's estimated ability to consume 
t he material . The se later es timates are based on Muni tions 
Board indus trial surveys which are reviewed by the IVIuni tions 
Board Industry Advisory Committees established for each tvpe 
. v -
materia l. 
The final figure re sul tan t from the above ad jus t -
ments becomes the reconm1ended quan t ity fo1• the stock pile 
objective. The entire calculation is a gain reviewed by the 
special material committee and by the Munitions Board Gener-
al' s Committee which is a working committee of the Board. 
It is then sent to the Inter departmental Stockpile ConJrnittee 
for approval. This committee was establi shed as a result of 
the Presidential Memorandum of 5 January 1949. Its duties 
in regard to requirements are: (a) to advise the IliiU-l"li tions 
Board in regard to the determination of stockpiling goals, 
including the kinds, quantities, and quali t ies of strategic 
materials to be accumulated and held in reserve t o meet 
critical wata-tirne needs, and (b) the analysis of the antici-
pated war-time requirements and availabilities, the use 
of substitutes, and pos s ible me a sures for the expansion of 
war-time supplies. (1) Representatives of the Departments 
of State, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Defense (by 
the Munitions Board, also the Chairman of the commi ttee), 
the General Services Administration and Economic Cooperation 
Aruninistration compose the membership of this committee , with 
representa tives of the NSRB and the Bureau of the Budget as 
observers . These representatives are the chiefs or assistant 
chiefs of the divisions in each of these agencies which is 
respons ible for its stock piling functions. 
Upon approval at this level and providing that the 
NSRB observer is satisfied, the stock pile objective is 
established. In the event that there is any disagre ement 
betwe en the members of the cormni ttee that cannot be resolved 
or any point which t he NSRB observer feels should have fur-
ther inYestigation by his agency, the problem is then re-
ferre d to the NSRB . 
The National -security Resources Board is composed 
of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior , 
( 1) Iviun i tions Board, "S tockpile Report to the Congress, 23 
July 1949. 
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Agr icul ture , Commerce, and Labor, together with the Chairman 
of the Bo~rd . (1) The NSRB is provided with a small staff 
and is i nstructed to utilize the resources and fac ilities of 
the various departments to the fulles t extent. Under the 
5 January Presidential Direc t ive, it is charged with the 
responsibility to adjust , or obtain Presidential decisio~ on 
all matters relating to the stock pile, where there is i nter -
agency disagreement, and also to advise the President on the 
adequacy of the provisions and policies being made. After 
there is complete agreement i n al l of t hese level s , the 
Munitions Boar d itself gives the stock pile objectives final 
appro\ral . 
At the present such action consists of revising 
previously established goals . The J CS plans, the end item 
requirements, and the materials and their 1~equirements 
are continuously being reviewed in the ligh t of current 
developments. A change in any of these will cause a change 
in the stock pile ob jectives . Re sponsib ility for this review 
lies in all echelons. Tne screening for less strategic sub-
stitutes is most difficult i n the genera l sense and is done 
for the mos t part in the military departments and industry 
in conjunction with the Research and Development agencies 
and the Muni tions Board Co~~ittee. 
(1) Exe cutive Order 9905 , 13 November 1947 and Executive Order 
9931, 19 February 1948. 
3 . Procurement. 
The •.ralu.e of the stock pile objectives established 
by the requirements procedure outlined i n the previous sec-
t ion is currently es timated at 3.77 billion dollars. As 
such a figure represents approximately one tenth of the total 
Federal Budget for FY 1951, it could not be expec t ed tha t any 
Congress would appropriate the entire amount for a singl e 
fiscal year. I f it were so appropriated the money could 
probably not be expended within that time . Procurement is 
limited not only by a·,railabili ty of funds but the availability 
of the ma t erials in the world market and i s limited by Sectio n 
3(a), Public Law 520, 79 t h Congress, to only those amounts of 
each material which are nin excess of the current indus trial 
demand." In addition, the procurement of any one ma terial 
is restric t ed by the need for balance in the stock pile. 
The restriction inserted in the law by Congress 
t hat all stock piled materials must be in excess of industrial 
demand at the time of procuremen t was intended to preven t both 
a rapid increase in prices of materials and the aggravation 
of postwar shortages of consumer items . The responsibility 
for computation of current indus trial requirements was assigned 
to t he Civilian Produc tion Board, now defunct. At the present 
t ime, the Departments of Co~nerce, Interior and Agriculture 
prepare estimates of future annual consumption requirements 
based on historical and inventory data. However, it can be 
conceded that the preparation of this es t imate and the deter-
mination of when the Government should enter the mar ket vvi thou t 
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causing any influence on prices are most difficul t and 
responsible tasks. 
As has been pointed out before, the stock pile, to 
be of maximum use at all times; must have balanced propor-
tions of each of the materials required. For instance, to 
have the complete requirement of copper with an insufficient 
amount of tin to meet the total requirement for brass means 
that the supply of ammun i tion (a principal wartime use) is 
limited by the amount of tin on hand . This in turn affects 
the number of guns, ships, tanks and ·aircraft which can be 
used . As the requirements for each material are computed to 
sustain a complete war plan and the complementary civilian 
effort needed, each is necessary to the success of the plan 
and none can be deleted. Therefor, to achieve balance,the 
amount of each material stock piled should be of equal pro-
por t ion to its total requirement; i.e . , if 50% of the total 
requirement for each material was in the stock pile there 
would be balance . 
During the first year and a half of the present 
stock piling program, procurement was greatly restricted by 
shortages of materials. More recently it has been restricted 
by insurf i cient funds at times when materials have been 
plentiful, and by the need to obtain stocks of those items 
which are disproportionately low in the stock pile but which 
are still not in sufficient supply . 
The s e factors have necessitated the scheduling of 
the procurement of the stock pile over a period of years . 
. l 
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At the beginning of the pPogram i n 1946, a period of five 
years was established by the Munitions Board as an appropriate 
leng t h of time f or its acquisition with consideration being 
given to the probability of accomplishment within that time 
and the then considered imminence of another war . The pro-
gram is now three and one half years · old. 
For actual procurement of these materials a more 
detailed schedule, which takes each of the above factors into 
considerat ion, is required. In the preparation of this 
schedule for actual procurement, p·eriodic procurement objec-
t ives are set and priorities are established between the 
materials to insure that the money is not all spent on those 
i t erns which are most eas i ly procured and to preser ve · the 
balance in the stock pile mentioned above. 
The establishment of the procurement schedules and 
pri ori t ies is the responsibility of the Inte r-departmental 
Stockpile Committee. This com .. mi ttee is also charged with 
the determination of sto'ck pile procurement policies and pro-
grams for the guidance of the Federal Supply Service. These 
policies as defined by the 5 January 1949 Pre sidential Direc-
tive, are to cover purchase and storage , procurement schedul-
ing, the balance to be mainta ined between contracts for 
current delivery and contracts for future delivery and the 
sound application of rotation policies. The NSRB has a pro-
curement role similar to that for the establishment of require-
ments. I t ha s the prerogat ive of review of the po lic ies and 
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sch edules and of settling any differences of opin ion. I ts 
responsibility is t o assure the adequacy o f existing polic i es 
and programs for a suc cessful stock pile and to assure the 
necessary coordination of planning fo r sto ck piling in rela-
t ion to the planning of other security resources measures. 
Once the procurement schedules have been approved, 
they are sen t to the General Services A&ninistration , Federal 
Supp l y Service, for the actual procurement. This agency was 
under the Tr easury Department where it was knovm as the Bureau 
of Federal Supply until 1 July 19 49. As a result of this, 
the Treasury Department is charg ed with the procuremen t 
responsib ili ty by Public Law 520, 79 th Congress . Public Law 
152, Blst Congress, e stablished the General Serv ices Admini-
stra t ion and transferred the Federal Supply Service, functions 
and personnel, along with those of several other a gencies to i t . 
The monies appropriated by Congress to the Federal 
Supply Service for the p rocurement of t he stock pi l e take 
thr ee forms : 
1. New cash appropri ations with which the 
Bureau may buy outright, 
2. Contract auth ority with which t h e Bureau 
may contract for ei t her present or future 
de l ivery with payment to fo llow from subs e-
quent appropr iations, 
3 . Cash appropr iat ions to cover previous 
contrac t s let under contrac t authority. 
The Federal Supply Servi ce obtain s t he stock pile 
frorn several sources. Any materials previously purchased fo r 
the stock pile automa t ically remain in inventory. Any excesses 
of strategic and critical materials held by any department of 
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Government are transferred without reimbursement to the stock 
pile. Under this provision of the law, extensive screening 
is done on the part of all disposal officers, the Federal 
Supply Service is notified of the amounts held, and the mate-
rial is then shipped to the proper storage point i f its value 
is great enough to cover the costs of transportation and 
reprocessing . Any expenses resulting fr om this transfer are 
covered by the stock pile funds. 
Sec t ion 204(e) of the Federal Property Adminis tra-
tive Services Act of 1949 (Public Law 152, Slst Congress) 
permits executive agencies to accept strategic or critical 
material, as determined by the Munitions Board, for rent, 
interest or principal installments under leases and sales of 
Government surplus property. The price to be allowed in 
computing the value of tbe material is the preva iling market 
pr ice at the time the cash payment is due . Contracts until 
December, 1949, under this pPovision, were limi ted to 
aluminum pig. Consequently, the agreements made with the 
Perman te Meta.ls Corporation, the Re:ynolds Metals Company ( 1) 
and the Henry Kaiser Corporation (2) were for payment of 
certain rental and purchas e payments in alu~inum pig. 
The Fore ign Aid Appropri ation Act of 1949 (Public 
Law 793, 80th Congress) requires tha t not less than five per 
cen t of the counterpart funds shall be allocated to the use 
( 1) .Muni tions Board, 11 S t o ckpile Repor t to the Congress 11 , 
23 January 1950, Page 28. 
{2) Engineering and Mining Journal, "Metals in Review," 
February, 1950, Vol. 151, No. 2, Me.graw-Hill, Pages 90- 91. 
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of the ECA for expenditure for strategic materials where 
available or for other local currency requirements of the 
Uni t ed States.. These funds are deposits of local curr•encies 
deposited by European countries in special accounts in 
amounts commensurate with dollar grant a id furn ished by the 
ECA . Difficultie s arise in the implementation of this 
requirement. First only thr ee of the ERP countries (United 
Kingdom, France and the Netherlands) which have five per 
cen t funds of any consequence have any strategic materials 
within their boundaries or those of their dependencies. 
Second, a technical question arises. As dollar aid is calcu-
lated in relation to the country's dollar earnings, any· ship-
ment of materials without dollar payment increases its need 
for aid~ Thu s , whenever materials are shipped to the stock 
pile under this requirement the ERP must recalculate the 
country's r·equirements for dollars and provide additional 
aid. Neve r theless, the ECA has recently procured rubber, 
mica, industrial diamonds, buaxite , beryl , cryolite, lead 
and zinc by this means . 
The next method of obtaining material s is by direct 
procurement . TJ:"J.is procurement may be made in the open market 
of suppl:J,es f rom domestic sources or from foreign sources . 
The Economic Cooperation Administration places contracts i n 
ERP countries using stock Pile funds with the approval of the 
Federal Supply Service. ECA cannot procure materials needed 
by the country itself for recovery purpose s . 
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The Commodity Credit Corporation is authorized to 
exchange agr icultul'•al products for strategic and c1~i tical 
ma tei'ials produced abroad . Such materials are to be trans-
ferre d to the stock pile. The Commodity Credit Corporation 
is 1~eimbursed for these materials from stock pile funds at 
a fair market price . This of course means that the amount of 
mater ials which can be transferred at any one time cannot 
have a value greater than the available appropriated stock 
pile funds . 
Purchases in the United.States or in foreign coun-
tries, other than ERP cotmtries, are made by the Federal 
Supply Service. The actual purchasing activity is exempt 
fr m the provisions of the purchasing law (R. S .. 3709) which 
requires public advertisement of requiremen ts , public open i ng 
of bids, and award to the lowest qualified bidder , because 
of the security whi ch necessarily surrounds the requ irements 
and procurement fo r the s t ock pile . The majo rity of the 
stock pile purchases are made by negotiation . The Federal 
Supply Service maintains a list of persons desiring to 
receive i nvi t a.tions to bid or offers to sell the various rna te-
rials. V'fuen a purchase directi,Te is received from the ~uni­
tions Board , the Federal Supply Service sends invitations to 
bid togethe r with the specifications f or the material t o 
each of t he possible suppliers on the list. The bids gener-
ally contain i nformati on as to the quantity available as well 
as the price for which it is offered. From these bids nego-
tiat ions are carried on with the prospective suppliers. After 
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t h e n egotiations have been completed, the successful bidders 
receive the awards and full shipping instruc t i ons . The 
materials are inspected for conformance with the specifica-
tions upon receipt prior to acceptance by the Federal Supply 
Service . 
Assistance in the location of new sources where 
materials may be procured, both domestic and foreign, is 
provided by the Depar~nents of Commerce, Interior and Agri-
culture, and for foreign sources only ,by the Depart men t of 
Sta t e. The Department of Stat e negotia tes with foreign 
gove rnments when necessary to obtain the modif ication of any 
polic ies which i mpede the export of strategic materials , 
obtains concess ions for bo th the development of foreign 
sources and the subsequent export of the materials, and 
formu lates u. s . foreign policy in such a way as to assist 
t he stock piling program where ever possible. The Depart-
ments of Interior and Agriculture, in both the domestic and 
foreign fields , assist in the identification of the materials 
and sources, and provide other technical assistance, such as 
the running of tests and malcing any surveys necessary. Such 
tests and surveys are sponsored by stock pile funds. 
The Department of Commerce provides its lrnowledge 
of markets, produc tion and possible surpluses as well as 
assistance in expediting any tools or transportation e qu ip-
ment which may be necessary for production of the mate rials . 
For instance , the export of certain manufactured equipment 
from the Uni t ed States is controlled because of continuing 
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shortages. This department took the steps necessary t get 
railroad equipment into Rhodesia for the transportation of 
chromite for the stock pile , and mining equipment to 
Yugoslavia in the last year. The Department of Commerce has 
also maintained certain restrictions on domestic uses of 
natural rubber and tin in the past year in order to make the 
necessary amounts of those materials available for stock 
pile procurement. 
4. S torage , Security and Maintenance. 
The Federal Supply Service is charged by the Stock 
Piling Act with the responsibility of providing for the 
storage, security and maintenance of the stock pile. Military 
and Naval reservations, or other locations approved by the 
Munitions Board, are used. Storage sites are selected so as 
to be accessible to consuming areas, outside of port areas 
and in locations which have adequate handling capacity . As 
a security measure, the stock is dispersed into many areas . 
For each material a determination is made as to area of con-
sumption. Wbere possible this data is developed on a city-
by-city basis . Every effort is then made to acquire Govern-
ment storage space fo r each material at or on the way to the 
ultimate conswning city. The most suitable space nearest 
tha t city is then selected. Space within port areas is not 
used except for amounts of material which may be used ulti-
ma t e ly in that area. 
All of this is done in a n attempt to avoid the over-
loading of highly important transportation systems i n time of 
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emergency. Further action along this line is taken within 
each area. The stocks are distributed in several l ocations 
within an are a , e specially in areas of large consumption, f or 
secu r ity reasons , to insure a continuous supply to the users 
by spreading the risk of interruption of transpo r t ation 
systems. 
Stra t e gi c mate rials are currently ~tored in 166 
different locations in the United States and one in Alaska. 
The number of locations by type and use are shown in Table VI. 
The operation of these locations is financed by the Federal 
Supply Service from the stock pile funds. The charges cover 
such expenses as receipt, handling and storage rentals. The 
details of the implementing agreement with the Air Force, as 
an example, are contained in Air Force letter 67-9 and Air 
Ma t eriel Co~nand letter 67-23 which direct that the neces sary 
work be done by Air Force personnel on a reimbursable basis. 
At the twelve Federal Supply Service sites, the Public Bui l d-
ings A&ninistration performs protection and maintenance 
dutie s while the care and handling of materials is performed 
by c01mnercial operators under contract at the direction of 
the Federal Supply Service Regional Supply Center Managers. 
The general storage policies are established by t he 
Mun itions Board. The Munitions · Board Stocl{pi le Storage Com-
mittee, the Industry Advisory Cormnittees and the I nterdepart-
mental Stockpile Committee all assist in the making of these 
policies and in the solving of current problems. The Stock-
pile Storage Committee is composed of representatives from the 
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Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force, Agriculture, and 
Interior and the Federal Supply Service. Its duties are to 
recommend : 
(a) the desired storage areas for each 
material, 
(b) the method of storing each material, 
(c) methods for the proper care and 
handling, including rotat ion of each 
mater i al, 
(d) specific military locations for the 
storage of specific materials, after having 
determined that the space required is 
available, 
(e) specific non-military locations for 
the storage of specific materials, with the 
reasons for non-military storage. (1) 
The channels for t hese policies are much the same as those 
for requirements and procurement schedules. Practical dif-
ficulties in the implementation of the policies are also 
worked out by the committee which can meet on call of any 
member. 
Under the direction of this committee, the Federal 
Supply Service is developing fire security criteria for each 
destructible commodity being stored. Industry, insurance 
companies, the military services and other Government agencies 
are contributing to this study. Criteria have been estab-
lished for tank farms and rubber. Other studies will be com-
pleted in the near future. 
5 . Administra tion. 
The complete a&ninistration and custody of the stock 
(1) Munitions Board Membership Directory of Councils, Agencies 
and Corrnni ttees, 1 January 1950, Page 14. 
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pile is assigned to t h e Federal Supply Service . Thi s in-
cludes all record keeping, t1•ansporta tion, rotation, and the 
actual disposal of mater i als when necessary. I nspection, 
processing and beneficiating are also functions of this 
organization. 
The Munitions Board Stockpile Storage Committee 
assists the Fede~al Supply Service in the determination of 
.. ,. . ~ . 
propel, policies for these activ i ties . Examples are the 
studies currently b eing made by the Federal Supply Service 
with the assistance of the couuni ttee on the extension of 
storable life and the lengthening of the rotation cycle of 
such perishable items as rubber, fibers, vegetable oils, and 
pyrethrum. To these studies the Industry Advisory Comnittees 
for the various cornmodi ties are also contributing . 
Beneficiation is done generally by private con-
tractors . It has been necessary to bring those materials 
transferred as surplus, part of whi ch were scrap, up to the 
stock pile spec i fications. Beneficiation is undertaken when 
the cost of so doing is less than that of purchasing an 
equal quantity of the srune material . One of the principal 
objectives of the stock piling operation is to have the mate-
rial in the best possible form to be of ready use to the 
various manufactu rers in time of emergency. This action 
will save much time , effor·t, manpower, and facilities later . 
It is also the principal reason why not all sou~ces of these 
materials are acceptable for stock pile use . 
Disposi t ion of these materials is rigidly con-
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trolled by the Stockpiling Act. If disposition is in the 
nature of rotation to prevent deterioration, the Federal 
Supply Service may sell the material in the open market 
with prior approval of only the Munitions Board and then 
make an immediate procurement of equivalent quantities of 
substantially the same material. If , however, disposition 
is being made because of a revision in the requirements, a 
more complex -procedure is r equired . First, a study mu st be 
transmitted to the Mili ta1~y Affairs Committee of each House 
of Congress giving notice of the desired disposition acti on 
and .stating the reasons for the revised requirement, the 
runo1mts which are to be disposed, the plan of disposition, 
and the date set on which the material will become available. 
Assurance s must be given that the date set for disposition 
has been fixed with due consideration having been g i ven to 
the protection of the Government against losses on the sale 
and of the protection of the consumers of the material . 
Congr•essional approval of this action must be obtained prior 
to disposal. Second, after the action has been approved, 
the amount and specifications must be published in the 
Federal Register for six months . Congressional approval 
is not required in the case of obsolescence which has been 
construed to include as well as deterioration, the develop-
men t of new or better matePials or when the mat erial is no 
longer usefUl in time of war . 
Release of the stock pile materials to industry 
requires a Presidential Order stating that they are needed 
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for co~~on defense and that the release will be monitored by 
(blank) agency. After tha t , release of the material will 
require only the approval of that agency . Certain mobili-
zation plans are b eing drawn by the NSRB which will contain 
phantom _orders of this sort and which it is hoped will 
facilitate the orderly transition into emergency use of 
these ma terials . 
The majority o f the records of the stock pile are 
classified and so are unavailable to the public. Though 
the Federal Supply Service has the duty of maintaining the 
records , the semi-annual report of p:r•ogress to the Congress 
is made by .the Muni tions Board. These reports are made on 
23 January and 23 July of each year . 
6 . Development of New Sources of Supply. 
The second phase of the Stockpiling Act objectives 
as stated in the declaration of policy is: 
'to encourage the conservation and develop~ 
ment of sources of these materials within 
the U. S. and thereby decrease and prevent, 
whe rever possible, a dangerous and costly 
dependence of the u. s. upon foreign 
nations for supplies of these materials in 
time of war." 
These functions are assigned to the Departments of Interior 
and Agriculture. 
The Secretary of Interior, through the Direc tor, 
Bureau of Mine s, and the Director, Geologic Survey in Section 
7a of the Act is : 
"authorized and directed to make scientific, 
technological and economic investigations as 
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to the extent and mode of occurrence, 
development, mining, preparation, treat-
ment and utilization of ore and other 
mineral substances in the United States 
or territories which are ess ential to 
the common defense or industrial needs 
and grade s and quantit ies are inade-
qua te from known sources ." 
These surveys indlude the devising of better method s of utili-
zation of lower grade ores, and the developmen t of more effi-
c ient methods of c losing mines, whose operat ions have become 
unprofitabl e but whe re deposits are still left, to facilita t e 
re-opening i n case of eme r genc y . Improved methods of reduc-
tion o f ores whereby less of the material is wasted i n the 
flux, and of ways by which the same proper· ties can be trans-
mitted to the user with the use of less of the strategic mate-
rial are also being s tudied. I n each instance, the conserva-
tion resultan t from such methodology may be equal to the 
discovery of a l a r ge new deposit. Much work is also being 
do n e by these agencies in the reclamation of materials from 
scrap. 
The survey of new sources is being conducted on both 
public and private lands. These sources are examined by 
drilling, trenching, and metallurgica l testing to discove r 
the extent , and quality of the deposits and the best methods 
of recovery . Technical advice and as s istance are provided 
to the State Department and the ECA in identifying and opening 
up new overseas sources of these minerals . The Bureau of 
Mines is also engaged in the development of new minerals as 
substitutes for those now strategic and critical . Titanium, 
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the one most headlined today, has been developed under the 
guidance of. this Bureau. Great hope is held for it as a 
possible substitute for some uses of iron and aluminum in 
light, strong forgings. It is a most plentiful materie.l and, 
with further development, may cure some of our most perplex-
ing problems . 
The Department of Interior divides these activities 
into three general types: geological, mining, and metallurgi-
cal. Table VII shows the number of projects currently unde1~ 
investigation in e ach category. It will be noted that the list 
of minerals for inve s tigation by the Department of Interior 
is not identical with the Munitions Board stock pile list. 
In certain instances the materials on the Munitions Board 
list are known not to occur in the United States. The Bureau 
of Mine s feels that it would be most foolish to establish 
further investigations for them. In other instances loca-
tion of large deposits of low grade ore are known. These 
will be a solution to the problem if costs of extraction are 
not important. The materials which appear on the Bureau of 
Mines list, but not on that of the Munitions Board, are 
being investi gated as possible substitutes for strategic or 
critical materials . 
Geologic investigations are of four types: 
1. The systematic geologic mapping of active 
and potential mining districts and regions as 
a prerequisite for the actual search for new 
deposits, either by industry or government . 
2. Research in ore finding, calling for the 
combined efforts of geologists, geophysicists, 
and geochemists. 
3. Exploration for new mineral deposits, 
in those areas and for those materials no t 
sufficiently attractive to bring for th the 
efforts of private industry, are carried 
to the point necessary to determine the 
existence of a deposit, and to estimate 
the overall tonnage and approximate grade 
of the mater ial as it exists in the ground, 
its quality, and the geologic factors of 
occurrence that influence mining and_ 
processing. 
4 . Continuing appraisals of the mineral 
position of the United States with respect 
to quantity, quality and grade of the mate-
rial existing in the ground, and with re-
spect t o the discovery possibilities. 
Apprais als ' of foreign sources of supply are 
made on the same basis. The work load of 
the Bureau in these four fields has been 
divided in the past about equally between 
the first three at 30 per cent each with 
10 pel"" cent on the physical explo1•a tion 
for ne'l.v ores . 
Mining investigation and re search is divided between 
projects to develop knowledge about known deposits and experi-
mental mining to develop efficient methods of extraction and 
the determination of the actual co sts of extraction. 'fue 
results of these studies are disseminated to industry to 
promote efficiency. Under these studies a low grade m~nganese 
deposit in Maine has been shown to have about ten tlines its 
previous ly known dimensions, and portions of a large Montana 
chromite deposit were repaired and experiments in low cost 
s top ing _ methods ·were carried on, with particular attention 
to the prevention of dilution of the ore. Many such projects 
are under way and onl;,r a few are complete. Nevertheless , more 
than sixty reports presenting the engineering data resulting 
from these various studies were published in the period 
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1 July 1949 to 1 January 1950 . (1) 
Metallurgical research i ncludes projects on the 
beneficiation and utilization of iron ores, the development 
of new metals and minerals as substitutes fo r certain stra-
tegi c materials, and the synthesis of mica and asbestos. It 
also includes the processing and development of domestic 
sourc-es for certa in rna terials such as nickel, manganese, 
cabal t and chromium, as well as the development of pl"Ocesses 
for recovery and refining of secondary metals to prevent 
- waste . Th~ development of new arid impl"'oved alloys such as 
titanium mentioned above also falls in this group. The 
most recent development to be announced was the synthetic 
production of pruogopite (black) mica crystals. These crys-
tal~ are still too small to be of use but give encouragement 
to further work along these lines. 
As these studies on strategic materials are simi-
lar to the r egular fun ction of the Bureau of Mines, no 
special organization has been established to carry out its 
functions under the Stockpiling Act nor has additional 
personnel been provided. (2) 
The Department of Agri culture is charged by Section 
7 (b) of the Stockpiling Act with the responsibility to make 
sc~entific, technologic, and economic investigations of the 
feasibility of developing domestic sources of suppl ies of any 
(1) Munitions Board, STOCI~ILE REPORT riD THE CONGRESS, 3 Jan. 
1950, Page 35. 
(2) Le t ter dated, 22 November 1949, from J. H. Hedges, Chief, 
Minerals Division, Bureau of Mines, Department of In terior. 
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agricultural material or substitutes therefor, and to make 
similar investigations for substitution of agricultural com~ 
modities for the manufacture of any materials determined to 
be strategic or critical by the Munitions Board. At present 
·these agricultural materials include : agar, castor oil, 
coconut oil, cordage fibers (manila and sisal) emetine, 
hyoscine, opium, palm oil, pyrethrum, quebracho, quinadine, 
quinine, rubber and shella.c, as of 23 _January 1950 . It had 
projects under way on each of these. The details of these 
projects are shown in Table VIII. 
In addition, projects are being carried on jointly 
with the Off_ce of Rubber Reserve in synthetic rubber produc-
tion as well as the stocking of seeds of rubber producing 
plants such as guayule . Joint programs are under way with 
the Latin American Republics to encourage the expansion of 
production of certain tropical plants. Development in certain 
overse as areas has been undertalr:en under the 11Point 4" program . 
The Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture 
is making surveys of certain types of lumber which are required 
as well as of those trees which are possible sources of 
tannin and cei'tain oils. Much work in the field of cellulose 
and lignin is being done. These are sources for plastics, 
rayons, and industrial materials used for the production of 
explosives. Other projects covel' the field of lamination of 
woods to obtain the characteristics of impor t ed hard woods , 
and to improve fire resistance, water proofing, etc . 
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As in the Department of Interior, these duties 
are so closely related to the normal work of the Department 
that no separate organizations have been set up to carry 
out these functions . 
The Strategic Materials Division of the Economic 
Gooperetion Administration is concerned with the encourage-
ment of geological exploration of new deposits of strategic 
minerals and of private development of mining and refining 
facilities in ERP countries as well as the procurement and 
delivery of strategic mat~rials to the United States. This 
division carries out these objectives by encouraging t he 
entering of both the capital of the foreign nation and 
American capital in the mining business in the Marshall Ple.n 
countries and their dependents. This work is most difficult, 
for in many instances the mining equipment is lacking, any 
production that is achieved is needed by the country itself, 
and because of lack of interest on the part of American 
capital due to tax and export problems, as well as the 
insecurity of foreign investments at this time~ Further , 
many of the best sources for the strategic materials are out-
side the sphere of influenc~ of the Marshall P lan countries . 
The Strategic Materials Division is under the direct super-
vision of the Director of Operations and perforn1s the policy 
functions . ECA foreign missions carry out most of the direct 
dealings with the specific countr ies. 
Loans have been offered to Arnerican companies, out 
of counterpart funds, for overseas development and exploration 
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programs, to be repaid in production if gained. However, 
for the most part these companies have indicated that they 
cannot assume the risks involved since combined United 
States and foreign taxes are excessive and no definite 
market is guaranteed for the output . Some ERP coun t ries 
require 51 per cent ownership by nationals. United States 
tax laws require majority ownership by .American citizens 
before deductions can be obtained .for foreign taxes paid. 
There of course can be little guarantee for long term con-
t inued procurement by the United Sta tes government of the 
output of any mines so developed nor can any investor be 
guaranteed that his investment would not at some future 
da t e be completely taken over by the foreign country. 
EGA is also charged with the obtaining of future 
schedules of minimum production of strategic materials 
which will be available for purchase by the United States. 
In order to do this, quantitative goals for foreign procure-
ment for each material are necessary prior to the commence-
ment of negotiation. To the present these have not been 
available, probably because of two reasons.. The Stock Pile 
authorities do not want to tie themselves to any specific 
market as this would lessen the opportunities to purchase at 
the lowest price. Any such definite foreign commitments 
would cause serious objections from the domestic mining 
interests. As has been pointed out in the chapter on legis l a-
tion, there have been many attempts made on the part of these 
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interests to restrict foreign purchases to only those mate-
rials not produced at all by the United States. 
Investigations have been and are being made by a 
special EGA mission to study the problems of mining expansion 
and exploration in the various countries . Included on this 
mission are representatives of the Federal Supply Service, 
the Strategic Mater>ials Division, EGA, a mining consultant, 
a transport~tion consultant and a legal consultant. Cex•tain 
repercussions of these investigations have been reported in 
the papers . The following quotation is taken from an article 
in the New York Times, dated 7 Sep tember 1949, which told of 
an unofficial report in Paris that Morocco and French Africa 
possess ample quantities of all minerals needed for light 
and heavy industry and continues to say, 
"I t is also hinted that a u.s . geological 
mission is now in North Africa examining 
possibilities of international cooperation 
in developing this wealth. 11 ( 1) 
More can be expected of these surveys in the fi1ture. Table 
IX gives a review of possible sources of strategic materials 
which was prepared by the EGA as of February, 1949. 
In spite of these difficulties the EGA as of 31 
December 1949 had development projects and purchases under 
negotiat ion amounting to 32 million dollars, of which 18 million 
were counterpart funds and 14 million were assignable to EGA 
and strategic materials projects in dollars. Pending contracts 
(1) ~York Times, 11France Believed Ready to Invite u.s. 
Capital to Help DeveJ.op Resources of African Lands", 7 Sept . 
1949, Page 6, Col. 3. 
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included several f or the production of bauxi t e , ch r omi te, 
lead and zinc. 
7. Financ j_ng. 
As h as b een indicated in other sections , the 
f i nancing of the stock pile operations is achieved in several -
ways. First, direct appropriations are pla ced a t t he dis -
posal 0f the Fede ral Supply Service for outright buying of 
mater ials and operating expenses. Second, contrac t authority 
is provided for procur•emen t contrac t s for future deli very. 
1hird, f or those operations which fall within the s cope of 
o ther agencies of government as a part of their normal 
funct ions, funds appropriated to those agencies are expended, 
in part, to fill stock pile requirements. Four t h, funds 
appropr ia t ed f o r other programs such as the EGA are used 
indirectly for the purposes of the stock pile. 
The budget estimate for the direc t stock p i le 
operations is submitted annually by the Federal Supply Serv-
i ce. It is based on requirements and procurement schedules 
provided by the Munitions Board, together with Federal Supply 
Servi c e estimates of the costs of operation and administration . 
In the Federal budget it appears under the group c alled mili-
tary programs along with the other simi l a r pro jects such as 
the Atlantic Pact Pr ogram. I t is defended by the Federal 
Supply Service with the assis t ance of all the agencies who 
participa te in c arrying out the program. It is first reviewed 
by the Bureau of the Bu dge t , Execu t ive Offic e of the Pre sident, 
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where it becomes part of the President ' s budget . It is 
then sent to Congre s s where it is screened by the Appropria-
tions Committees of both Houses and is finally approved, 
when it has passed by both Houses and has the signa tui·e of 
the President . At each of these l evels i t is s creened f o r 
possible excesses and as a part of the total Federal Budget. 
'I n the making of the final appropriations, the immediate 
needs of t he country must be weighed against all expenditures 
such as this . 
Every stock pile budget estimate so far has been 
reduced to some extent .. This of course necessi t ates comple t e 
rescheduling of priori t i es and pro curement s chedules to 
mainta i n balance i n the s tock pile. Until recently, the 
s tock pile has had vel'Y lovv priority among government pro-
jects . This may account for some of the r eductions of appro-
priations and for the delays which have taken place in the 
approval of thi s budget by the Congress . 
Any monies which are appropriated to the stock pile 
remain available unt i l expended, as do funds which are re-
ceived from the sale of materials for rotation . Funds which 
result from sale s of materials for any o t her purpose, however, 
must be re t urned to t he Treasury a s mi s cellaneous receip t s . 
Table X shows the amounts of the various appropriat i ons to 
da te and the mnounts which h ave been expended . 
The entire appropriation is seldom expended until 
the end of the fisnal year , as c erta i n amounts are retained 
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as 1,eady cash to buy those ·i terns which, due to scarcity on 
the marlcet, are far behind in progress toward the ultimate 
stock pile object . For this reason not all materials which 
are available on the market are bought though funds are 
still available . 
Table XI shows a breakdown, by type of cost, of 
the expenditures for the stock pile through 31 December 1949. 
I t i s inte resting to note that only .7 per cent of the funds 
have been expended on administration, 4.7 per cent for 
maintenance, 6.6 per cent for frei ght , storage , handling , 
process i ng and handling , while 88 per cent has been expended 
for the a c tual acquisition of the materials . Dr . J. D. 
Morgan, Jr. of the NSRB told the authOl'' t hat h e considered 
the sto ck pile operation one of the most efficient in govel,n-
ment . From the above data , the au t hor is inclined to agree. 
8 . Surmnary. 
I t can b e concl uded from the above discus sion tha t 
the i mplementat ion of the po l icy contained i n Public Law 520 
is one of maximum coordination be tween nearly all departmen ts 
of govermnent. The responsibilities have been delegated to 
those agenc ies already in existence whi ch can most easily 
combine them with previously assigned respons ibilities as an 
extension of normal day-to-day duties. Through a committee 
system duplications of e fforts are eliminated and the latest 
relevant information in any f ield assembled. Maximum use i s 
made of information and worl.c done under other appropl,ia tions . 
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The relative stratificati on of committee s fr om the wo r king 
level staffs on t h rough the policy making , and execut i ve 
levels of government assures that, at each level, due consid-
erat iOn is given to the practicality of both stock pile po li-
cies and other policies of gover•nment to insure t ha t none are 
at cro ss purposes i nsofar as possibl e . 
Dif:ficul ties may arise from the f act t hat no s ingle 
agency is solely r esponsible for the success of the en tire 
p1•ogram and that approving authority, with the exception of 
that of the Pres i dent, li es with a Cmmnittee composed of 
representatives of many agencies of government who may not 
be able , at a ll times , to give complete attention to t he 
stock p iL.ng problems because of the p ressure of othe r duties . 
I n either i nstance the stock pile function may be r elegated 
to a secondary posi t i on because it i s no t a ss i gned as princi-
pal duty . 
In spite of the above pos sible difficulties, one can 
conclude by appaising the apparen t costs of the stock pile 
progrrun as currently administered that the current de l egation 
of dut ies is less expens ive and probably more effi c i ent than 
woul d be a separate organiz~tion to perform all stock pile 
and r elated functions . Moreover , the duplication of efforts, 
records and pel~ sonnel inherent in addition of another agency 
are eliminated . 
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CHAPTER VII 
CUR::--EH T STA'IUS OF Ttffi STO CK PILE ( 1) 
Having ex&'llined the pre sent policies and the 
method of their i mplementation, it is time to turn to t he 
results of this activity and examine what has been accom-
plished and what remains to be dnne before the stock pile 
itself i s completed . 
The s t ock pile program is now i n the last half 
of its fourth year . It is approaching the date s et in 1946 
as the target for the completion of the fillin g of the 
min imum objectives . _.s of 31 December 1949, 41 . 5 percent 
of the dol l a r value of the stock pile ob jec t i ves had been 
reached . Of thi s, 30 . 4% was on hand and 11.1% on order . 
In terms of dollars thi s meru.1.s thEt of the to tal 3 ,773 
million dollar objective, 1,149 were on hand and 406 wer~ 
programmed for de livery within Fisca l Year 1950. f.i...nother 
4'13 million do;Llars worth of materials, Ol"' 12.21~ i s 
scheduled for delivery after 30 June 1950 . With the receipt 
of th is latter amount, t h e cur'l"ent stock pile will represent 
53 .7 percent of the to tal min i mum obj ec t i ves. T'Dese data 
are presented graphically in Char t No . VIII. 
In addition, the unexpended balances of the stock 
pile funds as of 31 December 1949 wer•e 438 million dollars , 
including funds appropriated under both Public Law 520 and 
the original law of June , 1938. Chart No. IX shows . the 
Data adapted from: Munitions Board Stock Pil e Report to 
the Congress , 23 J anuary 1950. No later data is presently 
avai l able . 
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progress of obligations through the first half of this 
f is cal year . Based on the data given in the previous chap-
ter OY"'. costs of opera tion, 88 percent of t he unexpended 
bal ance is ava ilE.ble for additional procurement . li th 
this expenditure of approximat~ly 4i5 million dollar s, an 
addit iona l 8. 11~ will be added to the stock pile this fi scal 
year bringing the total, exc luding further transfers from 
EGA or other agencies, to 61 . 8 percent of the objectives . 
These data indicate that some extension of the t i me 
allowed for the acquisition of the stock pile will have to 
be made . vn~ile it is true that expendi tures have increased 
greatly over those of the first few years; nevertheless, it 
will still requil"e the expendi tur·e of ove1• one billion dol-
lars to finish t he procul"'ement . It is improbable that tha t 
amount of mate rial could be withdrawn from industria l uses 
in a single year wi thout serious disruption of the materials · 
market and manufacturing industry. It is even less probabl e 
that such a large amount of money will be made available to 
t he Federal Supply Serv i ce . 
The expenditure of the last third of the funds 
wil l probably present much the same problems as the first 
t hird. Slmv progress was made in the first tvvo years of the 
program because of acute shortages of mater-ials on the market . 
This is noticeable from the data in Table X. The materials 
which arf3 shorte st and most out of balance in the stock pile 
are also t ho se which are still the most difficult to procure . 
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Among these a r e probably the steel hardening materials fo r 
which we are practically total ly dependent on i mportation . 
The poli tical s tuation surrounding sources for t hese mate-
r i a ls will probably mean continued shox•tages . No data· on 
the individual materia l s are available for security reasons . 
There f or , one can only conjecture as to which or ac tually 
how many materials are behind schedule. 
As the li sts and quant i tative obj ect ive s are re-
viewed at l east once a year, certain changes have been made 
in both . For example , optical glass was dropped f rom the 
list i n J une, 1945, kapok ir: May, 1946, natural rubber l atex 
in December , _ 1948, and rapeseed oil i n February, 1949. 
Chemi c~?. l grade chromi te, aluminum me t al, and asbes t os 
(c r ocidolite) were added to the list in 1950 . Certa in 
changes have been made in the spec i fications to permi t the 
acceptance of new sources of the material. The objectives 
themse lves are being reviewed in the l i ght of t he new stra-
teg ic assump t ions. So fa r this review has resul ted i n the 
establi shmen t of new objectives for eleven materials: chro-
mi te (meta:Llurgical) , manganese (metallurgi cal ) , rubber, t in, 
abaca, s:tsal, corundum , kyanite, talc, quebracho, and opium . 
The se ma terial s constituted about 36% of the total value of 
t he stock pile a s of 23 January 1950 . The review is now 
cont i nu ing with the reexami nation of objec t ives fo r ttems 
consti t uting about 93% of the value of t he stock pile . Thi s 
was t o have been compl eted b y Apr il, 1950 . Present world 
condi t ions have resulted i n generally increased stock pile 
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objectives for the materials which have been reviewed t hus 
far. 
Details of the progress of the other phases of the 
stock piling activ i t ies were indicated i n the previous chap-
te r as part of the description of the activities of the 
various agencies. The acquisition of suitable storage faci-
lities is being expedited, res earch is being done on storage 
methods and the extension of storable life of the more perish-
able items; work on beneficiation of sub-grade materials is 
progressing . All of these projects take time but will, i n 
the end, provide better management and materials whi ch can 
be used more readily in time of emergency. 
The research into new sources of materi:::..ls, syn-
thet i cs and substitutes , is beginning to b e pPoductive. It 
will be difficult, for some time, to measure hov,r succes s f u l 
these projects actually are. But such research is not being 
relega ted to futur·e use only, for it is now being placed at 
the disposal of both extr·ac ti ve and manufac tuPing indus trie s. 
The benefits may soon r e sult i n better production methods, 
new products , and lower costs. The pPogl"ess in t h e utiliza-
tion of ti taniurn, the production of synthetic mic a crystals, 
and the production of gua~1le are examples of this research . 
The most unsuccessful part of the current program 
has been that whi ch provide s for the transfer of our agri-
cultural surpl~s es i n exchange for fore i gn strategic mate-
rials. However , fore i gn countries h ave needed dollars for 
trading purposes far more t han they have needed a gricultural 
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supplies. Further, agriculturf:il products are available from 
other cotmtries where dollars are not needed for trade. It 
cannot be expected that a very good bargain can be obtained 
by trading lmown surplus for highly desired items. Durin g 
1949 much of the progress in the building of the stock pile 
was due to the cooperation of industry in using the voluntary 
allocation mechanism provided for by Publ ic Law 395, 80th 
Congress. This cooperation entailed inter-industry agree-
ments to reduce the amounts of the various mater ials used so 
that some would be availab le for the stock pile. 
As the international political situation deteriorated 
in the past several years, interest has increased in the stock 
pile program. The timing of the study of the Bureau of the 
Budget on stock pile organization in relation t o the Berlin 
Airlift p r og:t•am indica ted a realization of the interrelation 
of a sustained military operation and the necessity for stra-
tegic materials. With the clarification of duties and respon-
sibilities by the President ial directive of 5 January 1949, 
the agenc ie s of government were in a better position to 
contr j.bu te to the program. The President has subsequently 
urged that stock pil i ng continue at the fas t est possible ra t e . 
In the late summer o f 1949 when the Armed Services 
Appropriation Bill was under consideration, the Senate Appro-
priations Committee was cons ide ring the reduction of contract 
authority previously authorized for stock piling by 257 mil-
lion dollars. At this time the President sen t a memorandum 
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to both Houses of Congress stating: 
" ••• Since the presentation of the stock-
piling program to the Congress and more 
particularly since its consideration by 
the Senate .Appropriations Committee in 
connection with the Armed Services Appro-
priation bill, certain new and highly 
significant factors have incr•eased the 
impor tance of continuing the program 
originally authorized ." ( 1) 
The factors outlined by the President were: 
1 . that the military aid program which 
would further deplete our resources had 
been approved . 
2. that unrest and communi stic influence 
was spreading in countries which produce 
strategic materials. 
3. that the British pound had collapsed . 
4 . that Ru ss ia now has the atomic bomb . 
(This disclosure was made on 23 Sep t ember 
1950.) ( 2) 
Perhaps as a result of t h is memorandma and of the 
significance of the factors outlined by the President, the 
stock pile contract authority was finally reduced by only 
100 million dollars instead of the larger sum prev iously 
planned by the Senate Appropriations Conun i ttee. Thus it can 
be said that in the last year there has been a definite 
shift in emphasis on the stock pile program from one of 
secondary importance to one of primary importance both by 
the Executive and Legisle.tive branches of government through 
(1) Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 8ls t 
Congress, First Session, September 28, 1949, House of Repre-
sentatives., P. 13689. Read in to the Record by the Han . Mr. 
Gordon Canfield. 
( 2 ) Ibid . 
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organization and laws and by i ndustry through voluntary allo-
cation plans. 
Recen t progress, as a result of this interest, has 
been exce llent by comparison with t hat previously made in the· 
stock pile program. However, it cannot necessarily be expe cted 
that such progress will continue at the present rate because 
of the natural scarcity of the material s. Further, the inter -
national political situat io n may prevent the acquisition of 
certe.in mater•ials in any quantities grea t er than that requir•ed 
by industry • Certe.in phases of the program must continue 
afte.r the completion of the stock pile . The maintenance and 
ro t at ion aspects mean continued goverD~ent procurement, though 
at reduced rates . The investigation of sources and the 
development studies may be expected to continu e as standard 
operations of the gove:t•nment . Changes will occur in both 
the rna ter~ials included i n the stock pile and in the amounts 
desired as changes occur in methods of min i ng and manufacture, 
i n development of ei ther• new materials or equipment, and as 
the international situation shifts. The success of the 
program, ther•efore, can be only appraised in terms of current 
estimates of ever changing future requirements . 
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CHAPTER VIII 
EVALUATION OF THE S TCCK PILING PROGRAM 
In appraising the cu rr•en t s toc1c p ile program, it 
is apparent that the enormous dollar volume of important 
industrial cowmodities covered by the program has made it 
an influential force in shaping both business and national 
economic policies . For this reason the program is a subject 
of considerable impoPtance and controversy in two main are a s: 
first , debate as to the accuracy and a dequacy of the current 
stock pile items and the system of procur ement and second, 
the interpretation of the longer range effects on bu s iness 
product i on and labor policy as well as considerations o f 
national subsidies. 
Policy. 
...- - - ... 
Proponents of the present magnitude aD~- composition · 
of the stock pile po int out that it is based on- !i fun<famental 
concept that the United States will maintain only a "mi n i mum 11 
military pr>eparedness for a future war. Since this includ-es 
the support, in peacetime, of only that force which is abso-
lutely necessary to provide a base for future expansion , the 
stock pile, also, is to be only that amount necessar>y to 
furnish " insurance " tha t materials will be available i n the 
expansi on period of a future war . This policy represents 
the "middle road 11 discussed in Ch apter III and can be c a lled 
neither pacifism nor mili t rism. 
I n many aspe c t s the stock pile, as a fundamental 
element of national defense pol icy , is compar>ab le to an annuity, 
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whi ch upon maturity yields both the pr i ncipal and accrued 
interes t. Similarly, the stock pile , when needed, retUl"ns 
both the stored commodi ties themse l ves plus the i mportant 
accrual of time at "pr ewar " lower costs . 
A stock pi l e of materials can be of great use 
vvhether or not v;e ourselves are engaged in a war , for di sasters 
C8.11 occur i n o ther parts of the world cau sing our supply of 
ma terials to be curtailed or completely c l osed. Since such 
elimination of s ources of supply wou l d very shor t l y reduce 
ou1 .. industria l manufacturing , we must obtain a continuous 
supply of these materials a t al l times . For exrunple, the 
trouble in the Far East today may soon elimi nate no r mal trade 
and force black market prices for the ma teria ls which come 
from that area . I n this day of continuously inflating cos t s , 
such a situa tion mi ght serve t o reduce the ou· put of many of 
our factori es . No private industry alone can afford to hold 
such s t ocks of materials as would be n ecessary to assure it 
continuous production during foreign wars and closed supply 
sources . I t is well t hen that the Goverm1ent h as in the 
s t ock pile some reserves of these materials whi ch can be used 
if' neces s ary. 
While substitute materials can be use d for a while 
and for some pro ducts, experience has proved that imperfect 
substi tutes are very expens ive . For example , i n an inte rvie~l 
Paul W. Litchfield, Cha irman of the Bo ard, Goodye a r Ti r e and 
Rubber Company , stated: 
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••• During the last war· we had practically 
no crude ( rubber ) at all and had to go down 
to 15 percent of natural to 85 percent of 
synthetic and that is what made tires wear 
out so fast . Using the same amount of 
l abor and the same amount of other mate-
rials, they lasted only half as long , so 
the re is a point below which you cannot 
economically go in the use of synthetic . 
There is one thing tha t synthetic will 
not do so far as well as n a tura l rubber, 
and tha t i s it won ' t stand heat . For high 
speed or thick tires it simp l y falls down. 
So while we went up as high as more than 
50 percent synthetic in truck tires, you 
can't get half the mi leage that you ge t 
with na tura l rubber. Since the war, we 
have used pract · ca l ly no synthetic i n 
truck tires and we h ave never u s ed it in 
airplane tires. If natural rubbe r goe s 
up too high , we could make sati sfactory 
smal l passenger t ires wi th 95 percent 
synthetic. " ( 1 ) 
Thus from Mr . Li t chfield ' s comment it can be see 
how l ack of strategic mater i als generates other sho tages in 
less strategic areas. The stock pile t h en can assure no t 
only the ava:tlabili ty of t he materials stock piled bu t of 
those ma te1•ials which a re related by combination with stra-
tegic mater i a ls . For example , if it is assumed that substi-
t u te rna ter i a l requires the same proportion of other mater ials, 
l abor, and plant capacity to produce an end item as does the 
original mate r ial , and that the end item made wi t h the sub-
s t itute l asts only one half a s long as the one made ili ith the 
original material, it can be said tha t the resultan t product 
requires twice as much of these other items . Further , it 
requ ires twi ce as much hand ling, shipping, an d storage 
{ 1) U. S. Ne vs and World Report , Rubber• Needs for Peace and 
1ar, 24 March 1950, Page 32 . 
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fac ilities. To provide these extra facilities for the 
"er s a tz" product requires additional steel, lumber, machinery, 
and labor , which aga in increases t:r._e s hor tage of the stra-
tegic materials which we set out initially to conserve. 
An adequate stock pile can thus save both 'materia l s 
and money, and i n •so doing , acts as an obste_cle to vrartime 
infla tion. It is believed that if the savings outlined above 
and t he increment in value of the stock pile itself i n war-
time were sub t racted fr•om the tota l cost of the stock pile ., 
a substantial dollar profit would be real i zed in addition to 
th e s ent-al s ecurity as ects . 
Much criticism has been made of the steele pile 
objectives . As pointed ou t above, these obj ect ves are the 
minimum quant t ies believed to b e neces sary to bridge the 
critical period until our own marginal producers can come 
into pro duction . For other-materials not availabl e i n even 
mar gi na l quantities in the U. s., the pol i cy is bas ed on 
certain sea-lanes b e ing open and continued foreign produc tion 
in some ac ce s sible areas during a war . In addi t i on the con-
tinued use of 'Norld War II experience becomes less val i d 
as time goes on due to populati on growths, changes i n tech-
niques , and changes in consumpt i on hab i ts. The basic data 
for the quan ti t a tive determination of requiremen ts are the 
Bills of Materials for the various end items. For the many 
new weapons that are still i n the development or drawing 
board stage, the Bill s of Ma terials are approximation s at best . 
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Due to these diff i culti es, many critics find fault 
wi th the quanti tative aspects of the program and condemn the 
present ob j ective s as being nei-ther min i mums nor maximums 
but only educated guesses . Other• cl~itics argue the theme 
that "importati on a ter an M-day is wishful thi nk- ng . and 
that as we have a l ways needed twice as much as we thought we 
did ~ tha t we shou l d stock pile the max imum amounts so that we 
can be sure of hav i ng t he minimum requirements ." 
Vfuile there is some degree of val idi ty in each of 
these cr i tici sms, it sh:ml d be remembered that we ha e e en 
ab l e to acqui r e les s tD.an two- thil"ds of t he present mi nimum 
ob j ectives in nearly four years , s ince to have acquired mo r e 
would have curtailed industrial uses. Such a reduction of 
industry ' s share of the mater-ials on the mar ret would mean 
the cuPtailmen t of industrial capacity 1."lhich is not only 
neede i n an operating s t a t us i n a fu t u re wal" but i s needed 
today to ma i ntain our economic str~ngth. I t would h ave been 
as re aningle ss to establi sh a goal that is unattai nable now 
as it was t o establish a three year stock pile objective 
dul~ing the progress of World War II. I t can be conc l uded, 
therefore , that the present min i murn goals represent reasonab l e 
obj e c t ives based on the most fea sib l e of current assumptions . 
If the calcula tions cont i nue to be revie·wed f r equently and 
the bas i c data kept current with progress as i s no 1 being 
done , the minimum goa l s shoul d prov e sound f rom a long range 
planning point of view . 
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The present organizat ion and ass ignment of responsi-
b ilities are apparently functioning well. In persona l inter-
vi e-rf s \Vi th Air Force, Army, Munitions Board, and NSRB repre-
sentatives and observers on the Inter-departmental Stock-
Piling Committee in January, 1950, the author was given 
most favorable accounts of the progress and the workability 
of the present organization . The following points were 
emphas ized : 
1 . All departments of the Federal GoveJ•n-
ment are brought together in the solution 
of a complex problem at the various leve l s 
of responsibility. T'nis b1• ings a broad 
fund of background knowledge and promotes 
bette r understanding on the part of each 
department of the scope of the problem, the 
inter-reaction of each proposal i n the name 
of s tock piling on the other facets of the 
economy, and of the assistance tha t i s 
available in solving the problems at hand 
withou t duplic a tion of the preparation of 
lengthy and time-consuming studies . 
2. Each depa.rtment is charged vvith duties 
that fall within its normal functions and 
thereby prevents the duplica tion of these 
functions in an especial agency for stock 
piling. 
3 . Each department has knowledge of the 
stock pile objectives and has guidance 
therefrom in the execution of its other 
duties which affect the pr·ogress of the 
stock pile. 
4 . By requiring the detailed review of 
the policies of the stock pile by the 
several commi t tees , the better considera-
t i on of their worth and workabilityis 
assur•ed. 
5 . Because of the involved dispersion of 
functions and the counseling pos i t i on of 
the NSRB, which i s in f act t11e Cabinet, 
a moderation of the influence of pressure 
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groups from both i nside and outs i de the 
Goverrunent can be obtained. 
6 . The NSRB func t ions with more facility 
and ease in an obser ver status than if the 
d irect responsibilities of rev i ew and 
approval were charged to it. A better 
de gree of cooperation and freer contri-
butions are made by a ll agencies than 
would be expected if the NSRB were the 
final approv ing agency . 
On the other hand , most of the committee members 
with whom the authoi' talked agreed that c larification could 
be made i n the curren t laws. It would be most construct ve 
to rewrite Public Law 520 to i ncorporate the changes in 
government organization as well as t Q b1• i ng together the 
separate sections of t he many laws novv in existence which 
contribute to the stock pile authority. The separation of 
the stock piling functions and the development functi ons into 
two separate and d istinct la'iJvs was also co:nsidered to be 
~esirable both from an operating point of view and for elimi-
nation of the confusion of the two objectives. 
It would seem most desirable to the lNr i ter for 
the NSRB to assume the same re sponsibility for the coord i na-
tion of c ivilian r•equirements for the Departments of Commerce , 
Interior, and Agriculture , as the Munitions Board has f or 
militax•y requirements . This would insure that a ll computa -
t ions were on the srune basi s and that all phases of the 
c ivilian re qu irement were provided for in the estimate. 
Vhile the committee system is most democratic and 
provides the utilization of a wide variety of the member ' s 
tra ining and experience, nevertheless, it appears to be 
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ponderous in actual operation. TJ.1.e writer was assur•ed that 
if anything of an imperative nature arises the co@nittee can 
be called in to sees ion immediate ly - Ho'rvever, the member•s of 
the committee are from widely scattered agencies and many 
are not solely engaged in the stock piling program . It 
therefor appears most unlikely that these people could attend 
such meetings at a l l times nor be as readily available as 
claimed. Thus many of the decisions may be relegated to the 
personnel wi thin the operating agencies with little help 
from the committees. This, too, dispers e s the sense of 
responsibility of any one agency fOl' the success f u l ope ra-
tion o f the program. In many ways it would seem advisable 
. to have a full- time staff in the NSRB vdth the function of 
act ing as a clearing house for immediate stock pile problems. 
The present budgeting sys tem is most complex, with 
several agenc ies responsible for the stock pile budget com-
pu cation and the Federal Supp:}.y Service r•e spons ible for its 
defense before reviewing agencies with assistance from the 
other agenc ies. The system is not only time consuming for 
all concerned but would appea r most difficult for the review-
ers i n that so man:r agenc i es must be heard. Here again i t 
seems that as '' a little cabinet" , the NSRB should review the 
budgets of all agencies respons i ble for military, industrial , 
and civilian defense for• balance between irnmedia te and long 
range programs and the effectiveness of these programs in 
promoting present National defense policies. Accordingly, 
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if prior to the presentatiori of separ~te budgets by these 
- -
departments, a. combined coordination review was made by the 
NSRB , it is believed that the stock piling program as a 
pr_nc ipal element in the National security program would 
be given a more pr ominent budgetary position~ 
The limi tations placed on procurement of the stock 
pile by the various laws are difficult to apply and are in 
some instances contradictory. In spite of the efforts of the 
Goverr .. men t agencies, in accordance with the law, to eliminate 
insofar as possible any repurcussions on the materials mar-
ket from stock pile activities, the market has been and i s 
affected . ~nen the Government absorbs imported materials 
or fairly large quantities of materials the market price is 
bolstered. On the other hand, it is said tha.t the existence 
of the stock pile produces a depressing effect in the trader's 
minds _in that they cannot be certain that the present policy 
of restriction on the sales of materials by the Government 
wil l continue. Further, there is concern as to what the 
effects will be on the market when the Government ceases to 
buy rna terials. 
Some of these views are expressed in the following 
editorial quotation : 
11 0ne important factor in the metals pic-
ture in the u.s. in 1949 was the stock-
piling program. Tne funds voted by the 
first se ss ion of. the 8lst Congr•ess were 
the largest for any Fiscal Year yet and 
more progPess has been made in the last 
twelve months in accumulating the stock 
pile than i n any previous year. We may 
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expect a cut in funds this n ext year 
because of the desire to reduce taxes 
but probably some procurement will 
continue any·Nay. However the mining 
industry will do well to prepare 
itself for the probabllity that in 
another year or two stockpile buying 
may be decidedly on the wane . 11 (1) 
Another area of difficulty lies in the i mplementa-
tion of both t he "Buy .Ame rican clause " and the requirements 
that certain EGA funds and surplus commodities are to be 
u sed for the procurement of foreign produced materials . 
Much of the discussion in the House of Represen tatives on 
the min ing incentive bill (S2105) in September, 1950, cen-
tered around tlns conflict . It was stated that the Munitions 
Board and the Federa l Supply Service were discriminating 
aga inst the domestic producer any time materials we r e pro-
cur ed from foreign source . It is , of course , obvious that 
certain materials must be procured because they are not 
available i n this country. If the provisions of the EGA 
counterpart funds agreements are to b e carried out there 
must be foreign pr ocurement of strategic materials . Under 
the Commodity Credit Corporation Act, as amended, attempts 
must be made to exchange our surplus agricultural commodi-
ties for foreign strategic materials . Thus it appears that 
the "Buy American clause 11 is con t l"adic ted in other legisla-
tion and that all three laws cannot be implemented simul-
taneously·. 
I n many ways the methods established by the Congress 
{1) Engineering and Mining J ournal , February, 1950, Vol. 151, 
No . 2 , Page 72 . Steady Demand Ahe ad as Mining enters 1950. 
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for fo reign _ r ocurement under• the EGA and CCC Acts would 
seem to antagonize foreign countries and perhaps may pro-
v ide a substantiation for Iron Curts. in countries in spread-
i ng the "Yankee Tradel' reputation 11 accorded to us. That 
neither progrma has been very successful is not surprising . 
The EGA is on the one hand attempting to aid in the rebuild-
ing of ERP countri e s and on the other hand is to ne gotiate 
for the very items which are needed to rebuild the countries . 
It is to rebuild trade and yet requires that certain amounts 
of the most precious trading commodities be exchanged not 
for dollars but on repayment basis . The CCC in bartering 
agricultural cormnodi ties for strategic materials also reduces 
t he dollal' exchange which would be available to these countr ies 
if the transfer was an outright sale. The s~~e agri cul t ural 
products can b e obta i ned by them from sources where dolls.rs 
are not needed for exchange. It is to be expected t hen, 
that attempts to dispose of our surp lus commodi t i es will not 
resu.l t in the acquisition of appreciable quanti ties of rna t e-
r ia s and may result i n resentment on the part of other 
countries. 
The min i ng development progrrun of the EC~ on t he 
o t he r ha nd, has received more favorable reception. Und er 
t his program, supplies of mining and transportation equipmen t 
have been exchanged for assurances of certain proportion s 
of mine output . The loan to Yugoslavia was essentially on 
this basis and has re sulted in increased shipments of mate-
rials to the United States. 
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At present , three agenc ies of the Uni ted States are 
contrac t ing for mate rials i n foreign countries, the Fe e ral 
Supply Service, the Commodity Credi t Corp., and the ECA . It 
is possible tha t this has resulted in higher fina l pric es 
to the Uni ted States for the materials, as these agencie s 
may be unknowingly competing with each other f or the avail-
able supplies . I t would seem more satisfactory t o designa te 
one o f these agencies as the sole Gove r mnent contacting agen t 
i n t4e forei gn mar ket . It would be logical to so designate 
the EGA i na smuch as such purchases would then be coordinated 
with the other phases of the Reconstruction programs in 
Europe and Asia and t he r eby resul t i n more f avorable con-
tracts fo r the Uni ted Sta tes. However, there is val dity in 
the argument t hat the stock pile procurement should be ma i n-
tained separate and dist inc t from any other pro gr am if i t is 
to be completed in the near future and is to be kept i n 
balanced proportions. Under this cons ideration , t he Federal 
Supply Service, which is t he principal government procure-
ment agency, should be assigned full responsibility for all 
foreign procurement of strategic materials. In addition to 
the usual stock pile appropriat i ons , certain portions of the 
EGA counterpart funds would. be made available fo r its use and 
it would be designated as the sole agent for the exchange of 
surplus agriculural cornmodi ties for strategic materials i n 
foreign countries . 
Whi l e the pr ob lem of the marginal dome stic producer 
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does not seem on the surface to be appropriate to a discus-
sion of stock piling, such producers nevertheless are i ndi-
rectly connected with the program and have great influence 
on the success of the program in wartime . The requirements 
for the stock pile are based on the assmnption that the 
marginal mine can produce materials if paid premium prices . 
The amounts whiGh are expected from thi s source a r e sub-
ti'acted from the total requ i rements in establishing the stock 
pile objectives. However, if the mine is not sustai ned in 
operation during peacetime, the trained labor becomes dis-
pePsed in to other indus tries , the mine equipment deteriorates 
or is sold, and the mine itself, unless certain expens es of 
stand-by maintenance are undertaken by the owner, may fill 
wi th water or cave in because of rott i ng timbel''s , and the 
deposit may become weathered to the point of extinction . 
This actually was the case in many mines which might have 
been used during the l as t war . Rehabilitation after any of 
these t h ings has happened is not only very expensive i n money 
costs and i n time, bu t gener8.lly cannot be physically accom-
plished . 
During peacetime it i s true that marginal mines 
cannot compete with foreign producers because of grade of 
ore and certain additional operat i ng 6osts , such as the wage 
d ifferential . Tar iffs have not proved to be the answer . 
First, other i ndustry and consumers see little reason why 
they should be forced to pay premium prices for all of a 
material used when little of the t o tal needed is domestically 
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produced . Secondly, tariff s high enough to provide for the 
domestic marginal producer would not be in the best intere-st s 
of the Trade Agreements program which attempts by reciprocal 
agreements to obtain lower foreign tariffs for those goods 
we export in return for lower tariffs on our major imports. 
Direct subsidy is not favored by the mining inter-
ests because they feel that it is only one step remo"'red from 
nationalization of the mines. Many think that a program 
similar to that for agriculture should be established. Under 
such a program the Government would establish a price floor 
and would purchase materials which could not be sold on the 
open market at or above the given pricee From a stock pile 
poin t of view such action on the part of the Government woul d 
have to be maintained completely separate front the stock pile 
procurement . If such procurement were par t of the stock pile 
progrw1, any and all materials produced for which the floor 
price could not be obtained would end up in the stock pile . 
As has been seen, this would not be in the interest of com-
pletion of the stock pile and would produce great imbalance 
among the materials. 
The Bureau of Mines , Munitions Board and NSRB favor 
Government participation in the costs of stand-by maintenance 
of marginal mines as the most workable plan from all aspects . 
Under this plan, the mines would be preserved for fUtul"'e use 
and could be brought back into production rapidly. It is 
believed that the costs would be lower than under either 
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tariff increa ses, subsidy payments or guaranteed markets . 
This plan has the additional advantage of not encouraging 
marginal producers at the expense of the profitable enter-
prises and meanwhile preserving the limited supplies we have 
of scarce materials . 
If the compexity of the stocl~ piling program and 
the many phases are considered, one can say that good progress 
has been made in the acquisition of the stock pile. I t would 
appear that n early every other re l ated project has had pri-
ority over it: first, civilian industr•y has as much of any 
mate rial as i t can use and, secondly, ·o ther programs of 
reconversion, military defense programs, and foreign commi t -
ments have preceded stock piling in the allocation of funds 
by Congress . Under· these circumstances it can not b e expected 
that much more could have been done . 
When considering whether or not the stock pile has 
progressed to a satisfactory point of completion, considera-
tion mus t be given to the I nternational situation. Many feel 
that war is imrninent whi le others feel that perhaps at least 
another five years can be allowed before there is any real 
danger of having to use the stock pile . I n either instance , 
it behooves us to keep working as fa s t as possible toward 
the minimum goals foi•, even thoug h we may not be ouPselves 
embroiled, it is quite clea r that there are forces pressing 
currently in the areas wh ich produce these materials which 
can cut us off f rom them completely at any time. 
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2 . The Economic Implications. 
An exact measure of the economic influence of the 
stock piling policy on the materials market and prices, t he 
cos ts of the manufacturer, o r the support tha t it affords 
to the mining indu stry cannot be made without lmowing the 
amounts of materials stock piled. Inasmuch as this i nforma-
tion is class ified and no t ava ilable to the author, only 
certain generalizations can be made . It was estima ted by 
For t une Magazine i n December of 1948 that the stock pile 
pro curement equalled from five to ten percent of t he then 
current peacetime record consumption. (1) This estimate 
was based on t he first and second quarter pl .. ocuremen t objec-
t i ves for FY 1949. Such speculation, however, will not 
necessarily hold t1~ue for all materials , nor ·will it be 
ne ce ssarily valid over a period of time as both the to t al 
objectives change and the balance ratios change . It i s be-
lieved, however, that certain s ignificant areas mould be 
c l o sely observed by Goverrillent economists and bu s i ne ss to 
insure that the stock pile policies are beneficial. 
From the short range na tiona l point of v i ew the 
withdrawal of basic materials at the refining stage from the 
economic flow res t ricts the flow of these ma t erial s in to the 
manufacturing processes and in turn reduce s the a~ounts of 
the f i nished goods on the market. This reduction causes the 
price of the basic materials remain i ng on the market to 
· {1) For tune , "Indus trial and Corporate News of t he Month, 
T'ne No isy Stockpilers 11 , Time, Inc., Chicago, December , 1948, 
Page 16. 
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cormnand higher pr i c es a d t herfor causes inflated prices 
for a ll of the items which are manufactured f rom t hese mate-
ri a ls . I f t h r ough either the voluntary a llocation plans o r 
through some more drastic allocat i on plan, i nsu ff icient mate-
r ials were l eft for civilian manuf&.cture , it could be e x pected 
tha t some reduction in employment i n the manu factur i n g i ndus-
trie s wau l fo llow, as wel l as still higher prices for the 
finished goods . Meanwhile employment i n t h e extractive in s-
tries would remain high, until foreign product i on fill ed the 
d emand . 
Procurement for t he s tock p ile will preven t any 
cha nce of t h e accmnulation of s u r plus on t he market until 
its d emands are f lled . This, i n turn, acts as an i ndirect 
subs i dy to domes t ic produc ers , as t hey are assured of a mar-
k et for the ir production at a price h i ghe r than n ormally cotld 
be expected . Government purchas es of f oreign ma t e rials g ives 
manufact ring en t erprises an indirec t b enefit by rovid ing 
dollars f or exchange to fo re i gn markets, thus . enabling manu-
facturers to be paid for t he ir exports and incr eas i ng fo r e i n 
trade . The encouragement of the expans i on of forei gn extrac-
t.ve industries also creates a market for mi n ing a n d ref i ning 
ma ch i nery an transportat i on equ i pmen t . The fore i gn ma r _cet 
can be expec ted to ec ome mo re mportant t o i ndustry a s t he 
no~t\·mr shortages are fil l ed in this country . 
Fr om a long range po i n t o f view, i t can b e said that 
the possess i on of a stock p ile will reduce t he costs of a 
futur e war by the storing of mater i a ls, manpower, fac _lities , 
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machinery, transpo :r•ta ~ion, transports. tion equ i pment and time 
when plentiful and less expens ive . By providing less expen -
sive mater als in t me of war , it reduces manufacturing costs 
by the price d i fferentials which will then be existent for 
each of the above items . I t provides to indus try long term 
i nvent ries of materials which ·will be needed for operations 
which would otherwise be lacking during an emergency any 
where in the world . These materials are available to indus-
try at a relatively _ow cost because the carrying charges 
are spr ead over the whole economy through taxat i on. The con-
t in- ed availability of these rna terials in turn provides some 
assur•ance of continuous supply of tne basic f i nished goods 
which are needed ~ 
Since these aspects all sound very bene ficial, 
wha t then are the danger points in the policy of s tock piline? 
It is believed that there are two major dangers in the policy 
and many which follow f1~om them·. The first danger is that the 
organization is established fox• the direct or indirect control 
of both mining and. indus trial pro due tion through the manipula-
tion o f the strategic materials market . This manipulation 
could take the form of direct buying and selling to control 
the flow of materials and/or the allocation to each industry, 
extractive and manufacturing, of production quotas . These 
are the totalitariansbest weapons . To insure the maintenance 
of the present controls which prevent this manipulation re-
quires continued observation of both business and the public. 
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A second dange r point is a lready being evidenced . 
I t is showing up in t he wool ~arket, in the rubber mar ket , 
and can be expected i n o ther mater ials. The Russians , too , 
are sto ck p iling and the competition between the t wo gove r n -
men ts to obtain s tocks of these materials i s driv no the 
price very high. I ndustry and the consuming public soon may 
find prices prohibi t ive. It i s diff i cult to recommend act i on 
to e i ther stop this or to prevent i t ~ The war scares come 
too frequentl ~ to reconnn end that i n the face of sucn a si tua-
t ion the United States should s t art t o use the stock pi l e 
for peacetime use and to cease procuring for the stock pile. 
This competi t ion fo r t he supplies makes t he who l e project 
seem more urgent . Yet the situa tion has the seeds of tragedy 
in it, for a strugg e for the control of the Mal ayan mater i a l s 
could well foster the beginning of anothe r• war . 
The subsidiary dangers which a re inherent in the 
program are not as to tally omi nous as t h e f i rst ti!IJO but are , 
none the l ess , problems to b e solved. The p rocuremen t for 
the stock pile has prolonged the pro sperity of the extractive 
indu s tri es . The pos t wa r demand alone for durable goods woul d 
no t have maintained this l evel . Th is means that ~hen the 
ma jor pro curement for the stoc]{ p ile has been completed the 
extract ive and refining industries wi ll have to curtail opera-
t ions very sharply. Cer ta in o f them a pe now feelin g some 
re cession due to the x·eduction of industr i a l expansion and 
the re~entry of forei gn production . A few pri ces declined 
in t he suw~er of 1949 when t h e stock p ile appropriation had 
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not been a pproved . With renewed stock pile purchases in the 
fall, the prices immediate ly rose againw This is indicative 
of what probably will happen when the stock pile is - compl eted .. 
Th.e present "cries for assistance with no strings attached 11 
are j u st the forerunners of what may come when governmen t 
procurement is on only a maintenance basis . 
The encouragement of the expan s i on of fo:r• i g 
sofirc es p r esents futu re diff i culties . I t is possible that 
by the d evelopmen t o f new sources we may b e faced in the 
futu re with overproduction and a rap i dly deteriorat ing wo r d 
mai'ket . 1iVhen this happens the coinpetition for customers 
ce.uses the extract .on o f only the high grade o r es . The mute~ 
rials remaining, as has been shown before, t h en become uneco-
n omical to mine and are wasted . In these materials, we can 
afford n o waste . It has b een suggested by some that there 
should be a world stock pile of these matePials unde r the 
cognizance of the United Na tions to prevent such a situation, 
but the difficulties in administration of such a stock p i le 
make it highly improbable in the near future. 
The effect of research in developing substitutes 
and synthetics may in the future change the strateg ic mate-
rials pic ture. But it is safe to say that these mate rial s · 
will continue to play an important role in our daily livino-
and in international po litics for some ye a ps to come. They 
are dange r ous in their vi talness . Our ·indus t rial and national 
economic health depends on our ability to obtain and use these 
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materials for wi thout them our stee l mills close, oul" i ndus-
tl"ial machines ecome obsolete and unrepa irab l e, . precision 
instrmnents cannot be made and all other i ndustry whi ch uses 
these products would soon slow down . These materials then 
must be obta i ned, conserved and u sed wisely . 
' . 
\ 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ina much as a detailed study of strategic materials 
and stock piling clearly leads into the tangential, but spe-
cialized, fields of engineering, geology, geopolitics , and 
logistics , it is apparent that no one person possesses suf-
ficient skil s in all these areas to give a wholly correct 
appraisal of prese'nt programs and polic ies. On the oti:ler 
hand, special sts in all these fields have confi ,.ted the f u nda-
mental theory of stock piling on the basis that our country, 
rich though it may be in resources and technicolog ca skills, 
cannot depend entirely on the cont i nuity of our ovm reso rces 
but must rely, to some degree, on foreign sources for certain 
critical materials. 
Although thi s philosophy means that the United 
States must plan ahead for these mater i als to ensure our ovn 
continui ty and survival, the rapidly shifting internationa l 
situation has greatly clouded any analys ts perception as to 
how best to meet the objective of matez•ials self-suffici ncy 
a1d the res ltant economic security. Probably only the per-
spective available several decades hence may y i eld an accurate 
appraisal of our current stock pile policies and programs, yet 
we cannot p ostpone to the future , some mensure of the accuracy 
of our plans. Within these kinds of limits as to perspective 
there are, n evertheless, certain valuable findings and con-
clusions. 
or the possible solutions to the problem of being 
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prepared for continued industrial production in time of emer-
gency, strategic stock piling of mater ials by the Federal 
Government is the least expensive and most flexible. It doe s 
not approach the dollar cost of complete militarization nor 
does it expose us to the dangers of ma jor loss through com-
plete unpreparednes s. Under t his plan the materi a l s remain 
i n t..'la t fopm most useable to indus try for any purpose and 
can therefor be made into either the latest weapons or the 
latest machine tools. It appears to be the best compromise 
policy acceptable t o the United States today. 
The p r esent law has given full consideration to the 
a reas within the domestic economy which are affected by . stock 
pile purchases. The restr•iction s on p rocurement and release 
o f materials indicate t h is; however, such considerations were 
not give n to the foreign markets in the EGA and Commodity 
Credit Corporation Acts. In each of the latter the aruinister-
ing a gencies are instructed to dicta t e very strict terms to 
the foreign countries, with little respect as to what the 
effec t wi ll be on their national situation. Requirements 
t hat ECA countries must allow to u.s. investors in mining pro-
perties rights equal to those accorded their nationals, and 
that certain proportions of the output of t he ril ines must be 
a llocated to the U.S. for procurement represent extreme legi-
slation which probably results in difficult bargaining fop the 
EGA . It is believed that these port ions of the law should be 
rescinded and that such contracts s hould be worked out with 
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each nation if the EGA deems it in the best interest of 
recovery for that nation . 
At present no provision is made in the law for the 
review of the stock pile budget in relation to the progrruns 
which it is designed to support. It is believed that t he 
NSRB should be given the responsibility for the review of all 
budgets concerned with the civilian, industrial, and mili t ary 
mobilization to ascertain whether or not they represent a 
b a lanc ed effort and, in all phases, a consistent policy. This 
review should tru{e place prior to the presentations by the 
Departments to the Bureau of the Budget. 
The cost data provided in the Munitions Board Stock 
Pile Report to the Congress , dated 23 January 1950, shows 
t h a t eighty-eight percent of the appropriation is spent direct-
ly for materials. This indicates a relatively efficient opera-
tion. But, to that cost should be added the costs of the 
other agencies in the computation of requirements , many special 
studies, and the innumerable conferences. I t is apparent, 
therefore, that the true total costs of the program are no-
where presented in single or a ggregate form . 
The requirement of the . law that stock pile purchases 
and releases not affect the commodities market is a laudable 
objective. The efforts · of the administrators in meeting this 
requirement are equally commendable . Ho\;rever , any such pur-
chase or release does affect the market as has been shown. 
During the reconversion period it was desirable that only small 
amounts of materials were withdrawn inasmuch as t h is permitted 
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industry to absorb much of the war d i splac ed labor and to 
fill civili ru1 sho r t a ge s . The time ha s come when i t mus t be 
realized that due to increased industrial use of stra t egi c 
rna ter i a ls, excesse s may not soon appear on the raarket and 
that the stock pile program is not a depression "rna e work " 
mea s u re. If we are to fill the stock pile objectives, it is 
belie v ed tha t a planned procurement of a percentag e rather 
than a fi xed amount of t he a v ailable materia ls must be made . 
I f it is poss ible· that the procurement can be scheduled in 
11off 11 seasons , such p rocurement c an have a favorable react ion 
on the mar ke t . 
It i s believed that the 11Buy American" clause has 
no p lace in leg i s lation such as the Steele Pile Act and should 
be c ancelled. Strateg i c ma terials, by defin i tion, are t hose 
i n wh i ch we are deficient . n1is n ec e s sitate s foreign procu re-
men t . It is believed that by explana t ion of the i t erns selected 
for stock piling even the most ze a lous mining representative 
will be able to see t ha t such forei gn procuremen t is clearly 
essential and is not d iscrimination toward hfs i nterests. 
Inasmuch as the stock pile progrrun cannot possibly 
be completed wi thin the original five year per iod which ends 
with FY1951, it i s bel ieved that act_ion shou l d be taken 
immediately to extend the period for a n addit ional five years, 
or until FY1956. The fir s t half of ti1is peri od should r epre-
sent a phase of rapid procurement and the following half 
should be planned towa rd t he gradual reduction of stock pi le 
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purchases so that the transition to 11maintenance " -procurement 
can be accomplished with the least possible disrupti on of t he 
mining industry and the market . 
The existence of three contracting agencies in the 
foreign market, as is p res ently the case, is most inefficient. 
I t is beli eved t h at the Federa l Supply Serv ice sh ould be made 
respons i ble for all foreign procuremen t of s trategic materials 
and for the exchange of a gricul tural surpluse s for these ma te-
rials where possible . TI1e EGA should continue its work in the 
development of sources and notify the Federal Supply Ser vice 
of the availabili ty of any materials resulting from th_s 
deve l opment . 
The Mu_ iti ons Board and the NSRB a r e charged wi th 
the development and coordination of industrial mobilization 
plans. I n fulfilling these functions they must i nsure that 
the stock p ile i s continuously i n balance and is an adequa te 
representation of requirements in terms of new weapons , manu-
facturin techniques and strategic asswnptions . At the srune 
t i me , it i s equally i mportant that they insure t hat t h sto c k 
pi le is in balance with other phases of i ndustrial mob iliza-
t i on such as industria l c apacity, power and transportation. 
Added emphasis on the stock piling phase should not be al l owed 
to redu ce effo rts in these other areas . 
The Stock Piling Ac t presently incorporates two d is-
tinct ac tions: the acqu i sition o f a stock p ile of s trateg i c 
materials,and the c onservation and d ev elopment o f dome s t ic 
sources f o r these mater i als or t heir subs t itutes. As has b een 
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pointed out before, the confusion of these two actions has 
caused some misinterpretation of the stock piling act as a 
mining incentive act rather than a national defense policy on 
the part of some observers and legislaters. The development 
and conservation portion of the law actually reinforces the 
present enabling legislation for the Bureau of Mines and the 
Department of Agriculture. I t is believed that the deve l op-
ment portion of the Stock Piling Act should be made into a 
separate law and that provision for Government participation 
in the costs of margi nal mine maintenance should be added. 
There is at present no legal provision for such participation. 
I t is believed that the ma i ntenance of marginal 
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mines in a status whereby t hey can be br•ought . into production 
at such time a s is ne ces ar-y andisasJ .. mportant as the maintenance 
of stand- b y nanufa cturi ng capacity. Such Government expendi-
tury s shou ld not be considered as a subsidy to mine owners but 
rathe r as a cost of the protection of nationa l minera l rights . 
Funds should be allocated to the BuPeau of Mines immediately 
for this purpose in order to insure the preservation or" all 
possible sources of scarce materials fo r the future. 
Today, conservat i on in mining and utilization of 
s crap depend on the marlcet price s of the ma terials . This h as 
caused much waste of ou::> limited resources in the past . I.t 
is believed that t his dependence should not continue and tha t 
some con tr•ol measures should be taken. . In other countries 
miners are required to take certain percentages of each ore 
deposit tapped and the ac.cumulatlon of scrap mater i als of 
usa_le quali t ies are r e quired by law. It is reali zed that 
these ma·,y e cons idered drast ic measuJ•es a n d even a furthe r 
step i n Nationalization of our natural resources and the r 
mar k ets. Never theless , s ome a c t ion is requ ired i f 'le are 
to pro long our compa1,a t i ve independence in :r•e s ources . The 
current studies of t he Bu reau of Mines are certainly a step 
fo1•ward in thi s d i re c t ion , but the fi ndings of t hese studi es 
must be utilized if t hey a re t o be effective. 
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It can be expected that in fu ture depres sed per i ods 
of business activity efforts will be made on t he part of 
s p e cial groups to convert the sto ck pi le i nto a "minerals poo_ 11 
to sus t ai.n mining on the one h and and to control the flow of 
mate1•ial s to the commodi ties ma rke t. The desirability of such 
a poo l is outside of the scope of t h is paper. But it must be 
pointed out that any intermingling of the O) jectives of such 
a pool wi th the s toclc pile p r ogram will destroy the balance 
of the stock pi l e and concept of stock piling for emergency. 
I t is believed that the quantitative and qual itative objec-
tives of the stoclr pile should be p reserved e s sentially as 
they are today with only t hose change s ne ce s s a ry to keep the 
s tock p ile current with techn i cal p rogress and lo g i sti c assump-
t ions. 
I t is i mplied in the Stock Piling .Ac t that war wh i ch 
invo l ve s the United States consti tute s the only emergency for 
which the stock pile shoul d be used. Other ernergenc es can 
occ .r which vvould c aus e great disru ption of our economy . Among 
the se are the closing of foreign sour ces of supply by the 
actions of other Governments . The cu~rent difficul t ies be-
-Queen India and Pakists.n have caused a temporary disturbance 
in the bul .. la.p market . The U .. s . as s. principal consumer can 
and should use the stock pile as a weapon to force settle-
ments in such disturbances if our industry is greatly affected 
by them. Another instance where the stoc1c pile srJOuld be 
called into use is i n the support of · our allies, i n the event 
that they should become embroilled in a war which, if not 
successful, will require our entry. In addition, certain 
observers have pointed out that if the Nation ' s well being is 
jeopardized by certain internal disturbances, they will have 
less effect if the President has the power to use t he stock 
pi_l£.: to i nsure continued supply of these materials. For 
these reasons, it is believed that though the term 'emergency 11 
should be restricted to dis t urbances which last ove an ex-
tended period of time, it should be liberally interpreted by 
the NSRB and the President . 
Because of the importance of these measures and 
their direct or indirect effect on each person in the United 
States, it is believed that it is essential t hat a more 
general understanding of the stock piling policy and its opera-
tion be obtained. When the reduction of the national budget 
is considered by the Congress it is probable that those pro-
jects which are least known will be reduced or elim:i.na ted . 
This is probably one of the reasons the stock pile has had, 
until -recently, such low priority. It is believed that the 
stock pile and associs. ted research, development, and conser-
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vation should not be considered a s current operating expenses 
of the Gove!'nrrtent, but should be regarded as sound, long 
term investments for the fUture use of the Nation which will 
contribute to security in time of war and will insure that 
continued industrial progress can be achieved. In addition 
only by public understanding of the problem can the assurance 
be given th•at the program will not become the i nstrument of 
the few . The miner 1 s and importer ' s problem is also the 
problem of the machinist and industrialist . 
The above suggestions should not b e construed to 
deprica te the progress that has been made in the stock piling 
progl'am. Time is obviously required to perfect any program 
which has the breadth of this one. Looking back historically, 
it can be seen that much of the progress in the provision for 
a continuous supply of strategic materia l s has been made in 
the past few years. Afte r World -far I it took tvventy years 
(1919-1939) to get the concept of stock piling into legisla--
tion, whereas within five years after the end of World War II 
we have acquired nearly ~vo-thirds of the minimum amounts 
required for the stock pile and have recognized that the 
study of conservation is necessary. It is hoped that such 
progress toward wise management of our resources will continue. 
Public interest, combined with the present govern~ 
mental machinery can prevent a poss ible future need for com-
plete allocation of these materials in peacetime as we ll as 
wartime. I t can achieve conservation, develop methods of 
128 
reprocessing and r•ecovery of valuable, but formerly wasted, 
materials and can develop new and more effective uses for 
our abundant but undeveloped resources such as water power, 
titanium and others . 
Much wisdom , foresight and imagination has gone 
into the development of the program thus far and the economic 
security and freedom of succeeding generations , as well as 
that of our own, may well depend on the continued applications 
of these attributes . 
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TABLE I 
PERCEN 'EAGE OF MI NERALS I MPORTED--1942-1944 
(RATIO OF I MPORTS TO TOTAL U.S .. CONSID11PTIO N) 
Mineral 
Antimony 
Asbestos ( s . T.) 
Beryl ( S.T.) 
Chrome Ores and 
Concentrates ( S .T.) 
Cobalt 
Copper (S.T.) 
Cor undum Ores (# ) 
Diamonds (Carats} 
Graphite (S.T.) 
Lead (S. T.) 
Uanganes e (L.T.} 
. Mercury (flasks 76 #s) 
}!Jica (#) 
Nickel (# ) 
Quartz 
Tantalum Ores (# ) 
Tin ( L. T.) 
Tungsten ( # ) 
Vanadium (# ) 
Zinc 
1942 
83 . 8 
1 00 .0 
88 .4 
89.6 
85.6 
37 . 4 
100.0 
100.0 
100. 0 
44.6 
87.4 
43.9 
92.0 
100.0 
N. A. 
99 .9 
100. o· 
58 . 4 
36 . 7 
31 .3 
85 . 6 
100.0 
93.3 
85. 4 
88.4 
35.4 
100. 0 
100.0 
100.0 
43.2 
86.2 
47.4 
85. 0 
100.0 
99 .• 0 
98.6 
100. 0 
61.8 
27.5 
40.9 
1944 
77. 8 
100.0 
89.0 
94.6 
82.3 
40.3 
100. 0 
100.0 
100 .0 
44 .7 
82 .6 
34 .7 
88 . 4 
100 . 0 
99. 0 
99. 0 
100.0 
62 .2 
34.2 
3'1.3 
Total 
for 
Period 
83.2 
100.0 
90.6 
89 . 6 
85. 6 
37.6 
100 . 0 
100 . 0 
100.0 
44 . 2 
85 .5 
43 . 2 
88 . 0 
100. 0 
99. 0 
99 . 0 
100 . 0 
61 . 1 
32.4 
36.7 
Source : Statement of Dr. Alan D. Bateman, Hearings of Com-
mitte e on Military Affairs, U. s. Senate, Subcor~nittee on 
Surp l us Property, 79 th Congress , 30 October 1945, Page 1135. 
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TABLE II 
1947 DOI'!IESTIC PRODUCTION 
OF PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC & CRITICAL i[ATERI ALS 
Expre ssed as Per Cent 
of 1947 Uni ted Stat es Tot a l Consumption. 
Asbestos .Amos i te 
Chrysotile . . . . 
Castor Oi l 
Celestite & 
Chromi te 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Strontianite 
Refractory Rhodes ian 
Other 
Coconut Oil 
Columb ite 
Cordage Fibre 
Cordage Fibre 
Manila 
Sisal 
. . 
• • • Iii 
. . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I ndustrial 
Industrial 
Crushing Bort 
S tones •••. 
. . . . . . . . 
.. ... 
. . . . . 
.. 
...... 
. . . 
. . . 
. .. 
Corundum 
Diamonds, 
Diamonds, 
Emeti ne 
Graphite 
Graphite 
Graphite 
Hyoscine 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . Amorphous Lump 
Crystalline Crucible 
Crystalline Lubricant 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
.. . 
. . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ..... 
Instrument . . . . . . . . . 
. . .. . . . 
Jewel Bearings 
Jewel Bearlngs 
Jewe l Beai•ings 
Vee 
Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kyani te . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 • . . . . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
... 
. . 
Mica Muscovite Block •• 
Film 
Spllttings 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
I'Jiica 
Mica 
Mi ca 
Niuscovi te 
Muscovite 
phlogopite 
Monazite . . . . . . . . . 
Opium Crude Gum 
. . 
Splittings 
. . . . 
. . . . .. . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
... . . . . 
. . . 
. ... 
... . ..... . 
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
Palm Oil 
Pepper 
Py1•ethrti.m 
Quebracho ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
... Quinidine 
Raneseed Oil 
Rubber Natural 
S 1e l lac 
. . . . . . . . 
•.• ........ . 
... 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . .. . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ...... 
.. 
Talc Steatite 
Zirconium Ore 
Quinine 
. . . Block 
Badde leyite 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • e • . . . . 
. . . . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
Metallurgical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ore 
• • • • • • • • • • • e • • • • • • • w • • • • • • • • • • . . . 
Spe rm Oil 
Chromite 
Tan tali te 
Cobalt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Manganese 
Manganese 
Ore 
Ore 
Metallurgical 
Battery 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
0.0 
0 .0 
o.o 
o.o 
o. o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o .. o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
0.0 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
0.0 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o (1) 
0 . 2 
0 .8 
7.8 
7.8 
8 . 6 
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TABLE I I (Cont inued) 
Ifickel ..•..•.....•. · .............................. . 
Beryl . ... . ....... . . . .. ............................ . 
Iodine ...... .. ................................... . 
fun g s ten • . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . eJ • • • • • • , • • • • • • • 
Antimony •.......••..........•....•..•...•...••.... 
"Pla tinum - Platinum Metal •••••••••••••• .••• ••••• •. 
Tin ••.•••..••• • ••••••..••• • •.•••• • . •• ••...••.••.•• 
Ru tile .... ........... . ....... . .... . ..... .. ........ . 
Bauxite .... .. ....... .. ... ..... ... . ...... ... .... . .. . 
Pl a t i num - I ridi um Ivie tal •••••••••• •••• ..• • •••••••• 
Zirconium Ore - Z ire on ............................ . 
Aga r •...••....•.••................ .... ....... ... ... 
Vanadium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
rr el' cury . .. .......... . ........................... . . . 
Zinc .............. ....... .................. .. ...... . 
B i S.:tlU th •.....•...••.••..••....•.•..•••.....•...... 
Lea d ................ . .............................. . 
Copper ... • .. . .... . ....•... .• .•• . •...•.•••••••.••••• 
C admil:t...rn ... . ................ . ...................... . 
Sapphire and Ruby •••.•••••••••••••••••••• .• ••••••• 
9 . 6 
15 . 4 
22 . ~ 
25 . 2 
25 . 5 
28 . 5 
29 . 2 
37. 5 
40 . 0 
41 . 2 
46 . 4 
47. 6 
66 .7 
67. 4 
68 . 7 
77.4 
79 . 5 
81.0 
99 . 7 
100 . 0 
(1) Domes t ic production result s fro m the ref i ning of an 
of f - shore catch . 
(2) Domes tic pro duct i on of the three types of Ant i mony and 
the two types of Bauxi te i nc luded in the Stockpiling Program 
are not ava ilable separ ate l y . 
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( 2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
(5) 
( 3 ) 
( 3) 
( 5 ) 
( 3) -Domes tic pro due tion includes proce ss ing pr i mary rna terial 
and reprocessing of secondary materials. 
(4) Dome stic product ion i ncludes secondary recovery only, 
s i nce all domes tic pr i mary t i n is sme l ted fr•om fo l"eign ores . 
( 5) Domestic production includes pr ocessing of foreign 
mater i als since ou tput f r om imported s ources cannot be 
segregated . 
Source : Munit ions Board, Stockpile Report to the Congre ss , 
23 J anuary 1949, Page 60 . 
TABLE III 
HISTORICAL LISTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS 
A 
The Harbord List - 1921 
(42 Materials) 
Agar 
Antimony 
Arsenic 
Asph a l t 
Jute 
Kapok 
Linseed Oil 
Manila Fiber 
Potassium Nitrate 
Quinine 
Rubber 
Silk 
Bal s a 
Camphor 
Chromium 
Coconut Shells 
Coffe e 
Manganese (Ferro-grade) 
Mercury 
Shellac 
Sodium Nitrate 
Sugar Mica 
Nickel SulphUl"' 
Nitrogen Thymol 
Cork Nux Vomica Tin 
Graphite Opium Tungsten 
Hemp Palm Oil Uranium 
Hide s Phosphorus Vanadiuin 
Iodine Platinum Wool 
B 
Army and Navy Munitions Board List - 1939 
(17 Strategic Materials) 
Aluminum 
Antimony 
Chromium 
Coconut Shells 
Hanila Fiber 
Manganese (Ferro-grade) 
Mercury 
Mica 
Nickel 
Optical Glass 
Quartz crystals 
Quinine 
Rubber 
Silk 
Tin 
Tungsten 
Yifool 
Source: Munitions Board, Stockpile Report to Congress , 
23 J~uary 1950. 
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TABLE IV 
STATISTI CAL SUMMARY OF STOCK PILE. ACTIVITY UNDER ACT OF 7 JUNE 1939 
Materi al Unit Qu. an t i t:;y Qu antity Ba:lance 
of Purchased Rele ased in 
Measure Prior to to StockPile 
10/31/44 10f3i/44 10/31744"" 
Cadmium Pound 399,672.47 399,672.47 None 
Chrome Ore Long Ton 239,839.00 None 239,839.00 
I ndustr ial Diamonds Carat 1 ,089,146 .19 None 1,089,146.19 
Manganese Ore Long Ton 128,666.00 None 128,666.00 
Manila Fiber Bale 146,057.00 146,057.00 None 
Mercury Flask 20,010.00 None 20,010.00 
Mica : 
Block Pound 700 , 646 .63 700,646.63 None 
Splittings Pound 5,000 , 512.50 None 5,000,512.50 
Monazite Sand Metric Ton 2,934.00 None 2,934.00 
Optical Glass Pound 12,176.75 12,176 .75 None 
Quartz Crystals Pound 52,413.00 14,718.00 37,695.00 
Quinine Hydrobromide Ounce 1,491,547.00 None 1,491,547.00 
Quinine Sulphate Ounce 7, 194,749 .00 4,917,382.00 2,277,367.00 
Tin (pig} Short Ton 11,547.00 None 11,547.00 
'fungsten Ore Short Ton 5,830.00 None 5,830.00 
Source: Senate Document 5, "Strategic Materials ", Letter from the Army-Navy Muni t ions 
Board, dated 6 January 1945, U. s. Government Printing Office. 
Per 
Cen t 
Used 
100.0 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
100.0 
o.o 
100.0 
o.o 
o.o 
100.0 
28 . 1 
0.0 
68.3 
o.o 
o.o 
I-' 
\.)J 
.p-
TABLE V 
CURRENT LIST 
OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR STOCKPILING 
Materials being acquired pursuant to Section 3(a) (Purchases) 
and/or Section 6 ( a) (Surplus Transfers) of Public Law 520, 
79 th Congress, (known as Group I ma terials): 
Agar 
Aluminum 
Antimony 
Asbestos 
Amo si te 
rysotile 
Crocidoli te 
Bauxite 
Metal Grade 
Abi•asive Grade 
Beryl 
Bismuth 
Cadmium 
Castor Oil 
Celestite 
Chromite 
Chemica l Grade 
Me t allurgic al Grade 
Refractory Grade 
Type A 
T·ype B 
Co alt 
Coconut Oil 
Columbite 
Opper 
Co ~dage Fibers 
Ivianil a 
S a l 
or undum 
i a . . onds, I ndustr i al 
Emetine 
Gra h ite 
A..mo r•phous Lump 
Crystal line Flake 
Cruc ible Grade 
I.,ubricant and Packing Grade 
Hyo sc ine 
Iodi ne 
J evJel Bearings 
I nstrmnen t Jewels , except Vee 
jewels 
Sapphire and Ruby Vee J ewels 
Wa tch and Time-Keep i ng Dev ice 
jewels 
Kyanite 
Lead 
Manganese Ore 
B atte ry Grade 
Metallurgical Grade 
Mercu1~y 
Mica 
Musc·o'vi te Block, Good 
Stained and Better 
Muscovite Film 
Muscovite Splittings 
Phlogopite Splittings 
Monaz ite 
Nickel 
Opium 
Pa lm Oil 
Pepper 
Platinum Group IJietals 
I r idium · 
Platinum 
Pyrethrum 
Quartz Crystals 
Quebracho 
Quin idine 
Qu i n ine 
Rubber , Crude Natura l 
Rutile 
Sapphire and Ruby 
She llac 
Spe rm Oil 
Ta lc, Steatite, Block 
Tantalite 
Tin 
Tungsten 
Vanadium 
Zinc 
Zirconium Ores 
Baddeleyite 
Zircon 
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TABLE V (Cont i nued ) 
Ma t erials being ac quired for s tock pi l e on l y through trans-
fer• of Government-owned surplus pursuant to Se ction 6(a of 
Public Law 520, 79th Congress (known as Group II materi als ): 
Cryolite, Natural 
Diamond Die s 
Fluorspar 
Ac i d ·Grade 
Me tallurgical Grade 
Graphi te 
Crystall i ne Fines 
1\Fagnesium 
f i ca 
Muscovite Bl ock , Stained 
and low r 
Phlogopite Block 
Molybdenum 
Plat inum Group Metals 
Osmi um 
Pa l ac · um 
Rhodium 
Ru thei1i un 
Selenium 
Talc , Steatite, Ground 
Source : Mun itions Board Order No . 50-27 , 13 January 1950 .. 
TABLE VI 
STORAGE LOCATIONS OF THE STOCK PILE BY TYPE, USE ~WD ~mMBER 
AS OF 23 JANUARY 1950 
~ of Installation 
Mill tary Depots 
Commercial leased site s 
Commercial warehouse 
Federal Supply Service 
Depots 
Open Storage (Govt. ovmed) 
Bureau of Mine locations 
Tank farms 
Use Total 
Variou s 65 
Low grade ores. 12 
Rubber, vegetable 70 
oils, low grade ores, 
etc. 
Various 10 
Various 6 
Various 3 
Coconut, palm, cas tor 3-::· 
and sperm oils 
166 
~~ These are to be constructed in 1950 and are therefor not 
included in to tal . 
Source : Mupitions Board, Stock Pile Report to the Congress , 
23 January 1950. 
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TABLE VII 
THE DEPARTMENT OF I NTERIOR 
RESEARCH PROJECTS IN STRATEGIC MATERIALS 
COUl.t:J.Odi ty ~ of I nvestigation 
138 
S t ock Piled Materials Geological Mining Metallurgical 
Aluminum 
.An t imony 
Asbestos (synthetic 
Bauxite ( i ncl. high-alumina 
clays) x 
Beryl and beryllium x 
Chromite and chromium x 
Cobalt x 
Copper x 
Diamonds ( incl . substitutes ) 
Graphite 
Kyani te 
Lead and zinc ( incl. b i smuth 
and cadmium ) x 
Manganese x 
Mercury x 
Mica {incl . other pegmatite 
minerals and s ynthetic mica ) x 
Monazite x 
Nickel 
Talc x 
Titanium ( incl. rutile ) x 
Tungsten x 
Vanadium 
Waste metal s 
Zirconium 
Other Materials 
Fluorspar 
Iron ore ( incl . iron and steel ) 
Magn esium ( incl . magnesite ) 
Talc ( ground ) 
Total number o f 
projects 
X 
X 
X 
X 
60 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
33 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
38 
Source: Munit i ons Boax•d, STOCKPILE REPOR T TO THE CONGRESS , 
23 January 1950 . 
TABLE VIII 
DEPARTiviEN T OF AGRICUL'IURE 
RES.11;ARCH PROJECTS II'·! TRATEGIC MATERI ALS 
Rubber : Investigat ions as to the fea sibility of producing 
natura l rubber from guayule and kok-saghyz are continuing . 
Techni.ques are bein g developed to enable large- scale and 
eff c ient cultivation of these crops in t i me of emergency; 
new strai ns and hybrids have been produced that yie l d up t o 
70 ner cent mo re rubber, production costs have been reduced, 
and~ techn iques f or increasing yields by inhibi t ing flowers 
are being studied. 
Quebracho: Investigations of possible substitutes have been 
conducted since 1 July 1949. In the search for vegetable 
tanning material s which can be produced from domestic farms 
and forest crops, particular at tention has been given to 
c anaigre (sour do ck) and sumac . Acceleration is planned fo1• 
the Fiscal Year 1951 should fund s requested become availab e 
fo r this project , for pilot plant operations. TI1e regional 
proj ec t of canaigre is centered at Tucson, Arizona, with 
pla.n tings being made in Arizona, New Mexico and Texas to 
d e termine adaptability, crop possibilities and production 
costs . Agronomic practices ·under study include propagation, 
irrigation, harvesting, s hredding, and drying. From pl antings 
will also come stock to enable expansion of ac1•eage whenever 
necessary as well as roots foP large scale studies of 
extra c tion. 
Casto r Oil: Domesti c product i on and proce ss ing has been g i ven 
emphasis because of the i ncreas ing importance of castor oil 
in the manufacture of transparent plastics (for aii•craft wind-
shields ), and its use in special lubrica t i on and braking 
fluids. Brazil is at present the principal source . Domestic 
production has been tentat ve ly demonstrated to be f easible, 
bu t efforts are continu i ng to develop a strain t hat can be 
systematically harvested to lower the high labor requirement 
that is a princ ipal obstr uction to domestic cultivation of 
this crop. --.ngine er ing research is being conducted at Still-
water , Oklahoma, in adapting farm implements to the planting , 
cult vating and harvesting of this crop. 
Cordage Fiber>s: Heavy wart ime requirements for hard fibers to 
p rovide corr age fo r naval vessel s , lashings and loading gear , 
tow rope and binder- tw i ne far exceed ava i lable sup1)lies. 
Attempts are b eing made to develop domestic source~ of ha rd 
fibers to supp lement imports and stock pile reserves of manila 
fiber and sisal . Studies of sanseviria (cordyline), the most 
promis:ing source of do rnestic hard fiber and other pos s ible 
substitutes have been in progress s i nce 1 July 1949. ddi-
tional studies are pla ned for the year 1951 on hemp seed 
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storage, hemp production and also on the poss i ble use of 
co t ton , wool, and other sof t f i bers as subst i tutes in some 
used for manila, sisal, burlap and j ute . T:.r1.e r esear ch on 
sanseviria is being condu cted in Floi•ida . Investigations 
to Q.etermine the fiber con tent of wild specie s of yt1.cca are 
being made i n the Sou t:hwes t vvhere thi s plant is i ndi genou s. 
Test s on the pr oducti on of f ibe rs from phormium {New Ze aland 
flax or New Zealand hemp ) are to be made i n the Gulf Coas t 
are a and on t he l est Coast from the Mexican border i nto 
Oregon . 
Pyrethrum : Re search is continuing with a pro ject to deve l op 
140 
a domest cally-produced synthetic i nsectic ide mak i ng use of the 
active chemical ingredient of the pyrethrum flower . The t oxic 
chemi ca l in pyrethru:<n was synthesi zed in laborato ries i n the 
spring of 1949. Considerable further resear ch and develop-
men t will be necessary before there will b e any possibil i t y 
of t urning this program to practical account . 
Miscellaneous : Re search is being conducted to dete r mine 
storage conditions for co conu t o i~, pal m oil, castor oil , 
and spe rm o il. Stud i es are also bein g conducted to di scove r 
poss ible substitU tes for thes e oils from such possible 
sources a s peanuts and cotton se ed. 
Source: Adap ted from the Niuni t i ons Boe. rd, S t ock Pile Report 
to the Congress , 23 January 1950 , Pages 37 and 38. 
TABLE IX 
REVI EW OF POSSIBLE .SOURCES OF S Tli.AT-~GIC MATERI ALS 
Aluminum . 'Er1ere is no .surplus producti on of aluminum i ngots 
in Norway at the pr es ent time. All Norwegian present pro-
ducti on is allocated, and plans are under way to increase 
this produc t ion. 
A..n t i n1ony. S tand ine; offers of as much as 2, 000 to1is of Chine se 
antimony have had to be refused for lack ·or available Bureau 
of Federal Supply (BFS) dollars . If the Communist advance i n 
China does not overrun the antimony area , expansion of pro-
due tion can be accomplished, but no thing ca..! be done wi thout 
long-term purchase funds to justify expansion. Mea.nv.'n ile , 
the EGA is trying to interes t private purchasers in these 
offers . 
Asbestos . There are no i mportant deposits of asbe stos within 
the areas controlled by the participating countries. HoVIevm~ , 
with ·the assistance of the United Kingdom Governmen t, arrange-
ments were made by the EGA and BFS for future delivery of 
Southern Rhodes ian chrysolite and South African amosite to 
the BFS. 
Bauxite . This material i s produced in the Nether l ands Eas t 
Indies, Gold Coast, Italy, France , Bri tish Guiana , and Surinam . 
There are undeveloped deposits in Malaya , J ama i ca , Nyasaland 
a nd on islands off the coast of French Guinea . Nevertheless, 
the European material is not sui table for American plants as 
presently cons titu ted . The EC A is arranging for deliveries 
to the BFS, to be finan ced wi th 5 percent counterpart f unds 
from the NEI and Surinam . · Projects for development of the 
Jamaica and French Guinea deposits are unde r consideration. 
A proposal to dredge a channel for ocean-going ships to reach 
some of the Bri t ish Guiana and Surinam goes principal l y to 
t h e United States and Canada ; however, a large portion of the 
Canadian metal flows to the United States . 
Cadmium . This metal is produced entirely as a by- produc t, 
chiefly from zinc smelting . (See Zi nc) 
Chromi te . Turkey, New Caledonia, Greece, and Sierra Leone 
ax•e producers of t his mineral . The ECA is seeking to expand 
Turki sh produc tion . An expans i on program is in view for 
Sierra Leone production . This deposit is stated to be of 
limited capac ity. Southern Rhodesia is an important producer , 
but has not chosen to cormnit itself to the European Recovery 
Program . 
Cobalte Cobalt is produced in the Belgian Congo, Northern 
Rhodesia, Morocco , and Norway, the last being a minor source . 
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The Congo producer, accounting for 60 percent of world supply, 
has contracted fOl" deliveries to the BFS beginning in 1949 
and is willing to expand capacity substantially whenever 
assurance of a market is provided. An expan s ion of Northern 
Rhodesian production is contemplated. The Moroccan producer 
could double his output, but the product canno t be exported 
at current world prices. An undeveloped deposit, as sociated 
with copper but remote from transportation, is being explored 
in Uganda . · 
Coconu t Oil. Negotiat ions are proceeding to obtain coconut 
oil from the NEI, probably with 5 percent counterpart funds . 
Co lumbi te. The only impor tan t source in ERP areas is Nigeria . 
Although this has been the world's most important sou rce in 
recent years, production has come princi pally from re treat-
ment of t in tailings, and th is supply is near exhaus tion. 
Future supplies will be reduced to a rate keyed to tin pro-
due tion, plus small contributions from virgin ground. Pos-
s ible sources in the Belgian Congo, Uganda, Mozambique, and 
French Cameroons are being investigated by the ECA. 
Copper . Although Northern Rhode sia and the Belgi an Congo a r e 
among the world's more i mportant copper areas, their total 
supply i s requ i red for European needs . There i s a relat i ve l y 
small deposit i n Turkey, and discovery is reported in Uganda 
with cobalt associated wi th the copper . The last i s said to 
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be l a r ge but of low grade and remote f rom transportation 
facilities . Expans ion programs a1"e contemplated i n Northern 
Rhodesia and the Congo . The EGA is trying to advance the 
Rhodesian pro j ect into the 1949 program of the Uni ted Kingdom , 
and with Commerce Depar t;nent cooperation has expedited delivery 
of nec essary equ i pment to the Congo producer. 
Cor1:.ndmn . Negotiations are being condu cted by EGA and BFS to 
purcha se corundum from the French Cameroons and to i nvesti gate 
the possibility of expanding production. Mar ginal depos its 
are knovm in Moza.rnbique and Nyasaland which will be investi-
gated. 
Cryolite . This is Denmark ' s only strategic rna terial, and tre 
onl y commercial source in the world is a dingle deposit in 
Greenland. However , because it is also made synthetically, 
its strategic i mportance is not great. The BFS is willing 
to accept deliveries at New York . The EGA is investigating 
t he possibility of purchase and shipment with 5 percent 
counterpart funds . 
Diamonds. The l argest producer of bort is in the Belgian 
Congo . A quantity of indus t r i al stones and bort was purchased 
TABLE IX (Cont i nued ) 
in London with counterpart funds. Bort production in Angola 
is being inves tigated .. A quantity of industrial stones from 
French Equatori a l Africa was offered, bu t because of uncer-
tainty as to availability of doll ars , investigation is be i ng 
made of the acceptability of counterpart. funds . Di amoridi-
ferous gravels occur from Sierra Leone to the Congo and the 
EC A will seelc to foster development if adequate buying 
interest develops. 
Fluorsnar . The Bizone was a large producer before the war , 
and productive possib i lities are now being investigated by 
t he ECA. 
Germanium. An offering of germanium has been made from 
Belgium Congo sources , but pending further research by the 
:Mun i tions Board , this i s not a stockpile item. 
Graphite . An agreement h a s been entered into with the govern~ 
men t .of France and the negotiation of specific contracts is 
near completion to fulfill stockpile goals of Madagascar 
graphite out of expanded production, at the rate of approxi-
mately one-third of present world production. Investigation 
is being made of the acceptability of Austrian graphite and 
of the comme~c ial poss ibilities of depos i ts i n Tanganyika 
and Kenya. 
Iron. Some high-grade iron ore is now being exported f rom 
Sweden and Algeria to the United States. The North African 
high-grade depo s i t is small . La teritic iron ore carrying 
approximately 50 percent iron is available i n Celebes and 
New Caledonia , but no market ha s been found i n the United 
States . Norway has a large . low-grade iron deposit f rom which 
an exportable surplus of high-grade concen trates can be 
produced . 
Kyanite . ECA dollar funds are be ing made available through 
the Uni ted Kingdom Government to aD American opera tor in 
Kenya for the purpose of expariding producti on, sufficient 
to fulfill United States stockpile r equirements in t hree 
years . Delive ry will be made under the contract to the BFS. 
Lead. Le ad is mined in Moroc co , Northern Rhodesia, Italy, 
Greece, Turkey, France, the French Congo, the Bizone, Austria, 
Sweden, and Norway. Production, however, is not equivalent 
to European requirements . A recent discovery in Tanganvika 
is being developed, and a discovery has been reported i n 
Greenland, but the Greenland deposit is ice-bound unti l next 
summer . Attempts are now be ing made to expand produ c t i on in 
I t aly, Greece, Turkey; Bizone, Fran ce , Mo rocco, and Austria. 
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An expansion is progrrunmed for Northern Rhodesia. A counter-
part loan is being negotiated by the ECA to explore a promis -
ing deposit in Algeria. 
Manganese . The most important source of manganese in ERP 
t e rritory is in the Gold Coast. Othe r production e x ists i n 
. Morocco and the Belgian Congo. Undeve loped deposits occur in 
Turkey. Gold Coast production, of which the United States 
normally receives about 40 ·percent, is being maintained to 
the full capacity of the existent plant under curr ent labor 
conditions. The Gold Coast producer has offered 200,000 tons 
of intermediate grade materia l which although not acceptable 
fo~ stockpile purposes can be utilized by United States 
industry. The ECA tog ethe r with other interested government 
agencies is studying the feasibility and desirability of 
financing construct ion of additional plant facilities in the 
Gold Coast . Effor ts are being made to expand Morocco pro-
duction and to investi gate the Turkish deposits. The ECA 
is also investigating the Belgian Congo deposit. 
Mercury. Italy is one of the world ' s two largest producers. 
There is substantial stock on hand in Italy and a considerable 
expansion of production is possible. However, the United 
States stockpile position is comfortable enough to make the 
BFS unwill ing to pay even ocean frei ght . The ECA is currently 
negotiating to purchase and ship a large quantity with counter -
part funds if a satisfactory price can be reached. 
Mica . A considerable quantity of strategic muscovite mica, 
principally from India, i s available from t he British Board 
of Trade, and a portion may be purchased with sterling counter-
part funds . Phlogopi te is produced in Madagascar and t h e EGA 
is pursuing the possibili t y of purchase, and production 
e xpansion if appropriate. 
Nickel . Large nickel deposits occur in New Caledonia , and 
a le.rge undeveloped deposit i:s known in Celebes . The ECA has 
relieved the bottleneck in New Caledonian producti on from 
shortages of Australian coal by arranging for shipment of 
coal from the United States . The proposals of the principal 
producer for finances to expand production are being given 
favorable consideration, and in cooperation with the pro-
ducer, the ECA is seeking to interest private American capi-
tal part icipa tion. The ECA is do i ng likewi -se with reference 
to the Celebes deposit, where the concession owner is also 
·willing to take an American partner . The New Caledonia pro-
ducer is also willing to ship sintered ore to the United 
States. 
Palm Oil. Large areas within ERP territory are susceptible 
t o palm oil produc tion , given adequate assurance of markets . 
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The two areas now pl"'Oducing a sur plu s are the Belgian Congo 
and the Netherlands East Indies. This material is under 
international alloca tion. A purchase is being made of a larg e 
quantity of NEI palm oil allocated to the United States wi th 
counterpart funds. Arrangements are also being made for 
pur chase of a substantial tonnage each month in 1949 with 
counterpart funds. 
Pepper . Negotiations are now in progress in The Hague t o 
secure a quantity of pepper for the BFS. This is diff i cult 
without disturbing WOl"'ld prices because pepper is in such 
short supply. 
Petrolemn . ERP areas are petroleum-defic ient. The on ly impor-
tant producing area is Indonesia. A petroleum geological 
consultant has prepared a report making recommendatio ns as 
t o what ERP areas merit attention. The use of EGA loan funds 
is also being considered for the expansion of British- con-
trolled production in non-ERP territory. 
Platinum . No important production is known in ERP areas . 
An offer to sell a part of its invento ry was made by the 
Bri tish Board of Trade, but the BFS was unwilling to sanction 
payment of then current marlcet prices. An undeveloped plati-
num deposit is known in Northern Rhodesia. 
Pyre thrum. Kenya is a large producer, but the BFS i s not at 
presen t interested in pyrethrum purchases. 
Quartz Crystal. Undeveloped deposits are repo r ted in Angola 
(Portuguese) and Mozambique {also Portuguese), but the BFS 
has no active interest in acquisition with its dollar s at 
present. 
Quinidine. A substan t i a l purchas e from the Dutch has been 
arranged, using 5 percen t counterpart funds. The Du t ch have 
a lso i ndicated a willingness to sell a large quanti ty of 
qu inin e , conver t ible into quinidine, or to sbip cinchona bark. 
Rapese ed . This is produced in ERP areas and is a v a i lable , 
but the i t em is being stricken from the stockpile list . 
Rubber . Large quantities of rubber are available . A pur-
chase of 26,000 tons was made with 5 percent qounterpart 
f'unds f rom the British Board of Trade. The Du tch have indi-
cated a will i ngness to ship a considerable tonnage every 
month to the BFS during 1949 and to accept payment in 
counterpart funds. Natural rubber production is greatly 
expansible, but uncertainty over what level of synthet i c 
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prod.uc tion will be maintained by the United States as a. s tra-
t egic precaution is deterring investment, both in plantation 
rehabilitation 2 .. nd new clevelopmen t. 
Sisal. Tvvelve thousand tons have been purchased from the 
Br•i tish Board of Trade with counterpart funds, and more is 
s.ve.ilable for· 1949 delivel"Y• Sisal production, like other 
tropical vegetable materials, can be built up in various 
dependencies to any level for wbich a market is indicated. 
Talc. A strategic grade of block talc comes from Sardinia, 
but this is being made available to the BFS in satisfactory 
quantities through commercial channels. Samples of Austrian 
and Bizone talc are being shipped for testing as t o accep t -
abil ity. -
Tan tali te. This material cs.n be obtained from the Belgian 
Congo whenever the BFS des ires to make a long-term purchase 
agreement. 
Tin. The bu,lk of the wo rld 1 s tin comes from Malaya, the 
Netherlands East Indies., Belgian Congo, and Nigeria. A high 
level production is being obtained in the Belgian Congo 
and Nigeria. Investment in new production in Malaya is not 
at a rate sufficient to satisfy United States objectives. 
The area has been affected by bandi t1•y and the produc e rs are 
fearful that increased production might well result in over-
production when stockpile requirements have been me t . Tin 
has been the subject of consideration by the International 
Tin Study Group, which has been discussing an international 
agreement . The agreement will probably call for producers to 
expand production to the levels sought and for consumers to 
guarantee a sufficient market to safeguard necessary invest-
ments. The EGA intends to request the United Kingdom and 
The Netherle.nds to present programs for expanded production . 
The EGA and the RFC have developed a special purchas ing 
arrangement to expand the product ion of Chinese tin concen-
trates and have them delivel,ed to the Government-owned smelter 
at Texas City. 
TLmgsten. China, Korea, Malaya , and Portugal are producing 
areas. Inventories are available from China, and Chinese 
and Korean production can be expanded, whenever adequate 
dollar funds are available as there are no 5 percent counter-
part funds in these countries. 
Vanadium. Vanadium is produced in Northel"ll Rhodesia, but 
other ~RP areas are deficient. An expansion progrrun is 
contemplated. 
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Zinc. Zinc ore is produced in Northern Rhodesia, Morocco , tile 
Bizone, Austria , I tal y , France, Portugal, the Belgian Congo , 
Sweden, and Norway. However, none of this is produced in 
surplus over European needs. Zinc smelting is done in Belgium, 
United Kingdom, France , Bi zone , Italy, and Norway, the ore 
coming from Aus t l"'alia, Newfoundland, and La tin A.rnerice. , 
chiefl y Mexico . Some surplus of metal occasionally comes 
to the United Sta tes from Belgium and Norway. The ECA is 
st~dying possibili ties of pro&lction expansion of zinc ore in 
Austr i a , Bizone, and Italy. Expansion programs a re projected 
by the producer in Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo . 
Source: The Economi c Cooperat ion Administration , "European 
Re covery Program , A Report on the Recovery Progress and-
United States Aid, " February, 1949 , Pages 232-236 . 
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Period 
IIET TOTAL y 
PRIOR TO FI SC AL 
YE!Jl 194 7 , TOTAL 
FISCAL YE~~ 1947, 
TOTAL 
July - Dec 1946 
Jan - June 1947 
r i SCAL YEAR 1948, 
T~AL 
July - Dec 1947 
Jan - June 1948 
FISCAL YEAR 1949, 
TOTAL 
July - Dec 1948 
Jan - June 1949 
FISCAL YE~R 1950 
July - Dec 1949 
TOrAL OFlL!'}ATIONS AND EXPENDITURES r:P STOCKPIUNG FUNDS 
By Fiscal Year, Th1.·ough 31 December 1949 
Obligations Incurred Expenditures 
Under PL 520 Under PL 117 Under PL 520 Total (79th Cong.) (76th Con!'.) Total (79th Con.o:.) 
Sl us 778 ,341. l , Oft~ ,Z78 a!t!t $zo,ooo,ooo $6';18 1 672 1ftl 2 t6)2,Z2CZ,Z2l 
54,98 3,1 5 - 54,983,152 54,970,732 -
68 888 . 53 66.604 lll 2 , 28!t ,ft22 lL35';1,9'i9 ';1 ,065,850 
36' 799 ' 92~ 34,937,292 1,862,637 1 ,271,018 80 
32 , 088,60! 11,666,819 421,785 10 ,088 ,981 9,065,770 
C1~90l.il 24}.727.2S6 CZ ,1Zft,1~~ 82 ,CZOZ,~Z~ zz,z1z,886 
119,809' 63t 117,045 '732 2,763,904 25 ,736,718 23,145,563 
133,091,77 126,681,524 6,410,251 57 ,170,857 54,572,323 
459.766 88 4S6 208 610 Jo~~8 1 ;rl1 JQ4,ft86,1Z:Z JO~,';IlO,Z~'i 
405 '762 , 957 402,219,407 3,543, 550 93,137,256 92,628,592 
54,003,924 53, 989 , 203 14,721 211' 348 '921 210,282,167 
279' 238' 367 279,238,367 0 244,947,929 243,035,226 
Under PL 117 
(76th Cong . ) 
t 6~ .'i!t 2 ,6';1 1 
54,970,732 
2 , 2';11.,149 
1,270,938 
1,023,211 
~,18';1,682 
2,591,155 
.21 2,598,534 
1,~2~.418 
.21 508,61>4 
1,066,754 
1,912,703 
!!/ , djusted to exclude $30,545,256 of receipt s froao rotation salee • 
.2/ Adjusted ror receipts of 1149,066 f rom rotation sales which were transferred to Public Law 520 
accounts in Septeaber 1948. 
Source: :.:uni tions .:Joard; "Stoclc: ile P.enort To The Congress", 
23 Janu a r y l 950 , p.45 . 
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SIJAIARY STATUS OF STOCKPILING FUtmS AND AUTHORIZATIONS 
As Of 31 December 1949 
P11ra11ant to P.L. 520, 79th Congress Jl 
Item Appropri ated Advance Con-Total Funds t.ract Auth-
orizationa 
(l) (2) ( 3) (4) 
CELIG~TIONAL AUTHORITY 
Under P.L. 111, 16th Co!JIIress 1 Total .Q/ - - -
P.L. 361, 76th Congress, 9 August 1939 - - -
P.L. 442, 76th Congress. 25 llarch 1940 - - -
P.L. 667, 76th Congress, 26 June 1940 
- - -
Under P.L. ~20 1 12th Co!JIIreas, Total ll,~J2, 000 ,000 11,06~,000,000 I !!10,000,000 
P.L. 663, 79th Congress, 8 August 1946 100,000,000 100,000,000 
P.L. 271. 80th Collll:reaa. '30 Ju.ly 1947 100,000,000 100,000,000 £/ (75,000,000) 
25 June 1948 350 ,000,000 300 ooo oooLr!:!A 250,ooo,ooo)} P.L. 785, 80th Congress, • • !./ 50,000,000 
P.L. 119, Blat Congress, 23 June 1949 310,000,000 40,000,000 270,000,000 
P.L . 150, Blat Congress, 30 June 1949 675,000,000 525,000,000 150,000,000 
NET OBLIGATIONS INCURRED THROUGH 1. IE: 1949 l,O!t2,118 1 lit!:t 861,626,210 18!t,l2l,!tJ!i 
For llaterial Acquisition Coate 965,550,675 791,080,782 174,469,893 
For other Coate 80,227,669 70,576,128 9,651,541 
UNOBLIGATED BALANCES, 31 DEC 1949 !182.~21,626 20J,2!tJ ,Q20 ~82,818,266 
Allot tell for llaterlal Acqui o1 tion Costa 463,045,116 177,166,550 285,878,566 
Allotted for other Coate 26,176,540 26,176,540 0 
NET EXPE>iDITURES THROUGH 31 DEC 1949 
- 6J~.1ll.m -
For llaterial Acquisition Coate 
- 605,633,034 -P'or other Costa 
- 27,096,687 -
UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS 31 DEC 1949 413,048,623 228,927,189 184,121,4 34 
UNEXPENDED BALA'iCES 31 DEC 1949 
- 432,270,279 -
P11ra~~ant to 
P.L.ll7,76th 
Congress 
( 5) 
110,000,@ 
1.0,000,000 
12,500,000 
47,500,000 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10,000,000 
55,686,745 
14,313,255 
Q 
0 
0 
62,21.t~.221 
55,628,691 
10,314,000 
4,057,309 
4,057,309 
Jl Excludes 130,545,256 received from rotation sales. Receipts from such sales under the provisions 
or Public Law 520, 79th Congress, remain available !or re-obli ffation and expenditure to replace the 
aaterials sold. 
~ Does not include 18,845,792 received from sales or stockpile materials !or wartime consumption. 
These receipts were returned to the Treasury in February 1948. 
s/ P'unda to finance this contract authorization were included in the 1300,000,000 appropriated b7 Pub-
lic Law 785 1 80th Congress. 
~ Funds to finance this contract authorization were included in the $525,000,000 appropriated b7 P~ib­
lic Law 150, Slat Congreaa. 
~ P'unds to finance this amount or the Pablic Law 785 contract authorization have not yet been approp-
riated. 
Source: r:uni tions Board, 
23 January 1 950, 
" Stockp i le rteport To The Congress 11 
p . 4l~. 
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'l' ABLE XI 
EXPENDITURES OF STOCKPILING FIJNtiS BY TYPE OF COST 
Through 31 Deceu:ber 1949 
Type of Cost ToW Under P.L. 520 (79th Congress~ 
(1) (2) (.3) 
GROOS TOTAL e729,217,668 : 66.3,274,977 
ADJUSTI.:EllT FOR RECEIPTS FI:OI.l ROTATION SAlliS y -.30, 545,256 -:J:J,545,256 
NET TOT.I.L 6~8,6:Z~.t.1' ~J~ I :Zil2o 7i?J. 
UATERIAL acwc~~~I~QN cosrs, TOTP.L 66;!.,~.:z~~ 60~.~~~.o~ 
~aterial Purchase 615,860 '762 567' 921' 678 
Freight (Ocean & Land) 
.39' .341 ' 540 .32, 728,805 
Storece L Handling 4,841,796 .3,95.3,.3.38 
Processing 80,5.3.3 65,.399 
Inspection 1,1.37,094 96.3,814 
STCC!e'Ild:; r.:AINTE!:AJ-:CE cosrs, TOTAL J,,§,~.lJ~ ,J,62J.,66J 
Facility Construction, Altcr~tion and Repair 627,087 627,087 
Care 1 Handling & Processinc of Transferred 
l.laterisls 14,607,774 9,177,056 
Other Storr.ge & Handling Charges 17,091,.331 1.3,.391,577 
Net notation Costs 
.!ll 498,94.3 .!ll 498,94.3 
i!:!!lllOISTRATIVE COS:J:S 1 TQT;.L , ... ~§2.22~ J.{.Q~.Q~ 
Bureau of Federal Supply .3,471,647 2,29.3,1!41 
Other l,ll.3,905 1,108,18.3 
Jl Adjusbcent to elillinate duplication in reported totel axpendituree. 
~ Net toW in excees of receipts frm rotation._ 
Under P.L. ll7~ (76th Congrees 
(4) 
$65,942,691 
0 
6~.~~.~~ 
~~.~i1§.~ 
47,9.39,084 
6,612,7.35 
888,458 
15,134 
17.3,280 
~.1:!;1.!.1' 
0 
5,4:J:J,718 
.3,699,754 
0 
l.l§J.~~ 
1,177,806 
5,722 
Sou rce: l~nition s 3oa rd; 
23 Janua ry 1 950, 
" Stockp ile ne port To The Con:;ress", 
p. 47. 
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CHART I 
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CHART IIA 
ESTIMATED DEPLETION OF SELECTED MATERIALS IN U. S . 
11 THE ROAD TO DEPLETION" 
'l'n.--~~----1~ ZINC 
'------~- COPPER 
-..------1---I;IANGANESE 
.--~~-- MERCURY 
~,., .. __,,___TUNGST EN 
Source: " Mineral Resources Development 11 , Hearings Before the 
Committee on I nterior and Insular Affairs,u.s.senate 
8lst Congress, on S2105, ch.5. 
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WE PRODUCE 
OURSELVES 
n~NGANESE 
I 
NIC KEL 
1\.SBESTOS 
I 
I 
I 
CHROMITE 
TIN 
I NDUSTRI AL 
D"IAllfONDS 
CHART IIB 
SOURCES OF SELECTED STRATEGIC ~~TERIALS 
V! E I MPORT FROM 
~-_::..:.---· --
AFRICA I NDIA T:JSSR 
·CANADA 
CUBA E UR. 
A.FRICA 
- -U!-:SR AFRICA 
W. HEM. OTHER 
S . E. ASIA 
AFRICA 
y 
THE THINGS WE USE 
Ref ri g-
era tors 
~utos 
r- RR 
Radios Equip 
born. 
Items 
source.: " ~. ineral Resources Development" .Hearings Before the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S . Senate , 8lst 
Congre ss, on 82105, ch .7. 
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CHART ill 
OUR DECLINING MINERAL SELF-SUfFICIENCY 
NET E'XPORTSO NET IMPOR.TSO_ 
TIIOU~. --5J". 
•s-ooJ COPPER 
1aoo 
,00 
(i()Q 
fg~o·6~.~,o---.~~~s--~'~2~o--~·a~b~'~3~o--,~J~~~~.4~o--~.45~~~o 
l"MOUt, ----------------------------------------------------~~~--~ s~ ' 
BSo 
700 
sso 
400 
2.SIJ 
17S" 
ZINC APPARE .. l" COt'S . 
1906 'to 'IS' '20 '2S '30 '3S' '40 '45' 'SO 
SOUitCE MINI!RAL. RESOURCES oeva.tSPHENi HcARINiiS 
8E~R.E. THE. COMII'IJTTE£ Ort INTE.RIOR. ,i..!'A!) INS'ULAR. 
Aff,.AIRS I u.s. Sfl'IAiE. I 81 rr COCIIGRE rr, QH S2IOS', P'J. 32., 
"J nOUS . 
s.r. 
q60 
Boo 
~00 
4oo 
Joo 
LEAD 
Ia~ ,;~o~·,--~.,~o--~.~~&~---.2~·o--~'2-·~o--~'1-o~~.~3~s--~.40~·--~~~·s~-.~5b 
Hu •. 
IlLS . 
PETROLEUM 
zroo 
15'00 
Soo1~ 
j,:o~,~.~,o~~ .•~5~~.~2~a--~·~~s=-~'~l~O~'~J~s--~-~-~~--~--~-~-J_ 
1--' 
Vl 
~ 
OIL 
N TUP..AL 
GAS 
COAL 
P OTASH 
BAU'A: ITE 
COP PER 
CHA RT IV 
ADDED SUPPLY T HROU GH CONSERVATION 
( EXTRACTION vs WAS TE )* 
rE TAKE 
I r • I I 
I I I 
I I 
I 
. . I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I I I 
J 
I . 
I I I 
JOO 15 so 25 
-
0 
Y. 
VE LEAVE I N THE GROUND 
I I 
I -
I 
I• 
I I I I 
I I I 
I I 
I I 
I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I 
so 7S 
*EST. AVERAGES F OR 
ENTIRE I NDUSTRY 
Source: " Mi n e ral Re sources Deve lopment " , Hearing s Be f or e t he 
Committe e on I n t erio r an d I n s ular Af fairs, U. S . Sena te 
8 lst Congre s s,on S2105 , p . 3 3 · · 
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CHART V 
MILIT ARY PROCURE1ffiNT REnU IREMENTS 
rJE'fl 
TRAI NEES 
TO F ILL 
WARTD!IE STOC -
LEVELS & P I P -
L I ,J~S FOR 
PEACET H,;TE --
FORCE ND 
RESERVES 
I NITIAL EQUI 
FOR RESERVE - ~ ,. 
F ORCES 
PEACET D.-TE 
F ORCE 
M Da.y 
I 
I 
I NDUSTRY I \'liTHO T A 
STOCKPI LE 
I I NDUSTRY 
WITH 
I ~I I 
I I I STOCKPILE 
~ 
TRirNI NG EbT ABLISHMENT I I FOR RE~ACEiviENT 
I 
REPLACEME~l FOR STOCK-
LEVELS ANq P IPELI NES 
I NCREMENT! TO REPLA.CEMEJr 
CONSUMr ION FOR WAR 
1 
I 
AND 
I 
I 
Note : l. Cha rt s h ows t he oretica l trends sin ce b oth time a nd 
quan titive da ta are cl a ssi f ied military i nf ormat ion. 
2. No civilian r equiremen ts are includ ed. 
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Source: 
/.a~ 
;;.:.·:.-·'?' 
~}.fot ·"'~cl--~-... 
Munitions Board; 
23 January 1950, 
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PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PARTIOPATING IN STOCKPILING 
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CONFIDENTIAL ChA-rt VII 1c:;R 
BASIC DATA FOR DETERMINI 
PRODUCING COUNTRY 
UNITED STATES PRODUCT I ON 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
-
PRODUCT I ON 
I US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT! ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON I US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
1 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCTION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCTION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
I US IMPORTS PRODUCT ION ~- US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCTION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCTION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT I ON 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCTION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
PRODUCT ION 
US IMPORTS 
TOTAL WORLD PRODUCT ION 
TOTAL U. s. PRODUCT JON 
TOTAL U. s. IMPORTS 
TOTAL U. s·. PRODUCT I ON AND IMPORTS 
MB FORM NO. 23 SHEET 1 OF 2 SHEETS 
1 OCT 49 
NG STOCKPILE OBJECTIVES 
. 
PRODUCTION AND U. 
' 
!- -
SECTION I - SUPPLY DATA (NO ST 
S. IMPORTS 
' 
' 
I 
I 
I 
-, 
I 
I 
! 
- -----"· 
I 
-I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
"THIS DOCUMENT C( 
SECTIONS 793 ANi 
MATER I A L TYPE, GRADE OR FORM UN IT OF MEASURE 
. 
RATEGIC DISCOUNTS APPLIED) 
ESTIMATED PROBABLE PRODUCTION AND U.S. IMPORTS DURING EMERGENCY 
I ST YEAR 2ND YEAR 3 RO YEAR ~TH YEAR 5TH YEAR 5-YEAR TOTAL 
-
' 
INTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF TiE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., 
1 79~. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PER>OH IS PROHIBITED BY LAW." CONFIDENTIAL 
CONFIDENTIAL Chart VII _( ccmt+ ) 1 '39 
•· BASIC DATA FOR DETERMININ 
. 
i 
FJELD OF USE OF END PRODUCTS ! 
' 
. I 
I 
TOTAL I 
NAME DE PA l 
MB FORM NO. 23 SHEET 2 OF 2 SHEETS 
· 1 OCT 119 u.s. 
..__ 
G STOCKPILE OBJECTIVES (Continued) 
SECTION I I - DEMAND DATA 
CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS 
COMMITTEE APPROVAL DATE 
HMENT NAME 
\ 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 0 - 873700 
"THIS DOCUMENT CC 
SECTIONS 793 AND 
MATER I A L TYPE, GRADE OR FORM UNIT OF MEASURE 
. 
ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS DURING EMERGENCY 
I ST YEAR 2ND YEAR 3RD YEAR ~TH YEAR 5TH YEAR 5-YEAR TOTAL 
. 
' 
. 
' -· 
- - -· -· 
,~, 
ESTIMATED PROCESSING CAPACITY 
DEPARTMENT I ST YEAR 2ND YEAR 3RD YEAR HH YEAR 5TH YEAR 
REMARKS 
HAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U. S.C., 
79~. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW." CONFIDENTIAL 
CHART VIII 
ESTD.ili\TED COST OF TOTAL OBJECTIVES 
AND PROPORTION AVA ILABLE OR FINANCED 
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1949 
PERCENT OF TOTAL COST 
100 
80 
60 -
40 
20 
0 
NOT FINAN CED-
~1, 7l~5 N!ILLION 
PROGRAiv1MED 
FOR DELIVERY 
!\FTER FY'50-
$473 MILLION 
PROGR..\I\IITviED:·- :.·" · : 
FOR DELIVERY :• -. 
I N FY I 50- -~ 
':1 406 MILLI QN ... , 
. . . . . ---····--····-~-
IN INVENTORY 
31 DEC . I 49-
-·~ 1, 149 MILLION 
TOTAL . COST ~3, 773 MILLION 
--1 
-
~ 
PL 520 
SURPLUS 
ECA 
PL . 520 
SURPLUS 
ECA 
PL 520 
SURPLUS 
ECA 
PL 117 
4461 MILLION 
. 6 
6 
? iP 362 
25 
19 
$606 
452 
31 
60 
n 
" 
MILLION 
II 
n 
MILLION 
n 
" It 
Source: Munitions Board; "Stockpi le Report To The Congress", 
23 January 1950,p.43. 
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CHART IX 
CUMULATIVE STATUS OF 
P L 520 OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY 
AVAILABLE I N FISCAL YEAR 1950 
400 ~----------------------------------------------------~ 
200 ~-------------------.F=~--1 ·--
0 
200 
400 -- :_ 
I ~j-:. 
600 '--
~Boo 31 
J UL 
-
• 
.. · - ,- .• -
J CASH APPROPRIATIONS t 
. · 
... r . 
~- ... 
' :· ·. ·, - .::: ·-.· . 
31 
AU G 
30 
SEP 
31 
OCT 
I . ·· .. , 
30 
NOV 
t 
OBLI (h TED 
-
'· DURI NG ~· If n ~~ tJ·· :~ F . Y. 1950 
~k-_t;.;· 
. ._.: ~~~~~ 
. l~t BALANCE 
;-:·: :, < VAILABLE 
... ( :':': 
FOR 
. ·-. -·. 
-
, .. -:. - OBL I G TION -
t 
31 
DEC ( 1949 ) 
Source: Munitions Board:"Stockpi1e Report To The Congress" , 
23 January 1950,p. 45. 
CHART X 
CHANNELS OF REVI~N OF STOCK PILE POLICY 
THE PRESIDENT 
I 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
RESOURCES BOARD 
I 
MUNITIONS BOARD 
I 
MUNITIONS BOARD INTER-
. DEPT. S'rOCKPILING COM • 
I 
I I I I 
INDUSTRY INTER AGENC' I NTERDEPr . INTERDEPT . 
ADVISORY COMMI TTEES MATERIALS STOCKPILE 
COMMITTEES REQUIRE].IIENT.- ~ STOR.I\GE 
CO]JThUTTEE COMMITTEE 
I I I I 
I 
DEPARTMENTS 
CHART XI 
THE NAT IONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD 
ITS POSITION I N THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 
AS ESTABLISHED BY THE NATIONAL 
THE 
NATIONAL 
SE CURITY 
COUNCIL 
SECURITY ACT OF 1947* 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
r-----'--1 ~i ______ .,4. _ _ ,,-· .. ,_ __ __ -----~--; -----L-.1_ 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
1 - RESOURCES 
BOARD 
2 
--
CHAIRMAN 
SECRETARY OF 
STATE 
TREi\SURY 
DEFENSE 
INTERIOR 
AGRICULTURE 
CO!\.TMERCE 
LABOR 
I 
THE 
NATIONAL 
~3 MILITARY 
ESTABLISH-
MENT 
SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE 
VfAR 
COUN-
CIL 
MUNI'· 
TION:: 
BD. 
J.C.S. R&D 
BD . 
THE SECTY SECTY 
STAFF · OF OF 
OF THE ARMY NAVY 
BOARD 
I 
OTHER 
DEPARTME~"'TS 
AND 
I N DEPENDANT 
AGENCIES 
SECTY 
OF 
AIR 
FORCE 
*Note~ on next page. NSRB- 12 Feb. 1 48 
CHART XI (cont.) 
NOTES 
1. Coordination and liaison. 
2. Membership.~ 
3 . Coordination, liaison and military require-ments:. 
4 . (a) n In performing _its functions, the Board shall 
utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and 
resources of the departments and agencies of the 
Government." ( Se ction 103d National Security 
Act, 1947.) 
(b ) n Pursuant to the requests by the Board, all Fed-
eral departments and agencies shall furnish the 
Board such information, reports, statistics and 
other data or documents in their possession or 
under their· control or obtainable by them, all 
in performance of their normal and lawful ftmc -
tions , and make for the Beard such studies, in-
vestigations and reports as are, in the judgement 
of the Board~ necessary or desirable to fullfill 
the duties and accomplish the ·functions and pur-
poses of the Board as prescribed by the National 
Security Act of 1947.~1 ( Parae;raph 3, Executive 
Order 9905, 13 November 1947.} 
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CHART XII 
MUNITIONS BOARD INT ERDEPART11fENTAL' 
S TOCKPI LE COMMITTEE 
BUREAU OF 
BUDGET 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
( 
\ 
\ 
MILITARY 
DEPARTMENTS 
Observer status ) 
I 
CHA I RMAN & SECRETARY 
I 
I 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
RESOURCES 
BOARD 
I 
I 
I 
I 
( From Munitions Board ) 
~------ -------
DEPT 
OF 
STATE 
DEPT 
OF 
AGRIC UL . 
MUI'HT IONS BOARD 
I NTER DEPARTMENTAL 
STOCKP I LE COMMITTEE 
( Iv. embership ) 
DEPT 
OF 
I NTERIOR 
DEPT 
OF 
COMMERCE 
I'\ E .C . A. 
GEl\TERAL 
SE..RVICES 
ADMI N. 
APPENDIX "An 
DEFINI TIONS AS USED I N THIS REPORT 
CIVILIF~ ITEMS: Finished goods used by both the armed forces 
and by the civilian population or by civilians only. 
COUNTERPART FUNDS: Depos.._ts of local currencies by European 
countries.in special accounts in amounts commensurate with 
dollar grant aid furnished by ECA. Deposits of counterpart 
fund s a r e also made by recipient countries to match the 
amounts of drawing rights extended to them by other nation s 
under the intra-European payments plan. 
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE: Organized by the National 
Defense· Act of 1947. Consists of the Army and Air Force 
(formerly the War Department) and the Nmry. Some times 
referred to as the Military Establishment . 
FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE: New name for Bureau of Federal Supply. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADl:IINISTRATION: Agency created by the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. 
Composed of several previous government agencies among which 
is the Bureau of Federal Supply formerly with the Treasury 
Department. 
MATERIEL: Munitions and equipment used by the armed forces. 
M-DAY: The day on which mobilization begins. 
MILITARY REQUI REMENTS: Materiel needed by the armed forces 
which is neither on hand nor on order . 
MILITARY ITEMS: Finished goods used only by the armed forces. 
MUNITI ONS BOARD: Called the Army-Navy Munitions Board until 
reestablished as the uMuniti ons Board" by the National Defense 
Act of 1947. .Membership consists of the Under Sec i•etaries 
of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
STOCK PILING: Storage of materials for future use (used as 
two words in this report as it is in PUblic Law 520. More 
recent publications have combined the words into " stockpiling" 
The meaning s are identical.) 
Stock 
Piling 
Act 
1946 
NSRB 
not 
in 
exist-
ence 
at 
this 
time. 
APPENDIX B 
STOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD 
National Security 
Act, 1947 
Sec. 103(c) to advise the 
Pres ident concerning the 
coordina tion of mil itary, 
industrial, and civilian 
mobiliz a tion , i ncluding--
9(2) programs for the ef-
fective use in time of 
war of the Nation's natu-
ral and industrial re-
sources for military and 
civilian ne eds, for the 
maintenanc e and stabili-
za t ion of the civilian 
economy in time of war 
and for the adjustment of 
such economy to war needs 
and conditions . 
( 5) policies for estab-
lishing adequate reserves 
of strategic &~d critical 
mate rials, and for the 
conserva tio n of t h es e 
reserve s . 
Report Approved by President 
5 January 1949 
1 . Assure the adequacy of existing policies and 
programs for a successful stock piling effort. 
2. Advise the President on the s tock piling goals 
and programs and on ~her major proposals relating 
to stock pi ling. 
3. Assure the necessary coordination of planning 
for stock piling in rela t ion to the planning of 
other security resources measures. 
4 . Obtain the coordinated and consistent gather-
ing and appraisal of factual data related to war-
time supply and requirements for an effective and 
consistent approach to stock piling and other 
security r esources readiness measures. 
5. Obtain the initiative of the agencies, as nec-
es sary, for the formulation and coordination by them 
of new policies or modifications of existing poli-
cies for a successful s tock piling effort . 
6 . Obtain the initiative of the Munitions Board and 
the agencies, as necessary, for more effective per-
formance of stock piling respon s ibilities. 
7. Mai nta in a suff ic ien t contact with the executive 
Branch stock piling activities to be ab l e to fulfill 
the fore going staff responsibilities t o the President . f-1 
0\ 
-.J 
Stock Piling 
Act, 1946 
Sec. 2(a)l 
Coordinator 
between De-
partments of 
Army, Navy 
and Interior 
in . the deter-
mination of 
which mate-
rials are 
strategic and 
critical, and 
the determina-
tion of the 
quality and 
quantity of 
such materials 
to be stock 
piled. 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
STOCK PILING FTJ1JCTIONS 
1v1UNI TIONS BOARD 
National Security Act 
1947 
Sec. 213(c) It shall be 
the duty of the Board un-
der the direction of the 
Secretary of Defense and 
in support of strategic 
and logistic plans pre-
pared by the Joint Chiefs 
of Sta;ff--
(8) to maintain liaison 
with the other depart-
ments and agencies for 
the proper correlation of 
military requirements 
with the Civilian economy, 
particularly in regard to 
the procurement or dispo-
sition of strategic and 
critical materials and 
the maintenance of ade-
quate reserves of such 
materials, and to make 
r ecommendations as to 
policies tn connection 
tberewi th. 
Report Approved by President 
5 January 1949 
1. Serve as the central staff agency re-
sponsible for the effective formulation and 
coordination of stock piling policies and 
programs and for obtaining the coordinated 
participation and judgment of the agencies 
in the exercise of this responsibility. 
2. Serve as a central staff agent i n fol-
lowing up on program execution by the agencies. 
3. Stimulate corrective action or appropriate 
adjustments by the agencies, individually or 
collectively, where serious breakdowns or gaps 
occur in program execution. 
·4. P.romote conformance in Executive Branch 
stock piling activities with the policies de-
veloped for a coordinated national security 
resources planning~ 
5. Bring to the National Security Resources 
Board for adjustment or Presidential determina-
t ion, major stock piling problems which cannot 
be resolved by the agencies or warrant presi-
dential decision. 
6. Represent the interests and needs of the 
National Military Establishment in the formula-
tion of recommended stock piling policies, 
goals and progrruns . 
I-' 
0\ 
(X) 
APPENDIX B (Con t inued) 
. 
STOCK PILING FUNC 'l"'IONS 
SECRETARY OF WAR 
---
SECRliTARY OF NAVY 
Stoc~ Piling Act , 1946 
Sec. 2(a)l. Secretaries of War , Navy and Interior acting jointly 
through the Army and Navy Munitions Board are authorized and 
directed to : 
a . determine from time to time 
1. which materials are strategic and critical; 
2 . the quality and quantity of such material to 
be stock piled . 
b . To the fullest ex tent practicable the Secretaries of War, 
Ns.vy, and Interior acting jointly will appoint industry 
advisory committees selected from industries connected 
with the materials to be stock piled . 
1. The functions of these committees shall be to 
advise , ·with the Secretaries of War, Navy, and 
Interior and with any agencies through which 
they may exercise any of their func tions under 
the Act with respect to the purchase, sale, care 
and handling of materials . 
Sec. 3. The Secretaries of War, Navy and Interior sllall direct the 
Secretary of the Treasury through the medium of the Procurement 
Division of the Treasury to: · 
a . make purchases of the materials in the amounts and quali-
ties determined under Section 2(a)l 2.bove . 
National 
Defense 
Act 
1947 
Not 
men-
tioned 
Report 
Approved 
by 
.!:'resident 
5 January 
1949 
Not 
mentioned 
f-J 
0'. 
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APPENDIX B (Con t inued) 
SECRE~ARY OF WAR 
SECRETARY OF NAVY 
(Continued) 
b . provide for storage, security and maintenance on military 
or naval reservations approved by the Secretaries of War 
and Navy. 
c. provide through normal cha~Dels for refining or processing 
of materials acquired or transferred when the Secretaries 
of War and Navy deem necessary, to convert to form best for 
the stock pile. 
d. provide for rotation of any materials where necessary to 
prevent deterioration by replacement with equivalent quanti-
ties of substantially the same material, with the approval 
of the Secretaries of War and Navy. 
e. make disposition of any material no longer needed because 
of revised requirements. 
Sec . 4. The secretaries of War and Navy shall submit a report of pro-
gress every sioc months to Congress. · 
Sec. 8. Secretaries of War and Navy shall jointly direct the expendi-
tures of any monies appr•opria ted for• stock piling. 
1-' 
-.J 
0 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
STOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
DEPARTIVIENT OF INlliRIOR 
Stock Piling Act, 1946 
Sec. 2( a) Together with the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of Navy prepares lists of 
strategic and cri t ica l mate rials and estimates 
of stock pile requirements. (b) Together with 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy 
establishes Indu s tl•ie.l Advisory Cornmi ttees a 
Sec. 3. Toge t her the Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of Navy divect the procurement of 
the stock p:tle by the Treasury Depar t ment. 
Sec. 7 ( a) Thr·ough the Director, Bureau of 
Mines and DirectOl', Geologic Survey is author-
ized and directed: 
1. to make scientific , technological 
and economic investigations as to the 
extent and mode of occurrence, develop-
ment, mining preparation, treatment and 
utilization of ore and other mineral 
substances in the United States or ter-
ritories which are essen t ial to com.rnon 
defense ox• indus trial needs, and grades· 
and quantitie s ar e inadequate known 
sources. 
2. From known sources t o: 
a . develop. and determine new 
sources. 
b. devise new methods for 
Report Approved by President 
5 J~nUal"Y 1949 
1. Foster, as necessary, minera l explora-
tions i n the United States and United Stat~ 
territories to open up new sources of sup-
ply for the stock pile. 
2. Devise new methods of treatment and use 
of .low-grade ores for the stock pile. 
3. Develop satisfactory substitutes for 
stock pile mineral s . 
4. Provide information on the availabili-
ties of minerals for the stock pile. 
5. Provide technical advice and assistance 
as nece s sary, to agencies such as the State 
Department and ECA in activities such as 
identifying or opening up of new overseas 
sources of minerals for the stock pile. 
6. Develop and advocate policies for the 
increase , as necessary, of mineral supplies. 
7. Participate in inter-agency considera-
tions of stock piling matters with respect 
to United States policies and objectives 
re garding its mineral resources . 
8. Periodically assess t he capabilities 
I-' 
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APPE}IDIX B (Continued ) 
S'.IOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
DEPAR'llVIEN T OF I NTERIOR 
(Continued) 
treatment and utilization of lower 
grade reserves . 
c . to develop substitutes. 
3. On public owned land., on privately 
owned l and vvi t h the consent of the owner 
to make te sts including core drilling, 
trenching test, pitt ing etc. to deter-
m:J.ne : 
a . ex tent and quantity of deposi ts . 
b. the most su i tab le method of 
mining . 
c. co s t of produc t ion. 
of Interior Department t o contribute to 
stock pi ling and par t icipate in pe riodic 
inter-agency agreements on a total s tock 
piling program with respect to I nterior 
Depar~1ent' s contribution thereto . 
I-' 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
S'IOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE , GENERAL SERVICES ADMINIS'rRATION 
(Formerly with th e Depar tment of Treasury01 
Stock Piling Act, 1946 
Sec.2(a)2 Shall a ssi s t in the de termination of 
requirements by the designation of representatives 
to cooper ate with the Departments of War, Navy, 
and I nterior. 
Sec . 3 Shall t hrough the medium of the Procurement 
Divi'sion of t he Treasury: 
a. make pur chases of strategic and cr•i tical 
materials. 
1. from exc e sses to current industrial 
demands·. 
2. within a reasonable time (not to 
exceed one year) allowed for production 
and de livery, from domestic sources, 
where the ma terial is possessed by the 
U. s. and not commercially developed, 
bu t is considered economically feasible 
by the Secretar i es of War, Navy, and 
Interior. Purchases will be made with-
out requiring a vendor's bond. 
b. provide for s t orage, security, and mainte-
nance on military and naval reserva~ions or 
other locations as approved by the Secretaries 
of War and Navy. 
c. provide through normal channels for r efin-
ing or proce s sing of ma t erial acquired or 
Report Approved by Presiden t 
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1. Develop and advocate proposed 
procurement policies for strength-
ening or f acilitating stock pile 
procurement. 
2. Participate with other agencies 
through the Muni tions Board, in the 
formulation of pr·ocuremen t pro-
grams. 
3. Procure for t he s tock pile. 
4. Work with the agencies to 
obtain specific ac tions by them 
which open up new supply sources 
or increase existing supplies. 
5. Iviain t a i n custody of and admini-
ster acqui s i t i ons t o and r ota tion 
of the stock pile . 
f-J 
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APPENDIX B ( Continued ) 
SWCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICES, GENERAL SERVICES ADiViiNI STRATIO N 
(Formerly with the Depar tment of Trea sury) 
(Continued ) 
transferred, when 
deem necessary to 
for stock piling . 
or after transfer 
the Secretaries of War and Navy 
convert to form best suitable 
This may be done either before 
from owing agency. 
d. provide for rotat i on of any material where 
necessary to prevent deterioration, by repl acement 
with equivalen t quan t ities of substantially the 
same mater i al , with t he approval of the Secl~etari es 
of War and Navy . 
e~ Dispose of any material no longe r needed be-
caus e of revi sed requirements. 
1. Disposition will not be made unti l six 
months af te r publication of the sale in the 
Federal Register. 
2. and transmission to the Military Affairs 
Commi ttee of each House not i ce of such dis-
pos ition and 
a. the reasons for r evised requirements, 
b. the amounts to be disposed, 
c . the plan of disposi t ion , 
d. the date on whi ch the material will 
become available for sale . 
3. The da t e set mu st be fixed with regard to 
the protection of the u.s. against lo sses on 
t he sale and the pr o tee t ion of the consumers , 
producers , and processors aga inst avo idable 
disruption of the ma r ket . 
f-' 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
STOCK PILI NG FUNCTIONS 
FEDERAL SUPP LY SERVIC ES , GENERAL SERVICES ADIVIINI STRii.TI ON 
(Forme r•ly with the Department of Treasury) 
(Continued) 
4 . Congressional approval must b e obtained for 
r elease except in the case of obsolescence is 
construed to mean : 
a. deterioration. 
b. development of a new or better material . 
c. no further usefulness i n time of war . 
1--' 
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Stock Piling Act 1946 
Sec. 2{a) Shall assist 
in the determination of 
requirements by the des-
ignation of a repre-
sentative to cooperate 
with War, Navy and 
Interior. 
Sec. 7(b) Autho r ized 
and directed to make 
scientific, technologi-
cal and economic investi-
gations of the f eas i-
bility of development 
of domestic sources of 
any agricultural rna te-
rial or commodity pur-
suant to Sec. 2 deter-
mined to be stra tegic 
or critical. 
APPENDIX B (Cont inued) 
S'IDCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
DEPARTMEWE OF AGRICUL'IURE 
Report Approved by President , 5 January 1949 
1. Foster, as necess ary, agricultural development in the Uni ted 
States and Un~ted States territorie s to open up new sources of 
supply for the stock pile. 
2. Devi se new me t hods to increase agricul tural production for 
the stock pile . 
3. Develop satisfactory substitu te s for stock pile agricultural 
items. 
4. Provide informat ion on the availabilities of agricultural 
products for the stock pile. 
5. Provide technical advice and assistance, as necessary, to 
agencies such as State Depart~! ent and EGA in activities such a s 
the identifying or opening up of new overseas sources of agri-
cultural products for the stock pi le. 
6. Develop and advocate policies f or the increase , as necessary, 
of agricultural supplies . 
7. Participate in the inter agency consideration of stock piling 
matte r s with respect to United States policies and objectives 
regarding its agricultural resource s. 
8 . Periodically assess the capabilities of Agriculture Depart-
ment to contribute to s t ock piling and participate in periodic 
interagency agreements on a total stock piling program with re-
spec t to Agriculture Department ' s contribu t ion thereto . 
1--' 
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Stock Piling 
Ac t, 1946 
Sec . 2(a)2 Assist 
Secretaries of 
War, Navy and 
In terior in prep-
aration of list 
of strategic and 
critical mate-
rials and in the 
preparation of 
estimates of 
requirements, by 
the designation 
of representa-
tives to cooper-
ate with them. 
APPENDIX B (Con t inued) 
STOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
DEPAR'll1~EN T OF COMMERCE 
Report Approved by President 5 January 1949 
1. Provide information as to cu1~rent and anticipated demand in relEt-
t ion to availabilities, exports, imports, and allo ca tions with respect 
to stock pile items. 
2 . Provide information as to supply and production capabilities with 
!'espect to finished or semi-fin ished items in the stock pile. 
3 . Adm ini ster export controls, voluntary agreements and other economic 
controls i~ the interes t of the stock pile. 
4. Par tic ipate in interagency consider at ions o f stock piling measures 
with respect to their effect on United States objec t ives and inter ests 
for its foreign and domestic industry. 
5. Develop and advoca te in the fields of foreign trade and domestic 
co1nmerce and industry such policie s as are feasible i n the i nte rest of 
the stock pile . 
6 . Participa t e in determination or actions by other agencies which 
s ignificantly affect the foreign trade position of the United States. 
7 . Periodically assess the capabilities of the Co1nmerce Department 
to contribute to stock piling and participate in periodic i nteragency 
agre emen ts on a total stock piling program with respect to Commerce 
Dep artment 's contribution thereto . 
~ 
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Stock Piling 
Act, 1946 
Sec. 2(a)2 Secre-
tary of Sta te shall 
assi s t i n the de-
termination of 
requiremen ts by 
the designation of 
repre sentatives to 
cooperate with 
Depa rtmen ts of 
Wa1~, Navy and 
I nterior. 
APPENDIX B (Con t i nued ) 
STOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
DEP AR 'J:'MENT OF STATE 
Repor t Approved by President, 5 January 1949 
1. Assure consistency wi th basic foreign policy objectives in any over 
s eas policy or program measures in the interest of stock piling. 
2. Facilitate this coordination by participating i n t he Executive 
Committee on Economic Foreign Policy. 
3. Participate in interagency considerations of stock piling measures 
to assure a sound and consistent foreign policy and to propose or 
facilita te such adjustments in foreign policy as are feasible in the 
interest of stock piling. 
4 . Negotia t e, as ne cessa ry, with foreign countries, for modifications 
in their policies which impede or limit the export therefrom of stock 
pi le i terns. 
5. Cooperate with EGA in EGA ne go t iations with foreign countries in 
t he interest of the stock pile. 
6 . Provide, through the mineral attaches in foreign posts , informat i on 
on overseas availabilities for the s tock pile . 
7. Periodically assess t he capabilities of the Sta te Department to 
contribute t o stock piling and participate i n the periodic interagency 
agreements on a tota l stock piling program with respec t to State 
Department~ contribution thereto . 
I-' 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
STOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
ECONOMIC COOPERATI ON ADMINISTRATION 
Repo1•t Approved by President, 5 Jmmary 1949 
1 . Nego tiate with countries participating in the 
Eur opean Recovery Program fo1• new or increased suppl i es 
for the stock p i le as considerati on for United States 
assistance . 
2. Make ECA loans for specific projects which wi l l 
open up or expand supply sources for the stock pile . 
3 . Provide , through its overseas staff, information 
on ove rseas availabilities for the stock pile . 
4 . Assist , as necessary, t hrough i ts overseas staff , 
i n overseas arrangements for stock piling procurement . 
5 . Promote the use of foreign currency proceeds in 
reimbursements for stock piling ~rocurement. 
6 . Develop and advocate, as necessary, policies in 
the area of Europee.n recovery which will contribute 
to stock piling activities . 
7 . Periodically assess the capabilities of ECA to 
contribute to stock pil i ng and participate in periodic 
interagency agreements on total stock piling program 
with respect to ECA 1 s contributi on t hereto . 
E.C . A. Stock Pi le Objectives 
1 . Tb promote an increase in 
the production of materials 
thr•ough explo ra tion and 
deve l opment ; 
2 . To further the transfer 
of materials to the United 
States by purchase or other-
wise; 
3 . To obtain for t he United 
States schedules of future 
availab i lities and increase 
production as well as equal 
rights of access to the 
development of such materials. 
1-' 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
STOCK PILING FUNCTIONS 
MUNI TIONS BOARD INTERDEPARTMEN TAL STOCKPILE COMIVII TTEE 
To advise the Munitions Board in regard to : 
1 . The determinat i on of stock piling goals, including the determination of kinds , 
quant i t i es and qualities of strategic materi als to be accumulated and held i n 
reserve to meet critical wartime needs and the analysis of an t icipated wartime 
requirements and availabilities, the use of subs ti tu tes , and possible measu:r•es 
for t~e expans i on of wartime supplies . 
2 e The determination of stock pile procurement polic ies and pro grams , including 
purcha se and storage policies, procurement scheduling, balance between contracts 
for current deliveries and contracts for future deliveries , and the sound applica-
tion of rotation policies . 
3 . The determination of supporti ng pol i cies and programs , inc luding planning 
of all measures available to Government to facilitate acquisition for the stock 
pile . 
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